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ABSTRACT
Findler, Michael James. Ph.D. Department of Biomedical, Industrial, and Human Factors
Engineering, Wright State University, 2011. Cognitively Sensitive User Interface for
Command and Control Applications.

In many complex systems, such as nuclear power plants, etc., human decision
makers are required to make critical decisions in a time-pressured environment.
Typically, most of these applications are dynamic and uncertain and require humans
making supervisory control decisions through monitoring, re-planning, troubleshooting,
and control. Due to the critical nature of decision making, human operators are
responsible for the safe and efficient operation of these applications. Delays and failures
in making decisions, in these applications, are often expensive in terms of money, system
performance, and may even cost human lives. In a system where human supervisors
control computerized processes, the human must work seamlessly with the computerized
system in achieving overall system objectives. Research on human-centered automation
in aviation, satellite ground control, and nuclear power plant control has resulted in broad
guidelines on system design involving human and computerized processes in supervisory
control. However, problems remain, such as increased human error, lack of situational
awareness, and opacity from poorly automated systems, particularly in scenarios where
human operators must make decisions in time-pressured planning.
A key aspect of overcoming these problems is to effectively couple human
decision makers with the computerized systems through user interface design. Context-
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free research, i.e., research on 'best' menu structure or set of colors for display screens, is
not typically useful in enhancing operator or system performance in which operators are
well motivated. Research on interface design for complex systems for example,
demonstrates that semantic issues such as display content, level of abstraction, visual
momentum across windows, etc., quickly dominate the effects of the primarily syntactic
aspects of the human-computer interface, e.g., color, selection style, etc.
While there are broad guidelines for display or user interface design, creating
effective human-computer interfaces for complex, dynamic systems control is
challenging.

Ad hoc approaches which consider the human as an afterthought are

limiting. This research proposes a systematic approach to human / computer interface
design that focuses on both the semantic and syntactic aspects of display design in the
context of human-in-the-loop supervisory control of intelligent, autonomous multi-agent
simulated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A systematic way to understand what needs
to be displayed, how it should be displayed, and how the integrated system needs to be
assessed is outlined through a combination of concepts from naturalistic decision making,
semiotic analysis, and situational awareness literature. A new sprocket-based design was
designed and evaluated in this research.
For the practical designer, this research developed a systematic, iterative design
process: design using cognitive sensitive principles, test the new interface in a laboratory
situation; bring in subject matter experts to examine the interface in isolation; and finally,
incorporate the resulting feedback into a full-size simulation. At each one of these steps,
the operator, the engineer and the designer reexamined the results. The goal is to present
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to the operator a more complete feel for the complex system, and one that can evolve
with the operator’s experience. Individual user interface components were empirically
examined before acceptance into the integrated global design.
Two laboratory-based controlled experiments were designed and executed: a
static decision-aiding display showing relative merits for alternate mission routes and a
dynamic system monitoring display showing each UAVs health status. Following the
success of the first two experiments, the results were presented to domain subject matter
experts, at which time further refinements were suggested. Finally, this was followed up
by a hands-on demonstration of the displays embedded within a simulator testbed.
This research provided useful insights into human decision making in complex
systems. It examined multiple user interfaces: tabular text-based, graphical bar charts,
analog gauges and Visual Thinking widgets.

Results are promising.

The Visual

Thinking Sprocket display was significantly better as a decision aid and as a system
monitoring display. Responses were faster and more accurate using the Visual Thinking
Sprocket. This research presents a practical framework that can be systematically applied
to the designing and producing of cognitively sensitive displays in complex, dynamic
systems control.
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1 Introduction
Although many attempts have been made to create a practical framework for the
design of user interfaces, there has not been a definitive, easy to follow set of steps in
design. Rather, the designer is told to understand the key concepts and then figure out
how to translate that into a display.
Designing effective human-system interaction is critical when there are increases
in automation and computerization in complex systems. The user is separated from the
entity and can feel disassociated from the fate of the automated system. The increased
automation can lead to a loss of situational awareness, because the operator may not feel
entirely immersed.
Purely technology-centered approaches that consider the human as an
afterthought may lead to user/system mismatches resulting in lack of acceptance, or
worse – fatalities. There is an abundance of examples for this, such as the Three Mile
Island meltdown attributed to pertinent information being buried down 8 menu levels;
NASA landing system requirements calculated in meters while all other systems were in
foot-pound measurements; and the engineering designs that never caught on because they
were built for the engineer rather than the user, such as Reverse Polish Notation
calculators. Clearly, design impacts usage. Technological advances must be integrated
with human capabilities in the context of the application. This is one of the major tenets
of Klein’s (1993) Naturalistic Decision Making.
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Our research framework is discussed in-depth in Chapter 4 and follows the
McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999) recommended research framework. It is an iterative
approach that allows for an analysis of a wide range of complex systems research to
proceed in a reasonably straightforward way.
This research’s goal is to create a framework for display designers to
systematically create cognitively sensitive displays – defined as a system in which the
human operator can recognize a solution pattern without tremendous mental gymnastics,
i.e., a high mental workload. Furthermore, this research presents one possible set of tools
and a recommended ordering for applying those tools.

The design toolkit includes

Naturalistic Decision Making, Semiotic Analysis, Operator Function Model and Situation
Awareness tools. With this toolkit, the designer should be able to consistently create
displays of high quality and usefulness.

WHAT
information
needs to be
presented?

ASSESS
the display
design success

HOW
is the
information to
be presented?
Figure 1.1 Iterative process to designing a display
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The process for designing a display should be a simple iterative process that asks
“What information needs to be presented?”; How should that information be present to
the user?”; and “How does one evaluate the goodness of the design?” (Figure 1.3). Each
time through the iteration allows a more complete tuning of the display into the final
desired product. Chapter 2 will expand the discussion of this iterative process and where
the tools in the toolkit can be applied. The toolkit has the flexibility of modular tools that
can be changed to fit the problem and designer’s knowledge.

For example, if the

designer is more comfortable with another methodology for eliciting information form
stakeholders, then he can substitute that tool for the NDM toolkit.

1.1 Research Model
To perform any research in the Human Computer Interface (HCI) domain, the
researcher must ask three very important questions. The first two questions are about the
“what” and “how” of the information to present when designing the visual user interface,
while the third question is interested in deciding the effectiveness or “goodness” of the
HCI design. Another way of looking at the display design is the semantics (meaning) and
syntax (form) of the message being sent by the UAVs to the operator/supervisor. We
first elicit the appropriate or desired information for this domain (semantics) by
interviewing subject matter experts in the field of UAV command and control; and then
present it in a clear, concise way (syntax) through Visual Thinking design principles.
So the theoretical building blocks needed to create a cognitively sensitive display
are “what”, “how” and “assess”, but what tools can perform these functions (Figure 1.2).
This research used NDM to elicit the “what” from the SMEs and then used Semiotic

3

Analysis collaboratively to present some “back of the envelope” design ideas – bar
graphs, gauges, etc. Further Semiotic Analysis applied with Visual Thinking visual cues
(color coding, area visual acuity, etc.) suggested the first draft of a Visual Thinking
sprocket – our “how”. Finally, using SA techniques to compose questions, we showed
the resulting images to non-experience subjects.

Furthermore, the results were so

favorable that the displays were demonstrated to active duty military SMEs for their
comments.

Naturalistic
Decision
Making

Semiotics

What
(Semantics)

Visual
Thinking

Semiotics

How
(Syntax)

Naturalistic
Decision
Making

Situational
Awareness

Assessment

Cognitively Sensitive Display
Figure 1.2 Experimental design building blocks for a cognitively sensitive user interface

The first question, “What information needs to be presented to the user?”
examines the implications and content of the information pipeline, and makes tradeoffs.
This solution incorporates the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) principle of
developing designs with ample consideration to the domain users, i.e., develop products
within a given context, not in a vacuum. Thus, subject matter experts (SMEs) were
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interviewed to elicit what information should be included in any viable display, and these
categories were then subjectively weighted by the SMEs.

After interviewing and

observing UAV operators and instructors at the Victorville, CA UAV flight school, a
flexible, intuitive display was envisioned – all SMEs were either active duty or retired
USAF UAV operators and the instructors represented the manufacturers. At least three
levels of display flexibility were requested: USAF, manufacture and operator. In other
words, the USAF may require certain Fields of Merits (FoMs), the manufacturer may
require UAV model specific FoMs, while the operator may know operational/mission
specific information that needs to be displayed. That is, the USAF might require the
display supply the air speed for all missions, the manufacturer may require crosswind
calculations to be displayed for this particular model, and the operator may want the oil
temperature for this particular UAV because “it ran hot last mission”. The design of the
Visual Sprocket is such that the input stream can be changed to reflect “best practice”
mandates directed by the organizations and manufacturers, while at the same time
allowing for individual operator preferences.

This design allows the flexibility the

operator desires, while addressing organizational and manufacturer concerns.
For a visual display within the UAV mission planning domain, the pertinent
information must be quickly interpretable and assist in narrowing down the possible
alternate choices without excessively taxing the operator’s mental capacity. At the same
time, the underlying details behind the information must be accessible. Within this
structure, the minimum / maximum / current / alert data values should be readily
available to the decision maker.

Considering that any decision will have multiple

dimensions to consider and requires a quick response, then waiting for the operator to
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“interpret” or “calculate” the raw data values on the display can be detrimental to
resolving the decision.
The second question, “How is the information to be presented to the user?”
examines the graphical layout and visual cues to be implemented or constructed. Visual
Thinking posits that people make decisions almost instantaneously using visual cues in
the environment. Through evolution, the eye/brain connection has optimized responses
to certain visual cues (such as movement, shape, size, etc.). If the display follows Visual
Thinking guidelines, then the display should require a minimal mental workload and able
to be constructed with culturally obvious visual cues. The information sought by the
operator should nearly “pop off” the screen, i.e., allowing a near gestalt interpretation of
the information presented by the display. Semiosis (study of signs) supplies the relevant
cognitive model for display cues, in particular, designing culturally relevant signs. The
cultural influence of the signs this research explored were within the existing military
culture for UAV ground control stations and international representations of cold and hot
(water temperature) conventions. At the same time, it should be recognized that the user
interface is the communication pipeline from the UAV to the operator (as envisioned by
the UI designer).
Within the third question, “How do we assess the HCI?” is the issue of
quantifying the user interface experience.

Is the proposed display truly better than

existing displays? NDM supplied the structure and tools to observe the single UAV
operators “in the wild”, and from those observations led to a new hypothetical multiUAV display design. NDM also supports testing the final display results with Subject
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Matter Experts (SMEs), while at the same time acknowledging the usefulness of nondomain subjects for controlled testing environments. Furthermore, situation awareness
research has supplied the framework upon which this very subjective “is this display
better” can be objectively examined. Designing the experiments to address specific
levels of situation awareness allows for the quantification of the user experience. Finally,
in accordance with the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, Situation
Present Assessment Method (SPAM) was used as it is one of the best experiment
assessment feedback tools to use when addressing complex dynamic systems in this
domain.

1.2 Domain
One of the goals of any strategic military commander is to inflict the most damage
on the enemy with the least cost while sustaining the least amount of damage to their own
troops. The easiest technological solution to this problem was to “extend the warrior’s
arm”, meaning extending the offensive reach while at the same time not allowing the
enemy to attack. For example, swords are preferred to daggers, spears are preferred to
swords, archery preferred to hand-to-hand, etc. Each of these technological innovations
placed the warrior farther from the opponent.
Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) remove the human from harm’s way, and are
thus a technological innovation that enables this extension objective. Uninhabited aerial
vehicles (UAVs) belong to the class of ROVs that function without a human crew on
board. When the UAVs carry munitions, they are called uninhabited combat aerial
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vehicles (UCAVs). Even though the human is not on board, humans play an important
role in the applications of UAVs in practice (Narayanan, Edala et al. 1999).
Controlling a single UAV is a complex task: although there are multiple sensor
inputs, many of those inputs are very limited in their ability to transmit data about the
entire situation. As an example, consider the Predator UAV system (or squadron): “the
fully operational system consists of four air vehicles (with sensors), a ground control
station (GCS), a Predator primary satellite link communication suite and 55 people”
(Wikipedia 2007). For each of the four vehicles, the three most important personnel are
the pilot operator and the two sensor operators. Data supplied to the operators comes
from the UAV’s sensors and from external sources. Former USAF Deputy Chief of Staff
for ISR, Lt. Gen. David Deptula, recently observed that a single Predator soon will be
able to provide 60 or more video streams and noted that, “In terms of information 1
fusion, today’s main challenge is not too little but rather too much information.”
Furthermore, USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, said that
approximately 160 persons are required to perform “command and control” (C2) and
“processing, exploitation, and dissemination” (PED) for a single Predator. PED includes,
but is not limited to, data interpretation, intelligence, mission planning, etc. Now imagine

1

Throughout this dissertation, the use of the word “information” has the strict meaning of data plus
meaning. In other words, the display shows the operator data that has been filtered through a semantic
filter, placing that information with context (maximum, minimum, tolerances, etc.) The displays are
not raw data that need further interpretation skills by the operator at the basic level. The operator may
have to mentally join or split displayed information to assist current decision actions.
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the added system complexity when multiple UAVs are “flown” by a single person – now
in a supervisory role.
Obviously, if the operator controller is going to graduate to a supervisory role,
then the information needed by the supervisor is significantly different. More of the
rudimentary flying is offloaded to the UAV through automation, allowing the supervisor
to make more of the difficult, mission decisions.

This fits with the 2010 USAF

Technology Horizons study’s top finding, which identified the greater use of autonomous
systems as critical to realizing capability increases. Within this emerging multi-UAV
domain, developing new displays to present the information needed by the supervisor is a
priority.
This research assumes the operator works in a supervisory role and interacts with
the multiple UAVs in a method similar to a simulation game player. Directions are given
to the entities – individually or as a group. The entities are semi-autonomous and
perform tasks without interference from the supervisor – unless the supervisor needs to
re-task the entities or the task requires human intervention (bombing, surveillance
imagery, etc.). An entity may be re-tasked (externally by the supervisor or internally by
the entity) because of successful completion of a subgoal, deficiencies in performance, or
changed mission priorities.
Yet another question to ask is “Why do we need a new user interface?” Two
simple answers to this question: (1) The current display for one UAV is barely sufficient
to successfully operate the current control system of single UAVs – crashes during
takeoff and landing happen much too frequently; and (2) The large amount of data
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inundation / information overload for the UAV operator must be brought under control,
especially when increasing the number of UAVs the operator supervises. Controlling
multiple UAVs dictates that the operator-level “piloting” skills used with one UAV, such
as takeoff and landing, must be automated and offloaded to the UAV. This automation
has been incorporated in the aircraft of the domestic and international airlines for years.
The USAF clearly envisions autonomy as a major enabler of its vision for the
future of RPAs. More importantly, a key assumption in the USAF UAS Flight Plan is
that “Automation with a clear and effective user interface are the keys to increasing
effects while potentially reducing cost, forward footprint, and risk” (HQ USAF, 2009).

1.3 Research Approach
This research developed a cognitively sensitive approach that efficiently
incorporated the human into supervisory roles for mission planning and system
monitoring for multiple UAVs. A cognitively sensitive system is defined as a system in
which the human operator can recognize a solution pattern without tremendous mental
gymnastics, i.e., a high mental workload. Another way of saying this is the solution is
recognized as a whole, gestalt pattern, or “status at a glance”. If the pattern does not
exactly fit the requirements of the solution, then the operator can mentally reorganize the
given pattern with relative ease to suggest an alternative solution. It is hypothesized that
a system designed and implemented using this approach will improve operator
performance especially in high-stress or time intensive situations.
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This display system is contrasted with existing user interfaces within the military
UAV domain, mainly tables of numbers, and what can be considered traditional graphical
user interface design packages including analog gauges or bar charts.
In order to evaluate the displays, a high-fidelity test bed that could be configured
for the alternate displays is necessary. This research utilized Sytronics, Inc. MultipleUAV Agency (MAGE®) test bed and it was designed to integrate net centric information
to facilitate control of multiple UAVs. One of the chosen features for the MAGE®
software was to provide automated mission planning to reduce operator workload.
Towards this end, Sytronics, Inc. licensed from Operations Research Concepts Applied,
Inc. (ORCA) its OPUS® mission planning software library. OPUS® was employed by
MAGE® to generate multiple alternative mission routes from which the MAGE®
operator could choose to execute. In addition to the routes, the OPUS® software also
generates a series of Figures of Merit (FoM) to describe the characteristics of each
alternative. These FoMs could include more than a dozen dimensions, including the
probability of surviving the mission, number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) launches,
minutes of exposure to anti-aircraft artillery, minutes exposure to search radars, minutes
exposure to missile guidance radars, fuel consumption, to name a few. These measures
are all numeric but have different measures, different minimums and maximums, and run
in different directions (fewer SAM missile launches and higher probability of survival are
both better).
MAGE® uses state of the art agent programming to assist the operator, but the
simulation has been limited to a traditional Microsoft Windows® / Java-style interface,
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i.e., buttons, trees, menus, etc.

This clunky user interface paradigm may be quite

adequate for an office environment, but can be a hindrance to a time sensitive, high stress
military mission. Requiring a user to traverse a menu system multiple layers deep or read
several pages of data tables has been shown to be a human factors nightmare. 2 The
research examined the user interface as a presenter of information in a format that caused
little cognitive dissonance. Key FoMs of the problem to be solved by the operator are
presented as a visual pattern that he/she can readily recognize and allowed him/her to
quickly identify a potential solution.

Static
Function
Allocation

Static
Function
Allocation

Fully
Autonomous
Agents

Fully
Manually
Controlled
Agents

Dynamic Function
Allocation

Out-of-loop

In-the-Loop

Figure 1.3 Research into the human's role in control

2

“On March 28, 1979 a sequence of events; equipment malfunction, design related problems and worker
errors, led to a partial meltdown of Unit 2 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near
Middletown, Pennsylvania. The main feed water pumps stopped running, which prevented the steam
generators from removing heat from the reactor. Signals available to the operators failed to show
exactly what had happened, which may be why they took a series of actions that made conditions worse
by simply reducing the flow of coolant through the core.”
Lloyd J. Dumas, Waking up to the Real Threats to Security in the Post-Cold War World. Human
Factor and the risk of Nuclear War http://www.slmk.org/main/artiklar/Human_Factor.pdf,
Svenska Läkare mot Kärnvapen (Swedish Section of International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War) (Accessed March 15, 2008).
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How does one human operator/supervisor control multiple UAVs? What control
mechanisms or paradigms are needed to assure the appropriate level of human control?
In other words, must the control mechanisms for controlling multiple UAVs be
significantly different than the control mechanisms needed to control an individual UAV?
Figure 1.3 illustrates current research at the ends of the spectrum with regards to
controlling multiple agents.

Those exploring swarm intelligence (Bonabeau and

Théraulaz 2000; Dorigo, Bonabeau et al. 2000; Gaudiano, Shargel et al. 2003; Holland,
Woods et al. 2005) assume a fully autonomous swarm without a human-in-the-loop to
solve the given problem space. In their approach the human presents the scenario to
solve to the swarm and the swarm proceeds to “discover” a viable solution. At the other
research extreme (Narayanan, Ruff et al. 2000; Karim, Heinze et al. 2004; Ruff, Calhoun
et al. 2004; Lewis, Wang et al. 2006), the researchers are not interested in swarm
intelligence; but rather, are interested in humans controlling multiple autonomous agents.
These researchers experimentally demonstrated that under various levels of autonomy,
operators can control from one to thirteen UAVs. They claim that any larger group of
UAVs would require a massive leap forward in UAV autonomy technology.
These laboratory results were discussed among software designers and MultipleUAV Aircraft Control (MAC) Predator operators/pilots during the design of the MAGE
simulation testbed. The MAC concept was proposed and deployed as a method to
decrease the number of personnel needed to man multiple operational UAVs. The MAC
was envisioned to be a group of four traditional GCSs, but manned by four sensor
operators (SO) and one pilot – the pilot was the commander. As a method of reducing
the pilot workload, the SO controlled the UAV during low-intensity legs of the mission.
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However, after implementing the MAC, the pilot felt situationally detached during these
low intensity operations. When the pilot had to control a UAV in a (planned) highintensity leg of the mission (surveillance of a moving target or nearing a weapons
release), an auxiliary pilot was required to attend to the remaining (low-intensity) UAVs.
When a UAV unexpectedly goes from low- to high-intensity activity, the pilot felt he
needed to be in the loop at least one-half hour earlier. Although a MAC was originally
envisioned to have a capability of four UAVs being simultaneously controlled, only three
UAVs were put into operation because of the pilots’ fear of being overloaded. Finally,
the geographic separation of the operator to the UAV (operator in Nevada and the UAV
in Afghanistan) seems to aggravate many situation awareness problems.

After

experimenting and redeploying personnel in the 4-UAV MAC, the final empirical
personnel ratio for a MAC was four SOs and three pilots – a savings of only one pilot!
When one discusses human factors engineering and user interfaces in complex,
dynamic systems, we are entering the domain of situation awareness. Here we come to
the essential/primary problem this research addresses – how to get the critical information
to an operator in a timely manner. An operator has situation awareness of the system
when he/she has reasonable knowledge of all critical aspects of a controlled system, i.e.,
informally, he/she knows what is happening. Endsley (1988) formally defined situation
awareness as the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time
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and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and projection of their status in the near
future” 3.
This dissertation is arranged in the following order: Chapter 2 is a review of the
literature with respect to the military UAV domain, key technologies and the theories on
which this research is based. The third chapter explores semiosis and how it was used to
guide the research. The fourth chapter describes the research framework used throughout
the research. The fifth chapter describes the research methodology for each experiment.
The sixth chapter presents the findings of the research. And finally, the seventh chapter
describes the research contributions.

3

Notice the lack of reference to past actions and states. Gary Klein (NDM fame) told me at the 15th
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology held at Wright State University that this alone is
why his NDM is superior to Endsley’s SA theory. The current situation must not be concerned with
only the possible future outcomes, but rather reflection on past actions helps put the current situation
into context.
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2 Literature Review
This literature review is divided into two sections: (1) Theoretical Background
associated with the design of a cognitively sensitive display and (2) Information about the
multi-UAV domain necessary to understand the experiments – essentially, a toolkit and
an object on which to use the tools.
Some of the past cognitive science theories that have explored the design of the
user interface: Naturalistic Decision Making (Klein 1993), Visual Thinking (Arnheim
1969), and Situation Awareness (Endsley 2006).

Each of these approaches tries to

address the operator’s strengths and weaknesses, each with its own level of success.
Although the operator may have a goal or goals recognized by each of these theories,
there is the distinct possibility that the operator goals may not fit the specific theory – the
proverbial “square peg in a round hole”. Additionally, to fill in some of the perceived
applied design gaps, Semiotic Analysis 4 and Operator Function Models (OFM) were
applied.
Klein theorizes that experts internally encode information based on experience;
this experience is the experts’ knowledge and that sets them apart from non-experts – the
ability to “see/feel/hear” patterns in an evolving situation. Klein’s research shows that
experts do not necessarily compare multiple options, but rather use experience to look for

4

Semiotic Analysis (semiosis) is the study of signs and their meanings. The display is a grouping of lines
and symbols that are used to communicate between the system and the operator – as the designer
understood the problem.
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a solution (that has worked in the past) that satisfies the pattern of the problem without
real consideration for optimal solutions. Arnheim claims all cognition is derived from
visual processing and, because of this, displays should leverage this by encoding
information consistent with visual perception capabilities 5. He supports visual encoding
of numerical information where applicable – maps that emphasize population density
using color-coding, train routes using color and line width to emphasize direction and
capacity, etc. Endsley postulates the existence of three levels of situation awareness and
any interface that is going to succeed in any dynamically complex domain must address
these three levels – unsuccessful interfaces will fail in at least one level of SA when
presenting the operator with the needed information to make a correct decision.
These theories direct the designer to encode vital information the operator can
easily recognize, that will in turn, allow the operator to make correct and efficient
decisions.

However, none of these three theories had a specific methodology for

encoding the display information. This is obviously a distinct shortfall for these methods
to the practical designer, but later authors have addressed some of these failings. In
particular, the design of the display utilized semiotic analysis (Nadin 1988; Tufte 1997;
Ferreira, Barr et al. 2005; Tufte 2006) and recommendations from information / scientific
visualization to examine what might be considered culturally significant visual cues
(Tufte 1997; Spence 2001; Ware 2004; Tufte 2006).

5

This seems a little extreme, since by this definition, blind people could not reason! I believe it is meant
that most survival and base instincts/decisions are predominately visually aided, i.e., fight or flee
decisions. In this context, slow thoughtful decisions can have fatal consequences.
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The goal of this research is to create a framework for designers to systematically
design displays. The iterative steps to creating the display are as follows:
1) Interview stakeholders within the domain to ascertain what information
needs to be presented [Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and Semiotic
Analysis];
2) Develop a user model [Operator Function Model (OFM)];
3) Use semiotic analysis to create a display that encodes the information with
visual cues. These cues should be design such that the human can quickly
recognize any patterns [Semiotic Analysis and Visual Thinking (VT)];
4) Evaluate the design empirically through laboratory experiments [Situation
Awareness (SA)] and “in the wild” with stakeholders [NDM]; and
5) Assess the success of the designed display with stakeholders [NDM, SA
and VT]. Repeat if necessary.
An instantiation of the objective of this research was to develop a cognitively
sensitive approach that incorporates the human into the decision mechanism of
supervising multiple UAVs to promote effective control.

In the context of human

centered decision-making of multiple UAV control, this research explores whether a
“cognitively sensitive” paradigm can be utilized to design intelligent user interfaces that
are human friendly. It is hypothesized that a system developed using this approach will
improve operator performance in high-stress situations.

2.1 Theoretical Background
The research is presented in the order necessary to successfully proceed through
the steps of the framework proposed in Figure 1.3. The steps are expanded in Figure 2.1.
As can be seen by Figure 2.1, the three steps have been expanded to five steps, but in
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reality, the “what” and “assess” steps are expanded to show the tools used, and is not
necessarily sequential. In fact, in this research, the assessment of the results was done
using an in-house pilot study with a reassessment of the display before the formal
experiments were performed. This pilot study inspired a mouse rollover function to
display the underlying data – minimum, maximum, low and high thresholds, etc. This
rollover function was not tested as part of the experiment, but was added to subsequent
releases at the behest of other stakeholders. The steps for designing a display should lead
to an iterative solution.

WHAT

ASSESS

Interview domain
stakeholders [NDM]
for what information
needs to be
presented [Semiosis]

Assess success of the
designed display w/
stakeholders [NDM].
Repeat if necessary.

ASSESS

WHAT

Evaluate the design
empirically:
laboratory [SA] and
“in the wild” [NDM]

Develop an operator
function model
(OFM)

HOW
Use semiotic analysis
to create a display
that encodes the data
w/ visual thinking
[VT]

Figure 2.1 Steps to designing a cognitively sensitive display

Furthermore, the three steps for designing are not temporally mutually exclusive –
they frequently overlap. However, this suggested guide can keep the designer on task
enough to say that they are currently performing step X.
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The organization of Section 2.1, as mentioned previously, is illustrated in Figure
2.1. Section 2.1.1 discusses Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and how it can be used
as a tool to extract What information needs to be presented to the user in the new display
through interviews and examining the existing context or environment. Furthermore,
NDM can help validate the display, and verify the user has the information needed.
Section 2.1.2 presents a user modeling tool, called the Operator Function Model, which
will be used in Chapter 4 to more completely understand what the operator needs to know
so that they can make quick and accurate decisions. Semiotic analysis is described in
Section 2.1.3 and used as a tool in Chapter 3 to perform an analysis of the existing and
proposed alternate displays. The analysis helps transition from the What to the How
steps of the process. Following the analysis, the research examines Visual Thinking
(Section 2.1.4) and its implications in the How information is presented to the user,
addressing the need to present information that the human can perceive and categorize
quickly. The last step of this process is to Assess the display within the context of the
domain.

To achieve this, we examine the Situation Awareness research as a

measurement tool (Section 2.1.5). Furthermore, NDM is again used to verify the display
is useful within the context of the domain. Finally, Section 2.1.6 examines the research
on Separate, Integral and Integrated Displays and how these concepts can help explain
the research decision process on which existing and proposed alternate displays were
chosen and why.
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2.1.1 Naturalistic Decision Making
In the first step of the cognitively sensitive display design, one needs to gather
information about “what” should be presented to the operator/supervisor. This is one of
the most important steps, because an incomplete picture of the problem will probably
produce an incomplete solution. One such tool that has been successfully used within the
human factors community is Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM).
In his report on Naturalistic Decision Making, Klein (1993) asserts that most
designers of decision aids are handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the decision
maker’s internal decision algorithms for any given domain. Human computer interfaces
(HCIs) being developed “to help people perform cognitive tasks do not support decision
making”. Just presenting the information is not enough. It has to be presented in a
cognitively sensitive way.
The expert decision maker may not have all the information he would like, but
because of constraints (time, cost, etc.) a decision still must be made. The expert infers
or gathers information from external sources, “rules of thumb”, experience, etc. As
described by Klein (1993), experienced people do not normally perform a formal
decision analysis, but rather, attempts to pattern match previous situations to identify
potential solutions. The solutions are adapted to fit the current problem.
On the other hand, the designer has formal specifications that present the apparent
minimum decision requirements needed by a neophyte – requirements that do not
necessarily provide the whole cognitive picture. From these specifications, the designer
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is expected to design an HCI without being given information about how the operators
expect to use it to make their decisions. The resulting decision aid may not have the “feel
of the system” that an expert learns over time.
NDM attempts to go beyond the formal specifications by exploring how (and
why) operators make important decisions. It looks at the decision requirements of an
expert, not a neophyte, and then presents that information to the operator. One such tool
is Recognition-Primed Decision-Making (RPD).
2.1.1.1 Recognition-Primed Decision Making
One naturally assumes that when a person makes a complicated decision, he
would mentally make a list of alternative solutions and then narrow it down to two or
three good choices. Then these small few choices would be examined in more depth to
select the best.
Klein (1993) found that this is just not the case.

Instead, he found that

experienced problem solvers looked at the current problem and tried to find a previous
problem that was similar. They then mentally tried to use the successful solution on new
problem – if it did not work mentally, then they tried to adapt it mentally to better fit the
new problem. In other words, they recognized patterns in the problem to find a solution
template in the solution space. New innovative solutions were not created from scratch.
Alternative solution lists were not created.
These recognized patterns are the priming needed to find a viable solution. It
does not necessarily guarantee an optimal solution, but rather a tried and true solution
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that satisfies the problem constrains. Keeping the patterns simple for the operator /
supervisor allows them to quickly assimilate the situation – patterns such as “bigger is
better” and “best is a medium circle shape”.
2.1.2 User Modeling

Because the first tool does not have a formal method of modeling the expert user,
a second tool is needed to do this. NDM does recognize the need to understand the
expert and their decisions, but it does not have a specific toolset to perform this
modeling.

There exist several tools to that do such as Task Analysis (McCormick, 1976;
Sanders and McCormick, 1987) and Operator Function Model. This research’s primary
user model is the Operator Function Model (OFM), with the proposed solution for this
domain presented in chapter 4. Discrete control models (task analysis) and models of
operator function using discrete control modeling (OFM; Mitchell and Miller, 1985,
1986; Mitchell, 1987, 1996) constructs have been successfully used for modeling users in
complex systems. Task analysis identifies “and list[s] all the human operations performed
and their relation to system tasks (McCormick 1976, p. 24)."

They describe operator behavior in a range of complex systems and prescribe
operator functions by representing the interrelations between dynamic system state and
operator functions, subfunctions, control actions, and information needs related to
operator activities (Mitchell and Miller, 1986; Mitchell, 1987, 1996). The OFM is an
alternative to task analysis techniques used by other human factors engineers
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(McCormick, 1976; Sanders and McCormick, 1987), since OFM is a modeling tool that
provides a dynamic, task-analytic structure that can be used by system designers to define
a user interface that is based on operator rather than hardware function (Mitchell, 1987,
1996).

2.1.2.1 Cognitive Models
From nonscientific anecdotal accounts (Flying Magazine) and accident reports
[(Giffen and Rockwell 1987) summarizes many accident report findings], one finds that
there is a certain mysticism associated with regards to a pilot’s decision making skills.
These reports find that poor decision making skills cause or contribute to many of the
“pilot error” accidents. Most of these accidents involve time constraints or time pressure
requiring a very rapid decision by the pilot; the reports’ general recommendations tend to
be “more research is needed on pilot judgment and decision making”.
Despite these recommendations, researchers have been slow in examining the
cognitive processes of the cockpit crew. In the absence of experimental/empirical data to
support a new analytical model of decision making, it has been assumed that standard
analytical model fits. Besco, Maurino et al. (1994) claimed:
Decision making in the cockpit follows traditional views of decision making … in
which the decision maker, i.e., Captain, is 1) presented with a situation that
requires a decision; 2) the nature of the situation is assessed by the decision
maker; who 3) determines the availability of alternative outcomes to respond to
the situation, and 4) after evaluating the risk and benefits of each alternative;
5) selects an alternative in response to the needs of the situation. (p. 43)
The assumption that decision-makers’ always examine all alternatives
exhaustively is unrealistic. The Captain typically does not jot down a few alternatives,
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weigh and balance each possible outcome, and then select the “best” alternative.
Research in NDM argues that the Captain, if he/she is a good decision maker, is going to
recognize the current situation fits a previous situation problem pattern and use (adapt)
the solution that satisfied the previous situation, if possible. This requires much less
cognitive workload from the Captain.
2.1.3 Semiosis, Semiotic Analysis
Semiosis is the study of signs; including the cultural influences on the
interpretation of signs (Table 2.1). As an example, within the USA culture, the color red
is often interpreted as danger, or bad luck; while in China, red is considered very lucky.
The number “7” is lucky and “13” is unlucky in the USA, while in China, “4” is unlucky
because of the word “four” in Chinese sounds the very similar to the word “death”. So a
more complete definition of semiosis is the study of signs within a culture, but the culture
does not have to be based on national or ethnic backgrounds. It can be the culture within
a corporation (e.g., “mac happy face”, “blue screen of death”), a military branch
(iconology for war games), etc. In this section, the cultural influence of the signs this
research explored were within the existing military culture for UAV ground control
stations (GCS). 6

6

A detailed semiotic analysis of this display is reported in Chapter 3.
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Table 2.1 Some definitions of semiotics and its uses.
Semiotics is the doctrine of signs. The sign is the most important building block to
semiotic study and it is defined as anything that stands for something else to some
interpreter.
The object of semiotics is sign systems and their functioning within culture.

(Ferreira, Barr et al.
2005)

The main tenet of Semiotic Engineering is that interactive systems designers
actually communicate with users (at interaction time) through computer systems
interfaces. Interfaces act as the designers’ proxies (the designers’ deputy,
according to the theory). Thus, when designing any system’s interface, designers
are actually deciding what kinds of conversations they will have with users, using
which modes and media, and for what purposes.
Semiotics, also called semiotic studies or semiology, is the study of sign processes
(semiosis), or signification and communication, signs and symbols,

(Valente, Souza
et al. 2008)

The overall goal of the human operator modeling and semiosis effort is to decide
upon the content and form of information to be displayed to a well-trained and
motivated ... supervisor .... Semiotic analysis deals with the assessment of the
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics associated with human/system interaction.

(Nadin 1988)

(Wikipedia
contributors
2010)
(Narayanan, Ruff
et al. 2000)

The history of semiotics has two major figures which have defined the western
traditions, mainly the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and the
American scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce. This research used a model
derived by Pierce that has been shown to be appropriate for computer based signs. This
model has a three part relationship containing the representamen, the object, and the
interpretant (Figure 2.2). The representamen is the physical instantiation of the symbol
in reality – like an eight sided red and white stop sign is physical representation of the
concept to stop. The object is the actual concept for which the representamen stands –
“cars stop here”. And finally, the interpretant is therefore the sign created in the mind of
the perceiver, or how the sign is perceived. To an observer, the representamen creates in
the mind of the observer an equivalent or more “developed” sign – “I should stop here”.
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Figure 2.2 Peircean Triad

Although Peirce classified thousands of sign categories, he found the three most
fundamental sign divisions are icon, index and symbol. Any given sign can be assigned
one of these three categories based on the relationship between the object and the
representamen (See Figure 2.3). These categories are not mutually exclusive; any given
sign may belong to more than one of these categories.
In the left illustration of Figure 2.3, an iconic sign is presented.

The

representamen resembles a portrait of the author and the perceiver can interpret this as
such precisely because the representamen looks like the author enough to be recognized.
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It should be noted that the representamen can be (and has been) weakly argued to be an
indexical sign precisely because it is not three dimensional.

Iconic Sign

Portrait
of MJF

This is portrait
of MJF

Indexical Sign

Weighs
1 kg

Weight shown on
the scale is 1 kg

Symbolic Sign

Do not do
something

Something here
is forbidden

Figure 2.3 Sign classifications

The middle illustration shows an example of the indexical sign. In this case, the
sign is representative of a (class of) object(s). It does not represent a specific object, but
rather it makes a connection to a (class of) object(s) within the perceiver’s mind. The
object may not even be physically observable. In Figure 2.3, the middle illustration can
be interpreted differently based on the context, the symbol could be interpreted as
“weighing” (weigh something), “metric weighing” (weigh something using the metric
system), “measurement” (measure something to exactly 1 kg, like in a recipe), or a class
of measuring devices (scales).
Finally, the right illustration is an example of the iconic sign. These tend to be
more culturally interpreted and are a learned interpretation. The sign on the right when
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overlaid on another sign means “do not”. For instance, placing this sign over an image of
a cigarette is interpreted as “do not smoke cigarettes near this sign”, placing this sign over
the icons for restroom on a map should be interpreted as no restrooms available at this
site, placing the sign over a symbol of a fishing pole should be interpreted as “no
fishing”, etc. However, without the interpretant being instructed by their culture as to the
meaning of the sign, there is no intuitive, obvious interpretation. With the training, the
interpretation of the overlaid sign is easy to generalize of other settings. It should be
noted that written languages are iconic – we are taught to read and write for many years
to understand this very complex signing language.
2.1.4 Visual Thinking
The Visual Thinking phrase was first coined by Arnheim (1969) to address how
people make decisions almost instantaneously.

Inherent in vision is the ability to

preprocess data and recognize visual patterns.
Vision is not perception and perception is not thinking. The mind
gathers information and processes it. Note that I said information,
information is data plus meaning. Before the mind conveys the
information your eyes must observe it, and some preprocessing needs to
be done to turn this data into information.
Arnheim 2004
The key to Arnheim's thesis is that vision and thinking are not necessarily disjoint
concepts. When a person perceives an object with your eyes, before deep thoughts about
the object can be conceived, the simple sight of that thing at least causes classification
(placing the object in the context of other objects like it). For instance, if you see a cat,
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before any separate thinking is performed about the cat, it has already been placed in the
category of “cat”. This is a particularly useful cognitive trait to have when that cat is a
dangerous one that needs to be fled from, such as a tiger.
Arnheim contends the idea of visual thinking is an old one, going back to the
ancient Greek philosophers: Plato, Socrates and Aristotle. These philosophers were the
first to make a distinction between perceiving and reasoning, mainly because perception
from direct senses could not be trusted. (We have all experienced “our eyes playing
tricks on us”, or heard tales of mirages in the desert.) Reasoning was considered to be the
“correction of the senses” and the “establishment of truth”.

It can be reasonably argued that Arnheim’s visual thinking is almost
instantaneous pattern classification. It is not the perception of the object that classifies the
object, but rather the very well-travelled mental pathways that react with almost
lightening quick classification. The perceiving of the object (cat) does not require new
neurons to fire off and create new paths; the existing short pathways have always
succeeded previously.

Within this same paradigm of visual thinking may fall the education concepts of
audio and visual learning. It is recognized within the field of teaching that some students
learn best by listening, others by seeing, and still others by doing. It is recommended that
teachers make the effort to discover each student’s learning style, and furthermore,
present the subject material in as many modalities as possible to help the students’
diverse learning styles.
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2.1.4.1 Graphical Displays

This research proposes a new graphical display “widget” called the “visual
thinking sprocket” to enhance the supervisor’s control capabilities.

To judge the

appropriateness of the display, we look to Tufte’s (2006) [p. 13] definition of what
determines an excellent (statistical) graphical display:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

show the data
induce the viewer to think about the substance rather than … something else
avoid distorting what the data have to say
present many numbers in a small space
make large data sets coherent
reveal the data at several levels of detail, from a broad overview to the fine
structure
serve a reasonably clear purpose: description, exploration, tabulation, or
decoration
be closely integrated with the … data set.
The sprocket display fulfills all of these characteristics.

2.1.4.2 Visual Thinking Sprocket
Physiologically, the eyeball as an information-gathering instrument scans the
world under the guidance of cognitive attention centers. The eyeball fixates on a region
of interest. An image is buffered and scanned, like a massively parallel computer, to find
objects within the image through feature extraction. Once extracted, these objects are
serially scanned at about 25 items per second. Since the eye scans quickly, reacquiring a
new image about 10 times a second, only four to twelve objects are recognized before the
eye jumps to another fixation. These physical boundaries must drive the design of
cognitively sensitive displays.
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Furthermore, when designing a display, the two attributes must be balanced: the
overview of the situation and the details within the situation.

The overview is a

qualitative “aspect of data preferably acquired rapidly and even better, pre-attentively;
that is, without cognitive effort” (Spence 2007). A well designed overview display uses
visual cues that are acknowledged to be pattern classifier aids so information “pops out”
at the operator. On the other hand, details are quantitative and should only be presented
to the operator on an as needed basis, i.e., when the operator requests more in-depth
information, presumably because of the overview display observations.
Within the design of the Visual Thinking Sprocket display, primary attention is
devoted to the overview pattern classifier aids. A design that presents an overview of a
situation must be designed simply and stress those features that can be pre-attentively
processed. According to Ware (2004), features that can be pre-attentively processed can
be organized in the following categories:
•
•
•
•

Form: Line orientation, line length, line width, line collinearity, size,
curvature, special grouping, blur, added marks, numerosity
Color: Hue, Intensity
Motion: Flicker, Direction of Motion
Spatial Position: 2D position, Stereoscopic depth, convex/concave shape
from shading

The features in bold were the pre-attentive cues this Visual Thinking Sprocket
research attempted to model.
With this in mind, let us examine the interesting history of the Visual Thinking
Sprocket.

One of the earliest applications of a sprocket design (Spence 2001) to

graphically present data is Florence Nightingale’s Rose (See Figure 2.4). During the
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Crimea war, Nightingale visited the field hospitals while attending the sick and wounded.
She was appalled at the squalid conditions at the hospitals and persuaded the Sanitary
Commission to undertake improvements.

Figure 2.4 Nighingale's Rose illustrating the dramatic reduction of deaths in Crimea War field
hospitals attributed to improving sanitary conditions

The Rose depicts the striking improvements attributed to the improved conditions:
the length of each petal is proportional to the number of deaths that month; the subtended
angle of each segment is the elapsed time; and the dotted line is the number of deaths in
Army hospitals in Manchester, England. The new regime was initiated in March 1855
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(approximately 9:00 o’clock on the Rose), and the figure dramatically shows the
improvements.

Figure 2.5 Interactive Nightingale's Rose (http://understandinguncertainty.org/coxcombs)

The Rose is such a fascinating visual tool that it has inspired several online
versions of the display. One such interactive display is illustrated in Figure 2.5. With
this display, the rose can grow throughout the Crimean War, each wedge being added,
starting with April 1854 and proceeding through March 1856. The right-hand Rose
precedes the left-hand Rose, with the first three months of the right-hand Rose being
deaths preceding the Crimean War. The left-hand Rose is the second year of the war and
illustrates how implementing the recommended sanitary guidelines greatly enhanced the
chance of survival in the field hospitals.
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Figure 2.6 Starfield visual thinking widget

Singers and Endres (1996) present a second visual thinking widget they call the
Starfield® (Johnson Controls Inc. 2001). The Starfield shown in Figure 2.6, was created
to “help operators readily extract useful information from the vast quantities of data
generated by complex systems”, in particular, the facility management systems. A large
facility can have dozens of zones, each with its own heating, ventilating, air conditioning,
fire, lighting, and security systems. Text displays can provide values at each point in the
entire system.

However, an operator of a large facility may need to scan through

“numerous floor plans or hundreds of thousands of lines of text” to find that one piece of
relevant data. The Starfield represents data as points that appear in a scatterplot – “like
stars in the sky”. The clustering of points indicated data similarity or patterns of interest,
with the color of the points indicating tolerance status [red (corresponding analog value is
above the specified range), blue (below the specified range), green (within the specified
range), gray (offline)]. Using a mouse to select a point provides more details about the
data, for example doing a “mouse-over” of a point produces a Windows’ “tool tip”
indicating the name and value of the point while clicking on the point expands the details
to include possible fixes. The largest dot represents the systems calculated global status.
The most important parts of this research were: (1) operators are provided an “at-aglance visual gestalt” of the data; (2) the display works to the humans strengths of pattern
recognition and spatial reasoning; and (3) the display encourages data exploration.
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Figure 2.7 Visual thinking Kaleidoscope® for selecting search strategies

A third example of using a visual thinking widget, called a Kaleidoscope (Figure
2.7), is presented by Pu and Lalanne (2002). This Kaleidoscope is used as a decision tool
to select land usage in a neighborhood. Existing structures (housing, cemetery, school,
dumpsite, etc.) constrain the placement of new structures in available lots. For instance,
do not place a dumpsite next to a school. In the Kaleidoscope, the entire circle represents
the multivariate search space. Any solid lines represent a successfully met constraint,
with longer (black) lines being better solutions. Extending through the edge are the
potential solutions that must be examined in more depth.
Examining Figure 2.8, one can see the intentional feature implementation on the
initial single-threshold Visual Thinking Sprocket design prototype. This Visual Thinking
Sprocket was intended to be a decision support aid within a larger flight simulator.
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Figure 2.8 Early drawing of a multi-dimensional, multiple scaled decision support display. The raw detail
data display is visible by mouse roll-over of the slice.

Encoded into this initial Visual Thinking Sprocket were (1) angular slices
proportional to the weighting of the dimension; (2) acceptability of specific dimensions
(pink – unacceptable, blue – acceptable); (3) individual dimension “health” or
“preference” (larger colored area is always better); (4) slices nearer the red tolerance line
are less optimal, those nearer the maximum radius are deemed near optimal; (5) labels
naming individual dimensions and their associated current values; (6) a normalized
rescaling of the dimensions; and (7) the global preference of the decision – bigger
sprockets are better than smaller sprockets.

Finally, if the operator wanted more

information about a specific dimension, a simple “mouse-over” displays the detailed raw
data behind the image.
From Figure 2.8, one can see why the resulting circular figure is called a sprocket,
with geared teeth of varying length, resembling the tooth embellished wheel that drives a
chain, or in this case, cognitive understanding.
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2.1.4.2.1 Cognitive Congruence
Presenting information to a user in an easily decipherable context is difficult. As
Tufte (2006) quoted from The Commercial and Political Atlas (London, 1786):
Information, that is imperfectly acquired, is generally as imperfectly
retained; and a man who has carefully investigated a printed table, finds, when
done, that he has only a very faint and partial idea of what he has read; and that
like a figure imprinted on sand, is soon totally erased and defaced... [pages 3-4].
This emphasizes the importance of imparting information in a fashion that is
easily understood in an effort to make it effortlessly retainable.

To transfer the

information to the user, the user must grasp its meaning quickly without being overloaded
with extraneous minutiae.
In educational parlance, people learn through three modalities: visual/spatial,
auditory/sequential and kinesthetic/tactile (Silverman 2006).

Visual learners prefer

images, symbols, diagrams, etc. as the information conduit. Concepts are holistically
understood. Thinking may be visualization three dimensions and occurs all at once rather
than sequentially. Auditory learners remember much of what they hear (and even more
about what they hear and then say).

The auditory learner is a sequential thinker,

preferring to “follow a logical pattern.” [As an interesting aside, Felder and Silverman
(1988) assert college age students tend to fall into the first category, while professors tend
to fall into the second category.] The third modality, kinesthetic/tactile learn through
touching or moving things. Learning is “anchored in the physical senses” and example or
experimentation tends to help the learner. For example, infants must touch or put things
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in their mouths to learn or understand them. Furthermore, athletes develop muscle
memory by repetition of drills and exercises – this too is learning.
2.1.4.3 Concept of Cognitive Impedance
Cognitive impedance is the human information processing analog to electrical
engineering concept of impedance matching. Cognitive matching refers to information
presentation/representation coinciding with the recipient’s internal model.

If the

representations are too discordant, the recipient must perform mental gymnastics to bring
the representations more aligned. As examples, consider the electrical matching of two
stereo systems and the problem of American aircraft horizon displays:

2.1.4.3.1 Example: Stereo systems in cars (4 Ohm) vs. home (8 Ohm)
To get the best sound from a stereo system, use components (amplifier, speakers,
etc.) that have their Ohm ratings matched. In the American market, there exist 2 types of
stereo systems: those made for automobiles are 4 ohm (4Ω) and those made for in-home
are 8 ohms (8Ω). Matching the ohmage creates the least amount of audio distortion when
the signal is sent from the amplifier to the speaker. If the components are mismatched,
that is a 4Ω (8Ω) amplifier is paired with an 8Ω (4Ω) speakers, then "dropout" or
distortion results in the speaker output. Granted, the 4Ω => 8Ω distortion (dropout) is
different from the 8Ω => 4Ω distortion (overmatching, over amping, etc.), but they both
will lead to signal distortion of different frequencies.
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2.1.4.3.2 Example: Russian versus American Horizon displays
In the flight instrument that shows whether the airplane is flying level or not, the
Russians use an outside-in display and the Americans use an inside-out display. What
this means is that the perspective of the pilot relative to the aircraft is either from inside
the plane to the horizon, or outside the plane from the horizon (Figure 2.9).

Figure 2.9 Aircraft attitude instrument

The Inside-out, FAA approved instrument (Figure 2.9.A), holds the image of the
plane/pilot still and moves that earth's horizon moving in the distance. On the other hand,
the Russian instrument (Figure 2.9.B) holds the earth still and moves the plane. Donovan
and Triggs (2006) found that FAA approved instrument had significantly more “reverse
control” errors, i.e., turning the wrong direction and then having to correct that turn. It
was suggested that the pilots tried to "move the horizon" to the wing orientation instead
of moving the wing to the horizon.
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One can recognize that each represents a valid method of presenting information
to the pilots. However, if the pilots do not have the right frame of reference and/or point
of view, the information must be transformed/interpreted by the pilot. The pilots can be
trained using simulators or receive on-the-job training. If the pilot training is for a
manned aircraft through simulators, the inside-out display matches the real cockpit
perspective. However, if the pilot is flying by remote control using a stick control and
watching the vehicle’s movement, then the outside-in display more readily replicates how
the student “thinks” about the maneuvers.

When the display matches the way the

operator thinks, it is a cognitive impedance match and the information is transferred from
interface to user without distortion or dropout.
The historic weight of the inside-out instrumentation and training has made
changing to the safer outside-in instrument nigh impossible. American pilots in exchange
programs with Russian pilots have reported the difficulty of relearning the
instrumentation.
The concept of cognitive impedance assumes the user interface (UI) is a
communication channel that can be described by engineering descriptors. If this is the
case, then a designer of user interfaces must understand the user/operator bandwidth and
test for impedance mismatch as part of the interface design process. Obviously, signal
encoding can affect the design. For instance, any video display must be formatted to
match the engineered system and match the operator’s internal visualization of the
system. It might be easier for a dynamic display to adapt to the user's expertise, i.e., shape
the UI or even shape the user training. With a bidirectional communication, the UI can
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adapt and be written in as a theoretical abstraction. For example, a context or concept
map could drive the displayed UI.
2.1.4.4 Insertion of Information through Cognitively Sensitive User
Interface/Methods
To improve the cognitive impedance match of additional network centric
information, the information must be relevant to the current task at hand, otherwise it is a
useless distraction or noise, and it must be presented in an easy to assimilate format that
makes its value readily apparent.

The visual thinking paradigm is a way to affect

impedance matching. However, just presenting data graphically does not necessarily
create impedance matching.
Within the Predator control system, three personnel are used to control the
mission of the UAV.

In particular, one of the job titles is the mission

coordinator/controller (MC) with the responsibility of gathering, prioritizing and
presenting external information to the other operators. This seems a strong argument by
the Air Force for the requirement for an intelligent information channel that combines
external information from diverse systems. The purpose of the MAGE project testbed is
to aid the MC by presenting network centric information that is relevant, timely and
presented in an easy to assimilate format for the UAV/UCAV pilot or sensor operator.
2.1.5 Situation Awareness
When one discusses human factors engineering and user interfaces in complex,
dynamic systems, we are entering the domain of situation awareness. We say an operator
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has situation awareness of the system when he/she has knowledge of all critical aspects of
a controlled system. Endsley and Kiris (1995) formally defined situation awareness as
the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space,
the comprehension of their meaning, and projection of their status in the near future”.
This definition of situation awareness suggested by Endsley and Kiris is echoed by many
other researchers (Table 2.1).
Table 2.2 The definitions of Situation Awareness (SA) in complex and dynamic environments
(Vidulich et al., 1994)
Definitions
Conscious awareness of actions within two mutually embedded
four-dimensional envelopes.
The pilot's continuous awareness of self and aircraft in relation to
the dynamic environment of flight, threats, and mission and the
ability to forecast then execute tasks based on that perception.
The ability to extract, integrate, access, and act upon task relevant
information is a skilled behavior known as "situation awareness".
The accurate perception of the factors and conditions that affect an
aircraft in its flight crew.
The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the
projection of their status in the near future.
The knowledge that results when attention is allocated to a zone of
interest at a level of abstraction.
The pilot's overall appreciation of his current 'world'.
One's ability to remain aware of everything that is happening at the
same time and to integrate that sense of awareness into what one is
doing at the moment.
Where refers to spatial awareness… What characterizes identity
awareness, or the pilot's knowledge of the presence of threats and
their objectives, [as well as] engine status and flight performance
parameters? Who is associated with responsibility, or automation
awareness; that is, knowledge about 'who's in charge'. Finally,
when signifies temporal awareness and addresses knowledge of
events as the mission evolves.
The ability to envision the current and near-term disposition of
friendly and enemy forces.
Awareness of conditions and threats in the immediate surroundings.
The ability to maintain an accurate perception of the surrounding
environment, both internal and external to the aircraft, as well as,
identify problems and/or potential problems, recognize a need for
action, note deviations in the mission, and maintain awareness of
tasks performed.
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Sources
Beriger & Hancock,
1998
Carroll, 1992

Companion, Corso &
Kass, 1990
Edens, 1991
Endsley, 1990

Fracker, 1988
Gibson & Garrett,
1992
Haines & Flateau,
1992
Harwood, Barnett, &
Wickens, 1988

Masters, McTaggart,
& Green, 1986
Morishige & Ratelle,
1985
Prince & Salas,
1993

Definitions
[Situational awareness] means that the pilot has to integrate
understanding of factors that will contribute to the safe flying of the
aircraft under normal or non-normal conditions.
Situation awareness refers to the ability to rapidly bring to
consciousness those characteristics that evolve during flight.
The pilot's knowledge about his surroundings in light of his mission
goals.

Sources
Regal, Rogers, &
Bouchek, 1988
Wickens, 1992
Whitaker & Klein,
1988

Endsley’s defined three levels of situation awareness: Level 1 SA is awareness or
perception; Level 2 SA is comprehension within the context of the current task or
operator goal; and finally, Level 3 SA reflects the ability of the operator to predict the
future outcomes base on the current situation. A simplified model of SA in dynamic
decision making inspired by Endsley (2006) is illustrated in Figure 2.10, but there are
some key elements that have been moved for emphasis. Note that Level 3 SA depends
on Level 2 SA, which in turn depends on Level 1 SA.
It should be noted, according to Klein (2009), that Situation Awareness is a
measurement tool that takes no past information into account. In particular, it takes no
user’s domain experience into account.

Further criticisms fall into two categories:

1) Are explicit measures necessary when more naturalistic techniques are available and
appropriate (Durso, Bleckley et al. 2007) – is it long-term memory?; and 2) Then there
are those that question the validity of the SA construct (Dekker and Woods 2002) – is this
an artificial construct that is already addressed by research in attention?
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Figure 2.10 Model of Situation Awareness in a Dynamic Decision Making (derived from Endsley
2006)

Examining Figure 2.10 from top to bottom, the System Factors are those factors
inherent to the task domain or designed into the task/user interface.

For example,

operators monitoring multiple aircraft within a small domestic market such as
Dayton, OH (1.3 million total passengers during 2006 and nestled on a very sparse 4,500!
acres http://www.daytonairport.com/index.htm) is quite different from operators
monitoring a large international market such as the Ronald Reagan International Airport,
Washington, DC with 18.7 million total passengers during 2006 (10.2 times more
passengers than Dayton!) and a very dense 840 acres (only 733 acres above water!)
http://www.metwashairports.com/reagan/about_reagan_national/air_traffic_statistics_2]).
The mental stress of the air traffic controllers in Dayton International Airport can be
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assumed to be much less than Ronald Reagan International Airport. The scale and
complexity of the software and hardware for each market must be much different. The
automation and decision support included in the systems will be of different
complexities.
The Task Factors involve an operator feedback loop (very similar to the Boyd’s
(1996) OODA loop) that interprets elements of the real environment to construct a mental
map, called the situation awareness, as the basis of decisions and actions that follow. If
the situation awareness is not complete (enough), the decision and the action can be
faulty. The feedback loop allows the operator to self-correct if the action does not fit the
predicted outcome.
Finally, the Individual Factors can bias or shade the situation awareness of the
operator.

Because the operator’s goals and objectives may differ slightly from the

optimal solution’s objective, a first time operator may find an acceptable goal to be not
crashing, whereas the mission statement may require a full surveillance of the target
zone.

Furthermore,

an

individual

operator’s

personality,

background,

and

resourcefulness may shade the preconceptions of what is or is not acceptable within the
mission goal parameters. Each operator will have their own level of aptitude, experience
and training. It is hoped that training will weed out the inept, but this is not guaranteed.
Furthermore, additional training is often substituted for actual experience, but it is
precisely the combination of aptitude, experience and training that provide the support for
the skills (information processing skills), long term memory stores, and automaticity.
(Automaticity is “performing without thinking”, for example, the automatic muscle
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memory that allows a driver to automatically drive home without thinking about the
route.

Whole segments of a trip can be “blanked out” by the driver, with no

understanding of the details of how they got from point A to point B.)
Of these three factors, situation awareness of the system is experienced in the
Task Factors. The other two factors influence or bias the interpretation of existing
information of the current situation, but the actual actions based on the operator’s
understanding of the situation is in the Task Factors. Next, the individual levels of SA
are examined.
2.1.5.1 Level 1 Situation Awareness (Level 1 SA)
The “basic building block” of all levels of SA is Level 1 SA. Level 1 SA is the
recognition that something in the environment needs attention. This is the most basic of
all situation awareness levels, but failure to recognize a problem in the environment can
have horrendous repercussions. The processing of Level 1 SA is “bottom-up” 7, i.e., the
scanning of all the data to find any unusual data points.

7

“There are two basic modes of processing. ‘Bottom-up processing,’ also termed ‘data-driven processing,’
is processing initiated when data are bound to variables in bottom level subschemata that move upward
to activate the higher level schemata in which the subschemata are embedded. ‘Top-down processing,’
also called ‘conceptually driven processing,’ is processing initiated when top level schemata activate
embedded subschemata in the expectation that these subschemata will fit the data … Data-driven
processing moves from part to whole, and conceptually driven processing moves from whole to part …
Data-driven processing is subconscious, automatic, and guided by the principle that ‘all the data must be
accounted for,’ while conceptually driven processing is conscious, purposive, and guided by high level
plans and goals.”
Casson, R W (1983). "Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology." Annual Review of Anthropology
12(1): 429-462.
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Approximately 76.3% of accidents reviewed by Jones and Endsley (1996) for the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were directly attributed to failure to
perceive needed information. It thus follows that the level of SA to which user interfaces
need to focus is Level 1 SA and the critical cues of the domain need to be emphasized by
the designer to aid the operator.
How does one design a Level 1 SA UI? Endsley and Kiris (1995) posit that
critical cues are perceived in the environment when individual elements are classified
using pattern-matching prototypes; this in turn activates corresponding mental models in
long term memory. What Endsley’s theory of SA does not address is an approach to
create visual displays that present critical information cues tailored to the operators goals
and objectives. SA is enhanced when the critical cues attract the operator’s attention, are
tailored to the task (within constraints), and are related to the operator goals. By utilizing
the operator’s innate 2D pattern recognition abilities (sorting relative area), the visual
thinking display addressed Level 1 SA requirements, and thus enhance overall task
performance.
2.1.5.2 Level 2 Situation Awareness (Level 2 SA)
Nested within the Level 1 SA (perception) is Level 2 SA. This level recognizes
the need for the operator to contextualize the perceived situation. To contextualize, the
operator accesses “schemata or knowledge stored in long-term memory (Rumelhart,
1984) which are activated by recognized patterns in incoming data” (Endsley 1988).
Level 2 SA is “top-down” processing, i.e., goal directed. An operator has a set of goals
that directs their attention to specific, relevant information in the environment.
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Level 1 SA (“bottom-up”) and Level 2 SA (“top-down”) work in combination and in
parallel with each other in a means-ends process that, if working properly, quickly zooms
in on pertinent information.
operator’s situation awareness.

Each level depends on the other to fully develop the
When working together, the perceived data and the

operator goals afford meaning and significance, transforming the disconnected data into
relevant information. 8
How important is Level 2 SA? Approximately 20.3% of accidents reviewed by
Jones and Endsley (1996) for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were
directly attributed to failure to Level 2 SA. This means the operator was able to detect or
perceive that a problem existed, but was not able to recognize its importance or meaning
within the context of the operator’s mission. That is, the perceived problem’s importance
was down played.
According to Endsley and Kiris (1995), this combination of perception and
contextualizing “activate the appropriate goals and models”, i.e., it triggers a cognitive
schemata or pattern. Connecting the appropriate situation pattern to the current situation
allows the operator to access long-term working memory for suitable mental models.
Activating the mental models is a “bottle-neck” within the information processing system
of complex, dynamic systems (Endsley 1988). Designing a user interface that facilitates
this connection process would assist situation awareness: the design has to be domain

8

The use of the terms data versus information is intentional. From a strictly cognitive science viewpoint:
data + meaning  information. For example, 12, 3, 2 are data, but if you include the context (meaning)
of being numbers within Christmas song titles, they become information (“Twelve Days of Christmas”,
“We Three Kings of Orient Are”, “All I want for Christmas is my Two Front Teeth”).
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specific to capture the significant data in the environment; and help the operator make the
connections by utilizing the operator’s cognitive strengths.

Figure 2.11 Cognitive processes influencing the formation of SA (Endsley and Kiris 1995)

This active combining of Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA is situation assessment
(Endsley and Kiris 1995), where “internal cognitive constructs such as attention, pattern
matching, and long-term working memory influence what data in the environment” is
attended to, and what the final “snapshot” of SA encompasses (Figure 2.11).
Additionally, experience as a major external influence from the environment. (Of course,
SA is always fluid/dynamic and never static nor complete.
incomplete SA used to make decisions.)
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The “final SA” is the

To summarize the above discussion, situation awareness is not passive, and most
definitely situation assessment is a very cognitively active.

The activities driving

situation assessment are separate from the resulting constructed situation awareness. As
Tenney et al. (1992) states,
[t]he state of awareness with respect to information and knowledge is the product.
The process, in contrast, involves an active and dynamic series of cognitive
activities. Maintenance of situation awareness is not easy because the process
requires mental resources that may be in competition with ongoing task
performance. The information gathering activities that contribute to situation
awareness therefore may heighten workload momentarily. However, a principal
benefit of achieving situation awareness is that the operator or crewmember is
prepared to deal with upcoming events such that the extreme surges in workload
that can occur in unexpected circumstances are avoided. [p.2-3]
2.1.5.3 Level 3 Situation Awareness (Level 3 SA)
Finally, the final level of situation awareness is Level 3 SA, projection. Level 3
SA is the result of the active cognitive mechanisms (attention, pattern matching, and
long-term working memory) behind Level 1 SA (perception) and Level 2 SA (context).
The perception and fusion of external data from the environment (Level 1 SA) along with
information culled and guided by the operator’s goals and mental models allow the
operator to predict or project potential future states of the system (Level 3 SA).
Recall from the previous two sections, accidents reviewed by Jones and Endsley
(1996) for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were directly allocated to
76.3% (Level 1 SA) and 20.3% (Level 2 SA).

In other words, accidents directly

attributable to the Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA were 96.6% of the total accidents and only
3.3% was attributable to Level 3 SA. One way of explaining this is that once the problem
is identified and placed in context, most pilots are able to respond satisfactory to the
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existing problem. Therefore, designing a user interface just to address Level 3 SA does
not have a large return of investment. For that reason, this research will be designing the
user interface towards Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA. Improvements in the Level 3A will
be considered icing on the cake.
2.1.5.4 Situation Awareness Assessment Tools – SAGAT and SPAM
After this long discussion with regards to situation awareness, one would
naturally ask: “What does this give me?” and “How do I measure SA?” The SA theory
allows one to directly measure complex dynamic situations.

Thus, comparing two

different user interfaces can be achieved directly by comparing the operator’s SA for
each interface.
With regards to the second question, one must next decide whether the subjects
are required to memorize the situation or are they allowed to “look up” the answer. If the
first, then the subject should be well versed in the domain! The operator must be able to
mentally reconstruct the supplied information to reach a conclusion. Since our subjects
for the first two experiments were not subject matter experts, this did not seem feasible.
If the latter, then the SA measures the subjects ability to locate the correct information!
This seems to more accurately reflect real world complex domains.

Thus, the SA

assessment tools considered for this experiment were SAGAT and SPAM, two very
interesting assessment methods.

(There is a veritable alphabet soup of assessment

methods, but these two are of particular interest within the operator assessment domain
according to the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EOSAN).)

52

“The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) is a global
tool developed to assess SA across all of its elements based on a comprehensive
assessment of operator SA requirements” (Endsley and Kiris 1995).

Endsley’s

assessment technique requires the stopping of the experiment while hiding the
information on the display.

The Situation Present Assessment Measure, or SPAM

(Durso, Rawson, & Girotto, 2007), assesses the speed of accessing information from a
nonblanked display and provides a more sensitive, continuously distributed (time)
measure that will be less likely (than SAGAT) to be at floor levels because of memory
decay. Although Endsley prefers the SAGAT assessment tool, this research followed the
recommendations of the EOSAN for measuring SA in the UAV domain and used SPAM,
precisely because the subjects were inexperienced.
2.1.6 Separate, Integral and Configural Displays
Finally, one can describe this display with respect to display design organization.
Any user interface performs two functions: it presents the important state information (as
envisioned by the designers) to the user and it enables the user to perform tasks to
accomplish their goals. An interface should extract the critical features of the problem
space to enable users to achieve their goals. Furthermore, “the interfaces control-display
relationship should be consistent with human perceptual and cognitive abilities so that
effective control of the design process can be achieved” (Rothrock, Barron et al. 2006).
Another view of this presented by Edlund and Lewis (1995) states that any design
methodology must:
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1. Make a relevant process easy to discriminate
2. The process behavior (changes in state) intelligible
3. If mapping between display states, behaviors in the process being
controlled “easy” to follow
4. Do all the above simultaneously, within a single representation
This is very difficult and has had much research time expended on designing the visual
representations (Pomerantz 1986; Barnett and Wickens 1988; Wickens and Carswell
1995; Jenkins 2007).
2.1.6.1 The Gulf of Evaluation
Pomerantz (1986) proposed three relationships among visual stimuli: separable,
integral and configural. A separable relationship has no interaction between dimensions,
such as sound volume does not affect the perception of length. At the opposite extent, an
integral relationship cannot separate the relationship between dimensions, such as mass
and gravity combine to form weight. An intermediate configural relationship can be
defined by the independence of the dimensions that has an emergence of a new property,
such as the relative sizes of independent population bubble graphs. There may not be an
explicit ordering of the data on the graph, but the observer can identify an implicit
ordering based on the size of the bubbles – this sort ability is the new emergent feature.
According to Wickens and Carswell (1995) the Proximity Compatibility Principle
(PCP) “specifies that displays relevant to a common task or mental operation should be
rendered close together in perceptual space.” This defines the relationships between task
demands and the graphical form of a display (separable, integral, configural).
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The PCP’s “close together in perceptual space” means both display (physical)
proximity and mental proximity. To have display proximity nearness one needs: spatial
proximity (physical distance), chromatic proximity (same or different color), code
homogeneity (coding properties to be similar or different), and geometric form (integral
or configural versus separable displays).
On the other hand, mental proximity, meaning the “extent to which information
from the various sources in a display must be considered together to accomplish a task”
(Rothrock, Barron et al. 2006), has three categories: integrative processing (highest
proximity), nonintegrative processing (intermediate proximity), and independent
processing (lowest proximity). Integrative processing from multiple sources must be
explicitly combined (e.g., probability of survival requires information about SAM sites,
enemy aircraft and enemy positions). Nonintegrative processing similar features can be
categorized (e.g., oil- and engine-temperatures).

On the other hand, independent

processing has no interaction between sources (e.g., distance-to-base and airtemperature). (However, to calculate time-to-return-to-base may require distance-to-base
and air-temperature.)
The Gulf of Evaluation (GoE) is the “nearness” of the display proximity and the
mental proximity. An efficient interaction has a small GoE and occurs when the display
proximity matches the mental proximity, creating a cognitive congruence. When these
do not match, there exists a large GoE or cognitive dissonance.

Performance on

integrated tasks (high mental proximity) is predicted to be facilitated by displays that
have high perceptual proximity (integral or configural displays), i.e., analog gauges are
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more conducive to driving a car. By the same token, performance on focused tasks (low
mental proximity) is predicted to be facilitated by displays that have low perceptual
proximity (e.g., text tables are good for baseball batting statistics).
2.1.6.2 The Gulf of Execution
PCP may constrain displays so that efficient interaction can occur, it does not,
however, specify the form.

Display control literature has developed general design

guidelines called the principles of control-display compatibility (Wickens, 1992), that
stipulate:
•
•
•
•

The spatial arrangement of controls should allow users to easily tell which
control is used.
The indicator of a display should move in the same direction as its control.
The layout of the operational method of controls should be consistent with
expectations of the user population.
The direction in which a part moves on the display should be consistent with
user expectations.

These principles serve as a guide that uses user expectations to guide the display
design choices. For example, “bigger is better” might translate to a bar graph size
indicating the relative merits of that dimension. When these expectations are not met,
there exists a mental dissonance and the Gulf of Execution (GoE) is said to be larger.
These principles have been incorporated into the design of the visual thinking
display artifacts and the entire suite of displays for this research. The text tables were
modified to incorporate color as a visual cue to out of tolerance, and thus become
configural displays of the most basic type. The bar graph display was chosen as a naïve
design attempt as a graphical user interface. The bar graphs were grouped by dimension
(FoM) to create a display proximity advantage for the dimension (number of SAM sites).
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However, by definition of the bar chart form, this in turn presented a poor display
proximity for the by UAV tasks (Which UAV had a better chance of survival?). This
mental proximity disjointedness is inherent to the bar graph feature set – if the bar graph
is displayed along the UAV axis instead of the FoM axis, the mental proximity problem
would just be reversed. The mission decision aide (the configural visual thinking display
for experiment 1) incorporated the same out of tolerance color cue, had the within UAV
display proximity (the widget itself) and across dimension display proximity (adjoining
widgets had dimensions represented in the same relative positions, making comparisons
relatively easy).

2.2 Domain
The use of unmanned vehicles in the military and Homeland Security applications
are specifically for those missions that are too long, dangerous, or dirty to waste human
resources. When a mission has a long duration, the human operator’s attention may
wane; resulting is in a less than stellar mission result. In dangerous missions, such as
surveillance over enemy territory or rescue missions in toxic environments, the use of
unmanned vehicles lowers human injury and death rates. Finally, missions that are
uncomfortable can be a distraction to the human operator, possibly causing the failure of
mission objectives.
As a final argument for the use of UAVs, let us examine the economics of using
and crewing UAV systems.

UAVs are simpler and easier to operate than manned

aircraft; hence the cost of training is much less. For instance, training a rated pilot costs
over one million dollars and incurs a yearly salary of $80-$100K. Compare that to

57

training costs of UAV operators from the enlisted ranks ($30K), with salaries closer to
$30K per year. Furthermore, since there is no onboard crew, no crew safety training nor
life support systems need to be integrated into the UAV systems. Finally, the control
systems can be made simpler, bringing down the cost further and simplifying design.
The U.S. military is interested in applying single operator/supervisor control of
multiple UAVs to their unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) missions; in particular,
(1) search, (2) search and rescue (SAR), (3) search and destroy (SAD), and
(4) suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions (SRA International Inc. 2005).
SEAD “is the activity that neutralizes, destroys, or suppresses enemy [Air Defense (AD)]
systems in a specific area by physical attack and [Electronic Warfare (EW)] to enable
[Tactical Air] operations to be successfully conducted. It increases the probability of
success and reduces the loss of friendly air power” (Army 2000). The SEAD mission has
two forms:

non-lethal (disruptive suppression) and lethal (destructive suppression).

Disruptive suppression complements destructive suppression, and is best used to:
(1) degrade jammable threats; (2) assist destructive ground-based and airborne
suppression systems in suppressing surface-to-air defense systems; (3) temporarily
degrade or neutralize enemy AD systems when destruction is not possible or feasible; and
(4) sustain suppression effects achieved by destruction, once the threats have been
reduced to levels commensurate with the objective.
If we compare the two varieties of SEAD mission in a communications scenario,
the differences become clear. The non-lethal SEAD mission employs UAVs that use
electronic countermeasures to jam communication channels, thereby suppressing the
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enemy command and control.

Non-lethal SEAD can also use force to temporarily

damage communications towers, without obliterating the whole communications
infrastructure. On the other hand, lethal SEAD destroys the enemy communication
infrastructure using any military force deemed necessary, including armed UAVs. The
intent is to inflict so much destruction that alternate means will be needed to
communicate within the military and civilian societies for the foreseeable future.
Recovering from a non-lethal SEAD mission is relatively painless compared to the
rebuilding required if the lethal SEAD mission achieves its goals. As the Army FieldManual 1-114 (2000) points out, lethal and non-lethal SEAD methods can be used in
conjunction with each other. Each of these SEAD missions is currently used by the
military (individually and collectively).

This research addresses only the non-lethal

SEAD mission.
2.2.1 Control of UAVs
Controlling UAVs falls under three categories: (1) individual, (2) small team, and
(3) swarm size. Each of these categories requires different assumptions and levels of
control. Currently, the standard control paradigm is flying individual UAVs by a small
group of individuals.

The UAVs do not need to be autonomous and the control

mechanism can model operator control. Small groups require a more sophisticated, semiautonomous UAV and transfer the control mechanism towards a supervisory role.
However, the “pilot” may take operator level control of individual UAVs. On the other
hand, swarm control requires a smart, autonomous UAV with a nearly pure supervisory
control model.
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The Predator family of UAVs is the leading deployed production UAV system.
During the 1990’s, the usefulness of the Predator as a surveillance platform was proven
very effective. The Predator UAV started as an operator controlled vehicle, but is slowly
evolving towards a semi-autonomous combat workhorse. Since this research required an
existing UAV system to test its theories, the Predator’s evolution of purpose and
sophistication fit those requirements.
Although swarm control is an interesting topic by itself, this research only
examined the controlling of individual UAVs and small teams of UAVs.
2.2.1.1 Control of Individual UAVs
Individual UAVs can be controlled by pilot operators in a manner similar to how
a pilot controls a manned combat aircraft, i.e., stick and rudder. However, since the
operator is situationally removed from the UAV and the feedback is drastically limited,
forming a technological anomie, as experience has shown that the piloted aircraft control
model is not the correct model with respect to UAVs. Experience has changed the
control model to a “point and click” mouse driven operator interface.
The primary consumers of UAVs, the military and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), discussed the control of UAVs during the CERI 2nd Annual Human
Factors of UAVs (2005) sponsored workshop. Question and answer sessions were held
with current UAV operators from the United States Air Force and Army along with a
representative of the DHS and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
following information was gleaned from those discussions.

60

The

One of the major concerns for the operator is situational awareness because of the
lack of sensory feedback. Each of the military branches uses their own resources and
philosophies to try to address this problem. Each branch had a representative discuss
these military philosophies at the Cognitive Engineering Research Institute (CERI) 2nd
Workshop.
Currently, in the United States Air Force, each Predator UAV requires three
persons to complete a mission: an operator, a sensor operator (SO), and a mission
controller/coordinator (MC). The Predator is a large UAV, approximately one third of
the size of an F-16 fighter aircraft. The corporate mindset of the Air Force considers the
UAV operator to be equivalent to a rated officer; this means the operator is an officer
who has gone through the same initial training as any pilot or a rated navigator who has
passed instrument flight ground school training. Since the Air Force considers the ability
to “place one’s self into a remote vehicle” difficult, it has stated that it expects a pilot
may crash at least one UAV during training and still remain a viable candidate for pilot
operator (Gunter and Lytle 2005). Furthermore, the operators may be literally located
half way around the world from the battlefield; for example, while the UAVs flying in
Iraq II were launched and landed by pilots stationed in Iraq, the missions were flown by
operators based in Nevada. Although difficult, projecting oneself into the remote vehicle
is seen as essential to effective operator situation awareness.
On the other hand, The United States Navy requires only two rated officers as
operators for their UAVs. The navigator and weapons specialist positions are combined
(Cummings and Guerlain 2004). The Navy’s UAV interest seems directed more towards
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intelligent munitions that can be launched from sea and redirected afterwards. Retrieval
of the weapons system does not seem to be an important issue. The naval intelligent
munitions can be launched from an aircraft carrier, while the operator can be located on
the same ship, a different ship, or on a naval base on land. Once again, the operator’s
ability to project themselves into the remote vehicle’s situation is considered essential to
the success of the mission.
The third military branch, the United States Army, uses enlisted and warrant
officer personnel to operate their rotary and fixed wing UAVs. When choosing personnel
for training, the army selects the enlisted personnel with experience using computer game
and/or sophisticated model airplanes.

The Army expects the knowledge gained in

immersive gaming and model airplane flying to translate into the operator being able to
project themselves into the UAV’s remote situation.
2.2.1.2 Multiple UAV Control
As Cummings (2004) pointed out, “while currently [UAVs] require relatively
concentrated input for flight control, in the future, it is likely that the human role for
direct flight control will diminish and the need for supervisory control, to include higherlevel cognitive reasoning, will become much more substantial.” In other words, in order
for the services to progress from the individual UAVs to multiple UAVs, the individual
UAV is required to become more autonomous. This changes the control model from an
operator/pilot control paradigm to a supervisor control paradigm. The supervisor control
paradigm presents a lower human risk and cost than traditional pilot-controlled aircraft
and it is a lower cost alternative to single UAV operator-controlled aircraft.
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Recent research examining autonomous pack control issues have examined
heterogeneous teams (Tambe 1998), homogeneous wolf packs (Lewis, Polvichai et al.
2005) and autonomous wingman (Cummings and Morales 2005).

Tambe’s (1998)

research examined heterogeneous UAV teams, in which each UAV had a unique role and
explicit responsibilities – commander, scout and attacker. Each role had explicit rules;
had to have all failures explicitly accounted for; and explicitly defined rules for recovery.
This strict enforcement of roles is a very brittle, complicated system that does not easily
scale up to larger groupings.

Furthermore, the teams used an “explicit model of

teamwork”, known as the joint intentions framework. The joint intentions framework
creates an intention or commitment by the team to perform a task.
commitment, all teammates must mutually believe:

To create the

(1) that the task has not been

performed, (2) the task needs to be performed, and (3) that until the status of the task
changes to be mutually known to all teammates to be achieved, unachievable or
irrelevant, it remains a goal. If one team member finds that the task becomes achieved,
unachievable or irrelevant, then this team member makes its new task to be that of
changing the team’s mutual belief to reflect its own beliefs.
When one compares this approach with Lewis, Polvichai et al. (2005), teams are
referred to as packs; the packs are homogeneous – utilizing intelligent munitions; and
modeled after wolf pack attacking methods. Most importantly, in Lewis’ approach, there
are no unique roles. For instance, in a search and destroy, each UAV is initially assigned
a search role. If a UAV finds a target it calls for reinforcements to form a pack. Once it
is formed, the pack may attack en masse or sequentially with a lone UAV always held in
reserve to perform battle damage assessment. If the target is of high enough priority, the
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arrival of a second UAV can initiate the attack on the target by the first UAV. If the first
UAV does not destroy the target, then the second UAV waits for a third’s arrival before
proceeding to attack, and so on….
The autonomous wingman (Cummings and Morales 2005) typically uses the
UAVs as defensive weapons and battle damage assessment recorders.

The UAVs

assigned the “wingman” role in a tactical air formation are controlled remotely by the
lead manned aircraft. Who, what, where, when, and why the pilot’s commands are
executed is of intense interest to the researchers of the autonomous wingman paradigm.
As Cummings and Morales (2005) point out, “[p]reliminary research suggests that
without higher levels of autonomy and a shift from management-by-consent to
management-by-exception control strategies, the workload of pilots controlling UAVs inflight, especially single seat pilots, will be too high.”
2.2.2 Autonomous Agents
How autonomous is autonomous enough? If we assume that technologies already
available to larger aircraft (automatic take-off and landings, collision avoidance, etc.) will
soon be available to UAVs, then the argument can be made that the current or near term
UAVs are autonomous enough.

These leading edge UAVs can be modeled as an

autonomous intelligent agent and any improvements to the current technology can also be
modeled.
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Table 2.3 Agent criteria and rationale

Ferber (1999) defines an autonomous agent is a
biological, mechanical or virtual entity
that is capable of acting in an environment;

that can communicate directly [or indirectly] with
other agents;
that is driven by a set of tendencies (has autonomy);
which possesses resources of its own;
that is capable of perceiving its environment
(although limited);
that has only a partial representation of this
environment;
which possesses skills and can offer services;
that may be able to reproduce itself; and
whose behavior tends towards satisfying its
objectives, taking account of the resources and skills
available to it and depending on its perception, its
representations in the communications it receives.

Rationale
Environment affects decisions each
UAV makes, pop-up entities can affect
the UAV’s route
Communicate directly and indirectly
(through other agents) with other agents
Target detection affects tendencies
Has weapons and fuel
Perception of physical and virtual
stigmatic information
Local view that can be augmented with
neighboring agents views
Can search for or attack targets
Each agent has a specific role and
mission

In preparation of the UAV hardware technology catching up with the
requirements of autonomy, the Multiple-UAV Agency (MAGE) simulation testbed was
created. Table 2.3 shows how the MAGE UAV agents fit the agent programming criteria
as defined by Ferber (1999) and the rationale applied to show how the UAVs in the
MAGE simulation fit these criteria.

The MAGE environment is a distributed

heterogeneous multi-agent simulation testbed using a flexible and portable interactive
simulation infrastructure designed to be extensible. MAGE is a research testbed that
permits exploring different facets of controlling multiple UAVs, such as, network centric
information synthesis, supervisory control, path planning, multi-sensor data fusion, etc.
However, having an agent in an environment is not enough. Agents have only a
partial, local representation of their environment. There is no global awareness of the
evolving environment (situation); this exactly mimics how it is in human society. To
overcome this weakness, humans form groups and share local information to create a
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more global awareness. This awareness does not guarantee omniscience, but rather less
situation ignorance. The equivalent in the agent paradigm is the multi-agent system
(MAS). Table 2.4 illustrates how the simulation within the MAGE structure will fulfill
the MAS criteria.
Table 2.4 Simulation swarm criteria and rationale

Ferber (1999) defines a MAS application Rationale of MAGE as MAS
as requiring
an environment, E
Simulated geographic location, including
bases, no-fly zones, etc.
a set of situated objects, O
MAGE objects include targets, bases,
UAVs, “red/blue forces”, etc.
an assembly of agents, A, (a subset of Some of the simulation agents are the
objects)
UAVs agents and the target agents
an assembly of relations R, that link the A UAV can communicate capabilities,
objects (and agents)
mission, etc.
an assembly of operations, Op, allows the Each UAV search, destroy, perceive, etc.
agents to act on the objects; and
operators whose task is to represent the Decision Support Interface (DSI) agent,
application and react to these operations.
Wizard of OZ (WOOZ) agent, etc.
Based on these two lists of criteria, this simulation fits comfortably into the agentbased programming and MAS paradigms. However, the “intelligence” of the individual
agents may be programmatically internal or external to the agent, i.e., the MAGE
software contains legacy software that does not necessarily contain fully encapsulated
agents.
2.2.3 Humans in Complex Systems
Sheridan (1997) asserted that there are many alternatives to the human/machine
interface, the extremes of the spectrum being technology-centered and human-centered
paradigms. The technology-centered paradigm insists “everything that can be automated
should be automated,” while the human-centered approach believes one should “allocate
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to the human the tasks best suited to the human, allocate to the automation the tasks best
suited to it.” Within human-centered automation exists a wide spectrum of alternatives:
static or dynamic allocation; by function or by mission.
If we contrast the goals of technological automation to human-centered
automation; we find that the technological automation is trying to take the human out of
the system (presumably, because it is the weak link). As Hildebrandt and Harrison
(2002) precisely state, “automation promises to extend or support human performance, to
compensate for human performance deficits, to relieve the human of routine tasks, or to
replace the human altogether.” On the other hand, the human-centered automation goal
creates human/machine systems in which the operator retains control in well-defined
tasks such that the performance of both the machine and human is optimized
(Hildebrandt and Harrison 2002).

In other words, the human should be intimately

involved in the process without being overwhelmed. It also means the human and
machine need to work as a cohesive unit, and not as disjoint components.
In dynamic complex systems, the human interaction in the system has two control
methods at opposite extremes of the autonomy spectrum: human-in-the-loop (HIL) and
human-out-of-the-loop (HOL). The HIL operator has more manual control over its
system and, hence, is more active in the decision process; while the HOL operator has
less control (since the system tends to run itself) and so this operator tends to be more
passive. The HIL operator tends to remain more vigilant and less complacent, since they
are actively assisting in the decision making process. The active involvement of the
operator improves the operator’s situational awareness (SA) (Ruff 2000). HIL operators
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typically have faster response time and more accurate failure detection performance than
HOL (Hildebrandt and Harrison 2003).
When the operator is performing in HOL mode, then the individual UAV agent
being controlled must be fully autonomous. Endsley and Kiris (1995) argue the loss of
manual skills is a major concern for HOL operation. After interviewing eleven fighter
pilots, Rouse, Geddes et al. (1987-1988) found “... there is a clear consensus [among the
pilots] that the pilot should be in charge.” This clearly makes a reasonable argument for
lower levels of automation so that one can achieve HIL operator efficiency and maintain
SA. These human/agent systems are replacements for currently existing systems; that is,
a pilot is replaced by an operator and a manned aircraft is replaced by an unmanned aerial
vehicle. Notice the one-to-one correspondence with pilot/operator and plane/UAV. The
previous research assumes that the system design must mimic current job divisions and
methodologies. This argument is not necessarily sound for the emerging multiple UAV
systems research.
However, with regards to multiple UAV control, the loss of manual skills should
not be the reason for overloading the operator with information. Multiple UAVs must be
able to be controlled separately and as a unit. Two facts should seem obvious: 1) one
person cannot (simultaneously) fly multiple UAVs manually, and 2) a completely
autonomous UAV will not be trusted. One must find the right level of automation to
assure the best SA for the operator/supervisor.

As Ruff (2000) points out, even

automation intended to function autonomously will occasionally require operator
intervention.
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It thus follows that we must find a level of automation, which is dynamic,
somewhere between fully autonomous and manual.
2.2.4 Levels of Automation
Different levels of automation can be introduced into a decision support system
from fully automated, which leaves the supervisor/operator out of the decision process, to
the computer making no decisions and thus forcing the operator to make all of the
decisions. Modern supervisory control inserts a computer to track progress of a complex
dynamic task (see Figure 2.12)

Human
Supervisor

Human
Computer
Interface

Computer

Computer
Task
Interface

Task

Figure 2.12 Human supervisory control – adapted from (Sheridan 1997)

Parasuraman, Sheridan et al. (2000) suggests ten levels of automation (LOA).
These levels of automation can be categorized into three potential LOA paradigms:
(1) manual

control

[level

10],

(2) management-by-consent

[levels

5-9],

and

(3) management-by-exception [levels 1-4]. In manual control, automation is inactive
until explicitly activated by the operator, when the operator gives up control.

In

management-by-consent, the automatic problem solver proposes actions and requires
explicit operator approval to proceed. Management-by-exception allows the automatic
problem solver to act without requesting approval from the operator and will not act only
when explicitly commanded by the operator.
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Table 2.5 Different operator control paradigms provide different sets of strengths and challenges to
C2 interface designers. As always, designers should examine potential methods for combining the
aspects desired into hybrid approaches. (Lewis, Polvichai et al. 2005)

Direct Control

Management by Consent

Commands

•
•

Operator does all
decision making and
information
processing
Requires operator to
constantly attend to
vehicle
High workload

Status, Plans

Requests

Status

•

Management by Exception

Approvals

•
•
•
•

•

Vehicle performs
planning and sends plan
to operator for approval
Vehicle performs no
action without obtaining
operator approval
Operator highly
interruption-driven
Operator must react
quickly to ensure
vehicle safety for time
critical actions
Moderate workload

Overrides

•
•
•
•
•

Vehicle performs
planning, sends plan to
operator, begins execution
Operator has ability to
override vehicle actions,
plans
Operator must maintain
awareness of situation
Requires high degree of
intelligence, autonomy for
vehicle
Low workload

Franke, Zaychik et al. (2005) illustrated the different operator control paradigms
explicitly (see Table 2.5).

The military branches currently use direct control for

individual UAVs. Pack control require management-by-consent and management-byexception. The level or emphasis is related to the autonomy of the UAVs.
Ruff (2000) found that management-by-consent was the most appropriate
operator control mechanism for a small number of UAVs, usually considered a pack level
(four or less UAVs).
2.2.5 Human Role in Multiple UAV Control
Cummings (2004) suggests that within the supervisory levels of automation
proposed by Sheridan (1997) an additional layer describing the inter-vehicle
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communications levels of automation needs to be addressed to guarantee situational
awareness for the supervisor (See Figure 2.12).
Table 2.6 Operator and supervisor characteristics

Operator

Supervisor

Role

Tactical/Operational

Strategic

Level of Automation

Low-to-High

Medium-to-High

Minimum Level of Autonomy

Minimum network

Medium network

Maximum Size

Small (2-4)

Small-to-Medium (4-12)

Control paradigm

Direct control

Guidance only

As Table 2.6 illustrates, there are two possible roles for human control in complex
dynamic systems: operator and supervisor. The operator’s role is predisposed towards
an operational approach with intervention behavior similar to an intermittent correction
servo (Scerri, Xu et al. 2004; Lewis, Polvichai et al. 2005) , while the supervisor’s role
tends towards strategic planning, such as assigning a computer to solve a problem, and
then only intervening when computer makes a mistake or requires assistance.
The role of the human evolving from an operator to a supervisor is illustrated in
Figure 2.13. The nodes represent entities involved in the performance of a high level
mission. The arrows represent implicit and explicit exchange of information over time
throughout the mission. The Human Computer Interface is any controls and displays
necessary to interact with the computer. The Computer Task Interface is any necessary
actuators and sensors the computer needs to interact with its environment.
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Figure 2.13 Evolution of supervisory control

As Figure 2.13.a illustrates, the operator performs a task with computer
assistance. Since the levels of automation can vary the task may be performed by the
operator, the computer or combination of the two. The Human UAV interface is the
mental representation the operator forms of the UAV’s situation, i.e., position,
acceleration, etc. How well the operator can form this mental picture may determine how
well the operator projects into the UAVs situation. There is no direct communication
between the UAV and the operator. The human directs the computer as to which global
and intermediate goals need to be performed; in turn the computer directs the UAV to
perform a task (fly left, land, search, etc.); and finally, the UAV performs the task. The
UAV keeps an internal representation of its neighborhood and progress towards its task
achievement. The UAV reports on task progress by sending data back to the computer.
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The computer uses data incoming from the UAV and internal data structure
representations to update the operator through the Human Computer Interface.
The traditional supervisory role shown in Figure 2.13.b. illustrates how the
supervisor/operator no longer has direct contact with the task. The computer directs the
UAV to perform the task while the supervisor only corrects any perceived variance from
the desired outcome. The levels of automation may still in theory vary, but in a practical
sense, supervisory control is useful when the computerized system has at least a moderate
level of sophistication.
2.2.5.1 Human Supervisor Tasks
With these automation guidelines, some of the human supervisory roles for
multiple UAV control might include: 1) mission assignment, 2) subgoal assignment,
3) resource allocation, and 4) mission algorithm assignment. For instance, the mission’s
overall goal may be to identify survivors after a hurricane, but the individual UAVs may
be assigned to search different map areas. Furthermore, the supervisor may direct each
UAV to search differently depending on the priorities and exigent circumstances.
The supervisor must trust the UAVs to have a minimum level of autonomy, for
example, they must be able to continue performing assigned tasks without intervention.
While important decisions are necessarily reserved for the supervisor, this does not mean
that the supervisor is not intimately involved in the perception of the sensed data, but
rather that the UAV agent must also be highly automated in perceiving whether a sensed
blob is a target and what that target’s preliminary priority should be. If the sensed target
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is easily identified as a target by the UAV, why not utilize that information? The
supervisor cannot track all sensors in a multiple UAV group simultaneously to identify
targets and thus he requires help from the UAV in target identification. However, not all
blobs are going to be easily identified by the UAV and having a human’s pattern
recognition ability complements the UAV’s ability.
Along the three axes, the most difficult axis to model is determining the
appropriate level of automation.

As time progresses within a dynamic system, the

operator’s and UAV’s priorities and goals are going to change. For example, the internal
priorities of targets may change over time in a SEAD mission. Suppose a UAV identifies
a low priority stationary target during the initial search. The location is marked using
virtual pheromones and the supervisor’s global view is updated. The decision is made
(by the supervisor or UAV) to continue searching in hopes of finding a higher priority
target. As the mission progresses and fuel levels start to get low, suppose no new target
are identified. Then the UAV raises the priority of the already identified target and is
scheduled for attack. On the other hand, suppose a new higher priority target is found.
This higher priority target is attacked, while the supervisor has the option of assigning a
different nearby UAV to attacking the lower priority target. In this way, the UAV
resource is efficiently and optimally used.

2.3 Summary
This research overview presented several theories that individually are incomplete
as design tools. The theories’ creators (SA, NDM, etc.) purport that their specific theory
is the complete design tool, but in fact, they should be used as tools within a toolkit.
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According to Klein (2009), Situation Awareness fails as a theory because it does not use
the historical information when analyzing the designed display, but is in fact a
measurement tool that gauges the operator’s understanding of the present and future
states without formally addressing past circumstances. The fact that the operator may use
their knowledge of past events (experience) to predict future possible events is not
explicitly addressed by SA. On the other hand, Naturalistic Decision Making encourages
the context sensitive design of user interfaces, without really addressing how to assess
their validity, nor does it present a specific systematic design framework. NDM does
support the formal interview process before and after the design to ensure that the
stakeholder’s needs are met but the design is ad hoc. Missing from both of these tools
are the psychological and physiological tools needed to design the display, which is
addressed by visual thinking theory. Visual thinking emphasizes designing the display to
exploit basic visual pre-attentive cues, giving the operator the clues needed to make the
correct decision. And finally, semiotic analysis is the linkage between the domain culture
(context) and the display elements – how and why a display is used within the specific
domain.
Hence, each of these tools is purported by their supporters to be the complete
“design” package, when in fact they perform admirably as tools within a larger toolkit.
The first phase of this experiment is to develop a systematic approach that can be used by
field practitioners to design human centered, cognitively sensitive displays. The second
phase incorporated a more robust display that allowed the operator to actively monitor
the system, using historical system data to make predictions about near future states. The
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third phase integrated the developed displays into a simulator test bed and was observed
by current UAV operators.
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3 Semiosis/Semiotic Analysis of UAV Command and
Control User Interface
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Semiosis is the study of signs; including the cultural
influences on the interpretation of signs. What follows is an examination of semiotic
analysis applied to the different displays used in the command and control user interfaces.

3.1 Semiotic Analysis of UAV command and control system
Semiotic analyses applied to the domain of UAV command and control concludes
the following observations.

(1) Not all data available to the controller/operator is graphic. Reams of paper are
generated daily to inform the operator of weather, intelligence, target
destinations, etc. Some of this information is presented as images (weather
patterns overlaid on a map, target location, etc.), while some is listed in
tabular text form (available UAVs, target importance, target location, mission
goal, etc.).
(2) Information is processed through multiple data pipelines, informally known as
stovepipes. This limitation is in part forced on the system by onerous US
government regulations. Whenever a secure system is accepted by the US
government, it must pass a series of difficult tests. This testing can take over
a year! So when an accepted system needs to add a new data feed, the entire
system needs to be recertified. One way around this is to have the data
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stovepipe certified separately from the rest of the system. This requires the
addition of separate displays for the new video displays. (At one time, there
were five screens displaying separate, disjoint views of the mission.) Or, as is
the case with some data stovepipes in the UAV control domain, hardcopy text
table printouts that the operator reads/skims prior to and during mission runs.
(3) Not all information could be quickly accessed from the operator’s chair.
Some information is posted on a clipboard located away from the control
station. On shift changes, operators tended to read this information prior to
replacing current operators occupying the chair. Changes to the environment
(weather, social, mission, etc.) may be represented on one screen, and then
mentally composited on other screens by the operator.
(4) Most monitoring displays mimic existing paper/pencil tables or existing
gauges. In general, the displays do not take advantage of inherent human
cognitive perception abilities. This tends to make decisions more difficult to
arrive at and takes longer to execute. Most of the time, this time delay is not
crucial, but there does exist the possibility of a catastrophic result if the
decision is delayed or wrong.
(5) Since there is more than one person controlling the UAV, each person has his
own responsibility. It follows that there are times that the information needed
by one member is known by another or must be retrieved by another.
(6) Not all of the mission parameters are available to the operator prior to the
UAV mission launch. Since we are in a highly dynamic environment,
missions, goals and targets can change quickly and unexpectedly. Intelligence
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operators frequently hi-jack the UAV mission to accomplish new, high
priority goals. Forces in contact with enemy forces drastically alter priorities.
Informal and formal socio-political environments can alter UAV path
parameters profoundly without having an associated “data pipeline”.
Furthermore, adverse weather conditions can affect priorities on the mission
list.

One of the overarching themes of the semiotic analysis is the disjointedness of the
data/information pipelines. In part, this research presents a flexible display that can have
multiple data pipelines that can be visually organized as a static, weighted, figures of
merit decision aide or a dynamic, weighted health monitoring aide. Furthermore, the
number of axis available to view by the supervisor is flexible (range: 6-15), allowing the
supervisor to dynamically remove any inconsequential axis to further aide decision
making.

3.2 Semiotic Analysis of Alternative Interfaces
Next, we perform a semiotic analysis the different displays that could be
considered as decision aids within the multi-UAV command and control domain and look
at their strengths and weaknesses. First, we examine the original data pipeline – text
tables. This is followed by the graphical displays: bar chart for the static decision aid
display and analog gauge for the dynamic monitoring display.
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3.2.1 Text Display
As mentioned previously, the default data access to the operator for UAV
missions is the daily operations report, typically posted by the door, and more
importantly, not digital. These pages of text include daily weather reports, expected
tactical and strategic conditions, expected troop and weaponry locations (both friend and
foe), no-fly-zone information, etc. What it does not contain is information concerning
specific mission requirements, i.e., it does not contain the route the UAV is expected to
travel.
These original data tables were typically presented in generic tabular form on
several pages – the operator must be trained on where the important data is located.
Within this existing environment, there exist no cognitive cues to dynamically assist the
operator. The tables are plain black and white, without much formatting. Because of this
generic format, the learning curve is steep, and long experience of the tabular format
must be endured to become proficient. Furthermore, the data tables can be presented on a
hardcopy daily report or (a more recent innovation) through a separate screen monitor.
These two sources of data were not necessarily coordinated, nor consistent.

The

operator’s experience is used to analyze and decipher any irregularities. Furthermore,
digital tables may not be updated regularly, so the operator must be aware of possible
time lags.
This requirement of a learning curve to achieve reasonable mastery must make
one conclude that the text table in any of its forms is an iconic symbol. In fact, tables as a
generic information conduit are an iconic symbol system that is learned as a child in
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elementary school mathematics. One speaks of an iconic symbol system because the
table as an entity has many conventions involving row and column manipulations
(sorting, location, etc.) to speed data access and interpretation. Furthermore, although the
existing tables do not use visual cues, there exist some standard visual cues that can be
incorporated into the tables to aid emphasis of important data.

Figure 3.1 Static one-threshold text table display

For this research, the text tables were adapted to show upper and lower threshold
through color cueing. In the first experiment (Figure 3.1), the text tables were static with
a single threshold indicated by a red number, while the second experiment (Figure 3.2)
had dynamic text tables that were updated every second and had a low threshold and high
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threshold identified by a blue and red number, respectively. These choices of color were
chosen to reflect the western culture cues of cold (blue) and hot (red). Although not
displayed in this figure, the dynamic displays had an option of displaying the low and
high thresholds in the lower left and right corners. This was useful in predicting the
possibility of the UAV going out of tolerance in the near future (SA3).

Figure 3.2 Text table display for health monitoring system

3.2.2 Bar Chart – across and between axis
The bar chart is one of the subjects of middle school mathematics, and thus is also
an iconic sign system. Traditionally, the bar chart presents a relative scaling along one
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axis as a simple graph or as nested bar charts to examine multiple axes. In the UAV
domain, it can be presented to the operator in three versions: 1) across the Figure of
Merit (Anti-Aircraft batteries, distance, probability of success, etc.); 2) across the UAV
(UAV1, UAV2, etc.); or 3) a nested hybrid (UAV with nested FoM or FoM with Nested
UAV). The single axis charts are simpler to interpret, but have limited usefulness – if
your question about a FoM is presented via a UAV mapped bar chart, then the operator
may struggle to find an interpretation. The nested bars are difficult to interpret on a
monitor due to lack of screen space.

Figure 3.3 Bar graph display as a decision aid
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The bar graph presented in this research (Figure 3.3) chose to present across the
FoMs, and thus were handicapped for any questions across the UAV dimensions. Along
the left side, the label indicated whether the information presented was better with a large
value (higher survival rate) or a small value (fewer SAM sites, Air Interceptors, etc.).
3.2.3 Analog Gauge
The analog gauge implementation derives from the analog gauge currently
supplied in automobiles and aircraft, and is thus a pervasive iconic sign system. The
normalization of the data sets to range between [0-100] allowed for standardized gauges
that arced 180° through this range. Furthermore, each gauge had their high and low
thresholds identified by blue and red sub-arcs.
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Figure 3.4 Analog gauge display for health monitoring system

This GUI was implemented as a naïve approach a graphical display for multiple
UAVs – it is easy to implement (existing software libraries have gauge widgets) and it
has a direct real-life analogue to the gauges currently found in aircraft.
3.2.4 Visual Thinking Interface Design
During development of the Multiple UAV Agency (MAGE), designed to integrate net
centric information to facilitate control of multiple UAVs, one of the chosen features for the
MAGE software was to provide automated mission planning to reduce operator workload.
Towards this end, SYTRONICS licensed from Operations Research Concepts Applied (ORCA)
its OPUS mission planning software library.

OPUS was employed by MAGE to generate
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multiple alternative mission routes from which the MAGE operator could choose to execute. In
addition to the routes, the OPUS software also generates a series of “figures of merit” (FoM) to
describe the characteristics of each alternative.

These FoMs include more than a dozen

dimensions, including the probability of surviving the mission, number of surface-to-air missile
launches, minutes of exposure to anti-aircraft artillery, minutes exposure to search radars, minutes
exposure to missile guidance radars, fuel consumption, to name a few. These measures are all
numeric but have different measures, different minimums and maximums, and run in different
directions (fewer SAM missile launches and higher probability of survival are both better).
The multiple scales, dimensions, and directions make it very difficult to integrate their
meaning to get an overall idea of a route’s overall merit. Our original representation of the FoMs
was made in tables, similar to those shown in ORCA’s own interface to the OPUS mission
planning software library. However, because of the number and complexity of the FoMs the
tables were not effective in supporting route alternative choices. Our government technical
contacts asked that we develop a more effective representation to support choice of route
alternatives.
We chose to approach the design problem from a cognitive systems engineering
perspective, looking to theoretic psychology to determine how to build the new FoM display.
One particularly promising cognitive theory was Arnheim (1969) description of what he called
“Visual Thinking” (VT). Arnheim was trying to explain how artists, particularly painters, shape
their works cognitively. He theorized that human cognition evolved from sensory information
processing, particularly visual information processing, and shared communality with the
perceptual processes. Although Arnheim never considered the implications of this theory to
displays and controls, others did. McKim (1972) tried to translate VT’s hypothesis to the
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information design to facilitate problem solving. Using McKim as a point of departure, our
design effort prototyped displays based on perceptual-cognitive principles (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5 Early drawing of a multi-dimensional, multiple scaled decision support display.
difference is the raw data display only was visible by mouse roll-over of the pie slice.

Major

The acute perceptual skill we based on display design was form recognition and in
particular, the ability to judge the relative area of forms (Cleveland and McGill 1984).
Experimenting with a large number of different representations of the FoM data, we derived a
“pie” representation that employed expensive rescaling and standardization of the different route
effectiveness measures. The process first called for first determining the relative weight of each
FoM to the final decision. These weights determined the angular subtense of each measure’s
slice of the pie.
Second, a minimum and maximum value was identified for each measure. This process
was limited by identifying values beyond which there was no significant difference to the
decision maker to keep the dynamic range within manageable values. Also determined was a
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threshold value (high or low) which defined whether the FoM made the mission alternative
acceptable.
Third, reciprocals were taken of those scales which smaller values were better. This
“flipped” these scales so bigger always meant the preferred condition. Finally, the values falling
below the threshold were linearly scaled between their smallest (worst) values and fixed threshold
radius. This identified route FoMs that did not make criteria and their area was shaded red to flag
their failure to achieve the stated tolerance. A minimum radius was applied so there was
sufficient area to signal the user of the violated tolerance. Values above the threshold were scaled
between the threshold and the maximum diameter of the pie display. Hence, these pie slice radii
represented acceptable FoM values and their areas colored blue.
The resulting circular figure we called a “Sprocket” because it resembled the tooth
embellished wheel that drove a chain, or in this case, cognitive understanding. It implements the
VT paradigm because human vision is adept at area judgments and the Sprocket is designed so
that its area represents the overall merit of the alternative route. The user at a glance can compare
the area subtended by each alternative’s FoMs to determine the best route. It accomplishes
graphically what a weighed sum of rescaled values does mathematically. However, it clearly
displays which dimensions contribute to the overall worth of the route and which dimensions
exceed or fail to exceed their threshold requirements. Further, if the decision analyst wishes to
alter his or her weightings from the ones used to render the display, it is easy to visualize the
changes and use them to alter the decision.
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4 Research Framework
This research used the cognitive systems in context framework developed by
McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999) to design and evaluate the user interfaces for multi-UAV
supervisory control (Figure 4.1).

This general framework “provides a continuing

specification of boundaries around a work domain”, the research domain being MultiUAV supervisory control.

McNeese’s research framework is a guide for research

experiments within a given context. A researcher must, implicitly or explicitly, begin
with a set of goals. Based on these goals, further “decisions regarding the experimental
world, knowledge acquisition methods, representational schemes and evaluative
procedures” must be made. With each decision made, the researcher further limits the
research plan, giving the researcher more awareness of what needs to be done, and
specifying the level of detail required to complete the research.

In essence, these

constraints narrow the choices the researcher makes, excluding choices that do not make
sense given the previous decisions.

•
•
•

GOALS
Strategic
Theory/Modeling
Applications

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

•
•
•

KNOWLEDGE ACQUSITION
•
Surveys
•
Interviews
•
Observations

EXPERIMENTAL WORLD (Field)
Controlled Cognitive Tasks
Simulators
Real-World Environment

•
•

EVALUATION
Quantitative
Qualitative

•
•
•

REPRESENTATION
Conceptual
Computational
Mathematical

Figure 4.1 Components in the study of cognitive systems in context [adapted from (McNeese,
Bautsch et al. 1999)]
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As an example, this research’s goal is to evaluate visual thinking widgets as a
decision aid and monitoring displays in the multi-UAV command and control domain.
The expansion of Figure 4.1 showing specific goals for each experiment in this study is
illustrated in Figure 4.2. The figure explicitly illustrates the three experimental blocks
(named Exp.1, Exp. 2, and Exp. 3) and the decisions made for each. For each block in
the figure, a decision had to be made with regards to the individual experiments.

Figure 4.2 Framework of cognitive system expanded to this research
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However, Figure 4.2 is visually overwhelming and rather complicated, so each
experiment will be discussed in more detail with a breakout of the figure above to
emphasize the decisions made along the way. Along with this extraction, the questions
each experiment was going to answer are listed as hypothesis.

4.1 Experiment 1: Decision Support Research Framework Details
The first experiment’s goal is to use examine the visual thinking widget’s viability
as a decision aid, informally called a visual thinking sprocket (or VTS) in honor of the
cartoon “The Jetsons” and “Spacely’s Sprockets” factory.

The visual sprocket is

compared to other standard text/graphical decision aid displays.

The McNeese

framework for Experiment 1 (Figure 4.3) explicitly illustrates the decisions made for this
experiment.

Figure 4.3 Framework for Experiment 1

From the first block, one sees that the goals of this experiment were to design and
evaluate a visual thinking based user display as a decision-aiding tool for Multi-UAV
command and control mission assignments by UAV supervisors. After discussion with
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stakeholders within the domain, it was determined to use the visual thinking sprocket as
the decision aiding display.
As shown in block 2, from this decision and the fact that UAV operators are not
readily available for experiment subjects, it followed that a very restrictive laboratory
setting was appropriate for the experiment. This laboratory environment allowed the
research to utilize college students as the subjects in the experiment. As an added
benefit, using college students with no prior knowledge of UAV operations removed any
potential learning bias that a UAV operator subject might have with the existing system.
Block 3 of the framework included questions generated during the experiment
addressing different levels of situation awareness (SA) and questionnaires after each
block (Appendix B). In a cognitive system, the actual system functionality, rather than
the theoretical or ideal function is important (Hollnagel and Woods 1999). Thus, any
new proposed system must be empirically evaluated. This empirical evaluation used SA
directed questions to instrument the display, posing questions to the subject.
question format and applicable SA level is presented in Table 5.1.
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The

Table 4.1 Experiment 1 (Static Displays) questions
Situation
Awareness
Level

Question

Possible
Answers

Abbreviation

Level 2 SA

Rank order the routes
[Best to worst]

Rank_Order

Level 1 SA

Do any of the routes meet the all
minimum criteria?

1-2-3
1-3-2
2-1-3
2-3-1
3-1-2
3-2-1
Yes
No

Level 3 SA

Which route is Best if Dimension X
is dropped? (Where X was chosen
from among the 4 top weighted available
dimensions)
Which route has Best Dimension Y?
(Where Y was chosen from all available
dimensions)

1
2
3

Drop_Dimension

1
2
3

Best_Dimension

Level 1 SA
Level 2 SA

Minimum_Criteria

To judge the effectiveness of the new sprocket, data were collected both
automatically (behavior traces) via the computer and manually after each block (each
subject was asked to subjectively evaluate each display type via a questionnaire after
each block).

After all three blocks of the experiment were completed; a final

questionnaire asked the subjects to rate their subjective preferences of each display type.
The data automatically collected objectively reflects the speed and accuracy of the
decision aid’s usefulness. The data collected by the computer was statistically analyzed
using SAS 9.2 to examine the potential of the visual thinking widget as a viable decision
aid (Blocks 5 & 6).
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Figure 4.4 Overview of operator decision process

Modeling the operator’s decision process for selecting the best mission route
among those presented (Block 4); Figure 4.4 presents one very high-level representation
of the decision process. As mentioned earlier, observations of current Ground Control
Station (GCS) standard operating procedures show that the data the operators need to
help make these decisions among alternative UAV mission paths is, in part, presented in
text tables. These existing tables have no aids (highlighting or hints) to help the operator
to speed the decision. Some of the data is available as hardcopy and while some is
accessed through multiple computer displays. Furthermore, there is some overlap on the
data available through the different data stovepipes; only operator experience dictates
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which data stovepipe to access. 9 However, not all information necessary to make these
decisions are available, so the operator must mentally construct or interpolate the
necessary information.

Rather than use the existing data tables, considered rather

bohemian when compared with the sprocket display, the text tables were “updated” to
automated displays that have visual cues to draw the operator’s attention. In other words,
the electronic tables had color-coding to emphasize any out of tolerance Figure of Merit.
Finally, it should be noted that the UAV operator does not receive a list of
alternative mission routes as a rule, but rather each alternate mission route is generated
and evaluated much like Klein’s Naturalistic Decision Making (1993) satisficing
principle. If the new route generated satisfied the minimum requirements, then select it
and do not search for better solutions. If the new route failed to satisfy the minimum
requirements (FoMs), try to identify reasons for failure and generate new alternatives that
address some or all of the shortcomings.

The method of generating these new

alternatives is dependent on the operator, but generally appears to be the modification of
previously successful mission routes that were applicable to similar situations. Once
again, operator experience widens the pool of alternative routes generated.
On a visit in the summer of 2007 to a UAV command station 10, it became obvious
that the necessary information gathered for the operator to select among alternative

9

An information stovepipe is a data pipeline that largely restricts the flow of information to vertical
communication and inhibits or prevents cross communication.

10

The trailer came with four UAV operator control stations, each control station had three monitors (with
room for 6) and a single notebook/clipboard hanging by the door with the daily intelligence report.
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mission routes began when the operator walked into the trailer before mission handoff.
The operator scanned the daily intelligence report hanging by the entrance. This took
about fifteen minutes, and supplied the current mission objectives, applicable routing
information (waypoints for the next 2-3 legs of the mission), weather forecast, Human
Intelligence (FFN), etc. Following the intelligence report scan the new operator spoke
with the current operator staffing the controls to get a flavor for the current mission
status. At this same time, the new operator would be scanning the Mission Monitor, the
Satellite/weather Monitor and the Decision Support Monitor. Each monitor had different
information that operator might need, but no monitor had all the information that was
necessary. This debriefing also took about fifteen minutes, after which the new operator
changed seats with the old operator. The old operator might remain to observe the
mission for a few minutes to verify all pertinent mission information had been passed on
to the new operator. The old operator was then able to leave the trailer.
The reason for having many different places to get information is in part due to
the government’s burdensome acquisition requirements.

To validate any new user

interface requires a large investment of time, money and personnel – it takes between one
and two years to validate and accept any new data system. If the data is to be added to an
existing interface, the old interface might become invalidated until the new data is added.
Because of the inordinate amount of time to validate this new data, when new data is
deemed to be an important enough to add to the incoming data flow, a new separate data
stovepipe is created. Each of the three existing monitors (Mission, Satellite/weather, and
Decision Support) took more than a year to pass inspection. Adding another piece of
information to any of the UIs would require revalidating that entire subsystem. Rather
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than combine all user interfaces into a single complete data monitor, additional monitors
are added; thus speeding up acquisition and lowering costs.
Returning to the UAV mission script, each UAV’s complete mission may be
secret and often it is on a need to know basis, and since the UAV could be in the air over
multiple operator shifts, the operators frequently saw a partial release of the mission
details based on time and the current location of the UAV. Furthermore, the UAV’s
mission may evolve over the course of the flight as targets that are more important and
sub-missions rise to the surface of planning sessions. Generally, the mission planning
was performed away from the GCS.

(During an informal discussion session, one

operator described flying UAVs as “herding cattle from point A to point B”.)
Frequently, only the next waypoint or two in the mission were supplied to the
operator, not the whole route. If an operator completed a UAV’s sub-mission, then the
mission “script” was modified or updated and the operator was then given the next
waypoint of the current mission. In the case of a drastic mission modification, operators
might be requested to assist in rerouting the UAV through the new mission. This new
mission might include routing to a single new waypoint or a complete route with multiple
waypoints that eventually returns the UAV to base. The operator must use their own
experience and current environmental information to form a viable route that satisfies any
mission requirements.
As a hypothetical example, imagine you are an operator flying a UAV on a
typical surveillance mission that requires the recognizance of a suspected terrorist cell
meeting. The supplied routing for this mission was given by the Information/Intelligence

97

Officer to ensure maximum stealth (hovering downwind so propeller noise is not
propagated to the target and not easily identified by the naked eye) and UAV
survivability (outside the range of known AAA/radar sites). Another way of saying this
is that the top priorities of this mission from the commanders viewpoint is for the UAV to
have a high level of survivability and stealth (not being seen or heard), while at the same
time be able to fulfill its mission objectives to gather useful intelligence (UAV may have
to adjust location to take pictures). In this hypothetical situation, new information comes
through channels stating that ambushed troops “nearby” are presently under fire – a UAV
is needed to support the troops as their “eye in the sky” and to aid ground support
response planning.

One needs to gather information to determine which UAV(s)

should/can be reassigned in this high priority mission (usually distance and speed are the
dominating parameters). The UAV that is closest to the event and has a sufficiently low
priority mission can be reassigned – so the UAV is reassigned to this “support the troops”
mission. Now the highest priorities for this new mission might be speed and survivability
en route; however, after arriving the mission priorities might require stealth again.
Where the priority on a simple surveillance mission might require survivability and
stealth over speed, this new support mission might initially require speed over
survivability and stealth.

After all, human lives are at stake and time is crucial.

Furthermore, if the UAV is armed, then the UAV provides some valuable missile support
to the troops on the ground. If the UAV is not armed, then it might supply temporary
visual support while waiting for an armed aerial response to arrive.
The previous example illustrates the extremely complicated decision process that
the operator may perform while responding to a change of UAV missions. This decision
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process can be modeled by an Operator Function Model (OFM) (McCormick 1976;
Miller 1985; Mitchell and Miller 1986; Narayanan, Ruff et al. 2000).
4.1.1 Operator Function Model
An OFM is a mathematical construct finite state automata network of arcs and
nodes that represents the cognitive processing of a process. If represents the mental
decomposition an operator might use to breakdown a complex system into simpler parts
and any associated actions necessary to guarantee an acceptable overall system
performance. Other researchers have used OFMs to successfully model, design and
control user-interfaces and supervisory control systems. OFMs represent knowledge
representation, information flow and decision-making in complex systems (Narayanan,
Ruff et al. 2000).
The previous hypothetical example also alludes to the mental effort required by
the operator to determine a new UAV mission route. How does the UAV operator
determine the Probability of Survival (PoS)? What type of data needs to be gathered?
Where is it located? Is the data out of date? It should be obvious that the data is
incomplete and out of date (If it were complete, then the troops under attack would have
already had air support.). So the operator must gather information to make a reasonable
decision (Figure 4.5). From the figure, one can see that information is essentially pulled
from four sources:

mission, weather/satellite, decision support monitors and an

“annotated” printout of current and recent satellite images and intelligence reports. (The
standard printout is very poorly annotated as black and white dense tables with labels, but
little else to identify important datum. No data or trend analysis is available.)
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The mission monitor supplies a map of the terrain along with an overlay of the
active mission route. It also contains icons of relevant mission objectives and landmarks,
such as targets, friend/foe/neutral, AAA sites, EW radar sites, etc. The symbology assists
the operator, but the information is frequently out of date and incorrect. The location of
enemy troops can be especially problematic in a non-traditional war, since the enemy
moves fast and can be quickly camouflaged as civilians.
The weather/satellite monitor can give current weather conditions as long as the
operator is experienced enough to interpret the map. However, this monitor does not
supply a forecast capability. To the public, the weather forecast can be easily obtained
through a website (http://www.weather.com), which has international maps that supply
hourly forecasts. However, the UAV operator does not have access to a “web enabled”
system inside the ground control station.

An external source supplied the weather

forecasts (daily intelligence logs or a dedicated system as side effects of the information
stovepipes).
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Figure 4.5 Operator Function Model representing the information gathering stage of the decision to
select the best mission among alternatives.

Suggested mission alternatives can be partially compared on the decision support
monitors. The alternative mission routes might be graphed on a map, but the map does
not supply hints or Figures of Merit that would assist the operator in making any
decision. The operator must attempt to mentally calculate path lengths, AAA and EW
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radar footprints, etc. Furthermore, to compare the alternate mission routes to the current
mission, the operator must mentally translate the current mission route on the Mission
monitor onto the Decision Support monitor, since the current mission route was not
displayed on the Decision Support monitor. In other words, one of the alternatives – “do
nothing” – is not one of the choices on the Decision Support monitor. These are gaping
failures of the current system.
Furthermore, the mission objectives described in the daily intelligence logs can be
terse and incomplete.

Not all of the UAVs tasks will necessarily be listed on the

intelligence logs because of the “need to know” secrecy of the missions. After all, a
mission could last up to 40 hours and the first operator might not need to know what the
third operator is doing, nor does the third operator need to know what the first operator
did. The current, recent past and near future events are all that is relevant to the operator.
Once the information is gathered, it must be analyzed by the operator as modeled
in Figure 4.6. The information supplied on the data acquisition side of Figure 4.5
becomes the parameters to an optimization function side of Figure 4.6 in which the
Probability of Survival (PoS) for the UAV is calculated. Now we examine how this PoS
characteristic determined or computed. There are quite a few parameters that could make
up the PoS, for instance, the weather, probability of detection by AAA sites, the number
of AAA missiles available, airports, number of aircraft available for intercept at those
airports, number of intercept aircraft in the air, etc. Some of these FoM are reported
through real-time information pipelines, while others are updated at some longer discrete
intervals (hourly, daily, etc.).
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Figure 4.6 Analyze Results OFM

The operator selects the best mission route by calculating the PoS based on these
supplied parameters. For example, given two mission routes, one route with six known
SAM sites and the other route with only two, the second route is preferable, based solely
on this one parameter. However, the decision is seldom based on one Figure of Merit
(FoM) and sometimes the other FoMs suggest different alternatives. Since there are no
documented procedures to calculate the PoS, the operator uses an internal and very
personal algorithm to determine whether enough information has been acquired to make
the decision. The OFM shown in Figure 4.6 is an example of what an operator might
consider enough information. If it is not, then the operator attempts to gather more
information to better aid in discriminating among the existing mission choices.
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Alternatively, a new mission that better fits the accumulated data might be suggested by
the gathered information.
Since the experiment examines an existing complex, dynamic decision support
domain, UAV mission stakeholders were interviewed about what data was important to
the operator when making mission decisions following the walkthrough of the UAV
command station. As expected, there was a wide range of opinions in the number and
subjective priority of FoMs to use. This led to designing the sprocket with the flexibility
of displaying between six and fifteen FoMs with operator defined weighting. These
discussions directly led to the eight FoM and associated subjective weightings used in the
first experiment.
Based on the information derived from these interviews, a pattern of the decisions
made by each operator emerged, namely an optimization problem. Each operator applied
different subjective weightings to each of their parameters (FoMs) in the problem. For
each of these FoMs, there existed an empirical threshold in which the alternate mission
was scrubbed (more than 18 available SAMs, probability of success less than 25%, etc.).
In these cases, other alternatives would have to be explored.
The use of each parameter required the operator to have experience to interpret
the results quickly. Some of the apparent decision parameters for the operators could be
best defined as composites of other simpler parameters (Probability of Success), while
others were atomic (SAM sites). Some FoMs were better when bigger (probability of
survival, etc.), while other FoMs were better when the parameter was smaller (probability
of detection by X, number of AAA sites, time in battle zone, etc.). Furthermore, each
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FoM had a different range of values. And finally, a given FoM may have a maximum
range, but if exceeds a given threshold below that maximum, then the risk may be too
great.
These disparate conceptual FoMs must be combined into one cohesive value
representing the “goodness” of a mission route in order to differentiate among mission
alternatives.

As a first stab, they can be represented informally by the equation

f ( x) =∑ min( FoMsFOMs that need to be min mized ) + ∑ max( FoMsFOMs that need to be max imized ) + c , where
c is the unknown, unaccounted for information that is not represented in the formal
FoMs. Incorporating the threshold simply redefines the min/max functions to be the step
min( x) if x ≤ threshold
functions min Treshold ( x) = 
otherwise
 ∞

and

max( x) if x ≥ threshold
, respectively. However, the min function
max Threshold ( x) = 
otherwise
 0
needs to be small and the max function needs to be large making it difficult to interpret
and combine. To address these differences between min and max FoMs, the FoMs min
optimal can be inverted such that each the FoMs become max optimal, so the function
becomes
=
Optimal max( FoMs ) + c .

The individual FoMs have different scales, so

normalizing is required:
max =
Normal ( x)

max(
=
Mission)i

max( x )
max possible value

n

∑ w FoM
j =0

j

ij

→ [0..1.0]

+c
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where w is the subjective weight of the FoM and ∑ w = 1 and c represents external
information available to the operator.

However, another pattern emerged through the interview – a threshold point in
which the operator was unsatisfied with the solution. This threshold point was not a
specific value like 10, but rather was dependent on the FoM units. It might be that 15
AAA missiles were “okay”, but 20 were not. Likewise, 20 minutes flying over enemy
territory was subjectively “okay”, but 60 minutes were not. To create a display that can
represent different units and different thresholds led to considering the Visual Thinking
Sprocket. To address the different units, each FoM was normalized to be into the range
of [0..100]. Furthermore, the function was designed to be a two-piece linear function that
represented by the linear function [1..threshold] and (threshold..100].
Further bits of fuzziness that cannot be modeled with a computer program are the
esoteric influences, such as political, social and economic influences. (For example, do
not fly over the site of a “spontaneous” protest march. Avoid state X because a coalition
force is active there today. The superior, more experienced officer says not to choose
alternative B because “it doesn’t feel right”.)
After gathering the data, the operator must analyze the resulting parameters to
determine if the new missions are acceptable and/or optimal (Figure 4.6). This that
implies an informal risk analysis be performed on each alternate mission. Once again,
the operator’s experience tends to dictate the speed and accuracy of the analysis.
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Since the experiment examines an existing complex, dynamic decision support
domain, UAV mission stakeholders were interviewed about what data was important to
the operator when making mission decisions. These discussions directly led to the eight
FoM used in the first two experiments. Furthermore, as would be expected, there was a
wide range in the number and subjective priority of FoMs to use, so the sprocket was
designed with the flexibility of displaying between six and fifteen FoMs with operator
defined weighting.
4.1.2 Research Questions for Decision Support
The objective of this experiment was to examine the viability of applying visual
thinking concepts to designing static decision aid user interface displays. Objective data
was automatically acquired during the experimental trials, while subjective data was
collected through a short questionnaire given to each subject after each trial. Table 4.2
presents the research questions addressed and their associated 1-tailed hypotheses.
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Table 4.2 Research questions for Experiment 1

Experiment

Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Accuracy 1

Is there a significant
difference in accuracy to
obtain good rank order
solutions using cognitively
sensitive supervisory control
of multiple UAVs?

H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to
obtain good rank order solutions using cognitively
sensitve human supervisory control of multiple
UAVs.

Is there a significant
difference in accuracy to
determine global status
information using cognitively
sensitive supervisory
control?

H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to
determine global status information using
cognitively sensitive supervisory control.

Is there a significant
difference in accuracy to
envision new solutions using
mental visualization?

H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to
envision new solutions using mental visualization.

Is there a significant
difference in accuracy to
determine local status along
a specific dimension using
cognitively sensitive
supervisory control?

H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to
determine local status information using
cognitively sensitive supervisory control.

Is there a significant
difference in time to obtain
good rank order solutions
using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control of
multiple UAVs?

H0: There was no significant difference in time to
obtain good rank order solutions using cognitively
sensitive human supervisory control of multiple
UAVs.

Is there a significant
difference in time to
determine global status
information using cognitively
sensitive supervisory
control?

H0: There was no significant difference in time to
determine global status information using
cognitively sensitive supervisory control.

Is there a significant
difference in time to
envision new solutions using
mental visualization?

H0: There was no significant difference in time to
envision new solutions using mental visualization.

Accuracy 2

Accuracy 3

Accuracy 4

Response
Time 1

Response
Time 2

Response
Time 3

H1: It was significantly more accurate to obtain good
rank order solutions using cognitively sensitve
human supervisory control of multiple UAVs.

H1: It was significantly more accurate to determine
global status information using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control.

H1: It was significantly more accurate to envision new
solutions using mental visualization.

H1: It was significantly more accurate to determine
local status information using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control.

H1: It took significantly less time to obtain good rank
order solutions using cognitively sensitve human
supervisory control of multiple UAVs.

H1: It took significantly less time to determine global
status information using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control.

H1: It took significantly less time to envision new
solutions using mental visualization.
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Response
Time 4

Is there a significant
difference in time to
determine local status along
a specific dimension using
cognitively sensitive
supervisory control?

H0: There was no significant difference in time to
determine local status information using
cognitively sensitive supervisory control.
H1: It took significantly less time to determine local
status information using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control.

Each probe question used in the Decision Support Experiment was designed to
specifically address two of these research questions. For example, Rank Order the three
alternate missions from best to worst is designed to examine research question
Accuracy 1: Is there a significant difference in accuracy to obtain good rank order
solutions using cognitively sensitive supervisory control of multiple UAVs? and
research question Response Time 1: Is there a significant difference in time to obtain
good rank order solutions using cognitively sensitive supervisory control of multiple
UAVs?

4.2 Experiment 2: System Monitoring Research Framework
Following the Experiment 1 success, the same research framework (Figure 4.3)
was applied to Experiment 2, namely McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999). This time, the
goal (Block 1) was to examine the Visual Thinking Widget as a dynamic system
monitoring display within the multi-UAV control domain. This experiment incorporated
the Visual Thinking Widget into the MAGES simulation testbed, a medium/high fidelity
simulator (Block 2).

The subjects were directed to monitor three UAV’s gauges

simultaneously, determining whether a UAV’s “health” was out-of-tolerance.
Throughout the experiment, the operator/supervisors were queried about the current and
possible future states of the system (Block 3). Following each 20-minute trial, the
subjects were surveyed on their opinions of the presented design. So once again, the
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subjects were queried during and between experimental trials with SA guided questions
(Blocks 5 & 6).

Figure 4.7 Framework for Experiment 2

The experiment follows the monitoring tasks similar to those presented by
Narayanan, Ruff et al. (2000), but much simpler. The only three options presented to the
student subject were 1) do nothing (keep monitoring); 2) identify out-of-tolerance FoM
(reboot FoM and note failure); and 3) identify FoMs that may “soon” go out-of-tolerance
(watch more diligently and note potential failure). The actions performed by the subjects
were pointedly simple, but allowed the subjects to concentrate on the monitoring the
system.
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Figure 4.8 OFM of experiment 2 monitoring task

4.2.1 Research Questions for System Monitoring
The objective of this experiment was to examine the viability of applying visual
thinking concepts to designing dynamic monitoring user interface displays. Objective
data was automatically acquired during the experimental trials, while subjective data was
collected through a short questionnaire given to each subject after each trial.

The

simulation was performed on a medium-high fidelity testbed. Table 4.3 presents the
research questions addressed and their associated 1-tailed hypotheses.
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Table 4.3 Research questions for Experiment 2

Experiment

Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Distracter:
Root Mean
Square Error
[RMSE]

Can the operator perform the
primary task (keeping the target
centered) better using cognitively
sensitive human supervisory
control of multiple UAVs? [RMSE]?

H0: There was no significant difference in RMSE in
keeping the target centered

Monitor Task:
Accuracy

Is there a significant difference in
accuracy when monitoring out of
tolerance values?

H0: There was no significant difference in
accuracy when monitoring out-of-tolerance
values.

H1: There was significantly less RMSE in keeping
the target centered.

H1: There was significantly more accurate when
monitoring out-of-tolerance values.
Monitor Task:
False Positive

Is there a significant difference in
false positives when monitoring
out-of-tolerance values?

H0: There was no significant difference in false
positives when monitoring out-of-tolerance
values.
H1: There was significantly more false positives
when monitoring out-of-tolerance values.

Response
Time

Is there a significant difference in
time to respond to out-oftolerance monitored values using
cognitively sensitive supervisory
control?

H0: There was no significant difference in time to
accurately respond to out-of-tolerance
monitored values using cognitively sensitive
human supervisory control of multiple UAVs.
H1: It took significantly less time to accurately
respond to out-of-tolerance monitored values
using cognitively sensitive human supervisory
control of multiple UAVs.

4.3 Experiment 3 Research Framework Details
Still following the flow of the McNeese framework, the final experiment initially
was to instrument the existing Predator simulation software with the Visual Thinking
Widget library, and then have active duty and reserve UAV operators use the system.
However, due to internal military and external corporate requirements 11, the validation

11

The copyright to the Predator Simulation software is held by a subcontractor of the simulation system.
While the primary contractor had said that the instrumentation could be performed on the simulator, it
was contingent on permission being granted by the primary copyright holder. That decision on granting
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was achieved using the existing MAGE software along with the active duty and reserve
UAV operators.

Figure 4.9 Framework for Experiment 3\

During the experiment, the UAV operators were surveyed and interviewed about
the various MAGE training enhancements. These included the Visual Thinking displays
(decision aid and monitoring system) along with other enhancements 12. These interviews
were held in Victorville, CA with the Predator training site and at Wright Patterson AFB
Human Effectiveness Laboratory.

the permission was postponed until one week prior to the experiment, at which time the primary
copyright holder decided to not grant permission. At that time, it was decided to have the UAV
operators use the MAGE software to grant permission. So it was decided to have the UAV operators
observe the MAGE software to validate the concept.
12

The other enhancements included a mission timeline decision aid, network centric information displays,
real time weather low fidelity modeling,
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4.3.1 Research Questions for third Experiment
Table 4.4 Research questions for Experiment 2

Workload
preference

Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Does the SME prefer the VTS to
the current or modified VIT
system?

H0: There was no significant difference in
subjective workload preference among the
three displays
H1: There was significant difference in subjective
workload preference among the three
displays
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5 Experiment Design
5.1 Decision Aid Support Experiment
The experiment presented three alternate static displays in a controlled laboratory
environment. The displays were to be used as decision aids for UAV mission planning.
This experiment’s goal with respect to this research was intended to answer whether the
visual thinking widget was an effective display alternative as a decision aid.
5.1.1 Training
Training consisted of 30 minutes of instructions via an oral PowerPoint®
presentation, and visually (projected on a wall mounted screen and on each subject’s
computer desktop). Furthermore, each subject was given a paper copy to refer to “as
needed” during the experiment. Each of the three display formats were examined in
detail, with each prompting question examined along with verbal descriptions of what the
interpretations should be.
5.1.2 Design
The experiment was a two factor repeated-measures design with full-model
partitioning. Microsoft Excel® was used to generate the text table and bar chart images
that were compared with the sprocket, while software developed for the MAGE Decision
Support System (DSS) generated the sprocket images. Each image was generated from
the same data, i.e., a bar chart, text table and sprocket image were generated from dataset
1, 2, 3, etc. Each subject was shown a series of generated images of the Figures of Merit
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(FoM) for three alternative paths’ and a question. The subject responded to the first
question (rank order the three routes from best to worst), and then the second question
was displayed, and so on – the presented image did not change and remained visible
during the questioning (SPAM – Situation Present Assessment Method).

The four

questions, possible answers, levels of situation awareness, and question abbreviation are
listed in Table 5.1. The question abbreviation is used in the Results section as an easy
mnemonic for each of the question types.
Table 5.1 Experiment 1 (Static Displays) questions
Question

1

Situation
Awareness
Level
Level 2 SA

Possible
Answers

Abbreviation

1-2-3
1-3-2
2-1-3
2-3-1
3-1-2
3-2-1

Rank_Order

2

Level 1 SA

Do any of the routes meet the all minimum
criteria?

Yes
No

Minimum_Criteria

3

Level 3 SA

Which route is Best if Dimension X is
dropped? (Where X was chosen from
among the 4 top weighted available
dimensions)

1
2
3

Drop_Dimension

4

Level 1 SA
Level 2 SA

Which route has Best Dimension Y? (Where
Y was chosen from all available dimensions)

1
2
3

Best_Dimension

Rank order the routes
[Best to worst]

After the fourth question, a new image was displayed and the same four questions
were asked. For each display type, 12 images were generated with the same datasets. In
other words, 12 datasets were used to generate 12 bar chart, table and sprocket images for
a total of 36 images. Referring to Table 5.2, the two factors are display type (text table,
bar chart, and sprocket) and image dataset (I1, I2, …, I12). The order of presenting the
displays was fully-balanced and randomly assigned to each subject to avoid learning
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effects. The order of presenting the images was also randomly assigned per block;
however, there were only three lists of random images. Each subject saw 36 images and
answered four questions for each image for a total of 144 questions. For each question,
the response time and answer were recorded, thus giving two objective measures for each
question.

Display (D=3)

Table 5.2 Outline of the design with two repeated-measures factors

Table
D1
Bar Chart
D2
Sprocket
D3

Images (I=12)

I1
I1D1

I2
I2D1

I3
I3D1

I4
I4D1

I5
I5D1

I6
I6D1

I7
I7D1

I8
I8D1

I9
I9D1

I10
I10D1

I11
I11D1

I12
I12D1

I1D2

I2D2

I3D2

I4D2

I5D2

I6D2

I7D2

I8D2

I9D2

I10D2

I11D2

I12D2

I1D3

I2D3

I3D3

I4D3

I5D3

I6D3

I7D3

I8D3

I9D3

I10D3

I11D3

I12D3

Each mission route has seven weighted Figures of Merit (FoM) in which the
subject was to judge the routes (Table 5.3). Each FoM was presented to the subject in a
predetermined order primarily based on its weighting value. Although the FoM measures
would likely have some interdependencies (i.e., SAM shots and SAM tracking
probability of detection have an obvious relationship), their test values were randomly
generated and independently determined.
Table 5.3 Mission Figures of Merit descriptions and order of presentation
Figure of Merit

Weight

Description

Probability of Survival

40

Self-explanatory

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)
shots
Aircraft Intercept launch

15

Number of SAM missile launch opportunities by the enemy

15

Anti-Aircraft-Artillery (AAA)
exposure
Net number of tracks exposed

15

Number of aircraft intercept opportunities (determined by
tracking) that can intercept the UAV
Number of minutes the UAV is exposed to enemy AAA

SAM tracking probability of
detection
Early Warning (EW) radar
probability of detection

3

9

3

For each track (leg) of the route, how many allowed radar
tracking
Given a SAM battery, the estimated probability of
detection
The possibility of an early warning system detecting the
UAVs entering the enemy airspace
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Each block of displays had twelve images of three alternative mission routes.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the same three routes displayed as a table, bar chart and a visual
thinking sprocket image. In the Table Display format (Figure 5.1.A), the first column
lists the weight given for each FoM, the second column states the FoM’s name – so the
Probability of Survival is the most important dimension reflected in the 40%, while SAM
tracking probability of detection, Early Warning (EW) radar probability of detection
share the bottom at a 3% weighting value. The third, fourth and fifth columns represent
the three alternative routes. The sixth and seventh columns are used in conjunction to
assign pass/fail for the specific FoM. The sixth column states the minimum/maximum
threshold for that respective FoM, any value failing to meet this threshold is colored red.
The last column refers to the directionality of the FoM axis: the plus sign (+) means
bigger is better, while the minus sign (-) means smaller is better. (Only the Probability of
Survival has a positive direction, i.e., the value must be larger than the criterion to pass.
All of the other FoM require smaller values to pass the criterion.)
Looking at the first route (3rd column) in Figure 5.1.A, one can see that for the
Probability of Survival (2nd row) – “bigger is better” (7th column) and fails to exceed the
minimum criterion at 0.11 (6th column), and is thus colored red (3rd column).
The Bar Chart Display (Figure 5.1.B) and the Visual Thinking Sprocket Display
(Figure 5.1.C) formats supply the same information as the Table Display. (See Appendix
A for more complete description to the experiment.)
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Figure 5.1 Three different display modes of the same mission alternatives

The same twelve data profiles were used in each image, but the profiles were
presented in six different orders to reduce carry over effects. This was so the subjects
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were not able to detect similarities across blocks. The blocks were counter balanced to
further reduce any carry over effects.
5.1.3 Participants
The research design and procedures were submitted to the Wright State
University Institutional Review Board, who approved conduct of the study as a low-risk
protocol. The first experiment had 24 volunteer subjects, mostly engineering graduate
students, recruited from Wright State University. All subjects saw the same images. The
order of presentation was varied by display type (3) and mission/route order (12) using a
Latin Square design. Each subject was given a Subject Consent Form prior to starting the
experiment.

This was followed by a thirty minute PowerPoint® presentation of

background material and instructions for the experiment. Training, presentation of the
three conditions, and debrief of the subjects took a total of 2.5 hours.
5.1.4 Evaluating Rank Order
This research explores a novel approach to grading the rank-order selection of the
by the subjects (question 1 above). A correct/not correct grading seems not a strong
enough statistical measure of wrongness, nor is it a fine enough measure of the
permutations of wrong. Referring to Table 5.4, I propose using a weighting function that
places a premium on the number of orderings that are correct. For instance, if the correct
ordering of the routes was 1-2-3, then one can break this ordering into three pairs:
1 before 2, 2 before 3 and 1 before 3; henceforth written as 12, 23 and 13,
respectively. One then considers the six permutations of these the original three numbers
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and counts the number of correct paired orderings: the first column is 1-2-3, and has
three correct pairings (12, 23 and 13), giving us a correct ordering value of 3; the
second column has two correct pairings (12 and 13), giving a value of 2; the third
column has two correct pairings (13 and 23), giving a value of 2; etc. In short hand
notation, if 1-2-3 were correct, then one could write Selection123 (12, 23, 13) = 3;
Selection132 (12, 13) = 2,

Selection213 (23, 13) = 2,

Selection231 (23) = 1,

Selection312 (12) = 1, and Selection321 (ø) = 0. A Table 5.4 lookup table is created for
each of the six possible permutations of ordering truths. The benefit of this function is
that the answers are objectively partitioned into four groups of relative wrongness
[3, 2, 1, 0], giving us a way to measure the “wrongness” of an answer.
Table 5.4 Evaluating rank order
Truth
1
2
3
Ordinals correct

Order Selected by Subject
1
1
2
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
1
2
3
2
2
1
1

3
2
1
0

An alternate weighting function in which the correct placement of the first two
items in the answer is rewarded with bonus points: first (+2) or second (+1) correct. For
instance, in the first column, since 1 is in the first place setting this answer gets a bonus
of +2, and since the 2 is in the second place setting this answer gets a bonus +1; for a
total bonus of +3 and grand total of 6. The second column has the 1 in the correct place
but not the 2, so it gets a bonus of +2 points. Columns 3, 4 and 5 have no bonus points,
but column 6 gains a bonus point. This weighting function was not used since the
subjects were not told to concentrate on getting the best first (and because it adds some
undeserved ambiguity to the "worst" three choices). [Again, assuming that 1-2-3 was the
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correct

order,

the

final

scores

with

Selection123 (12, 23, 13,+2,+1) = 6;

any

bonuses

added

would

be:

Selection132 (12, 13,+2,0) = 4,

Selection213 (23, 13,0,0) = 2, Selection231 (23,0,0) = 1, Selection312 (12,0,0) = 1,
and Selection321 (ø,0,1) = 1]. Again we have 4 levels of discrimination.

5.2 System Monitoring Experiment
The experiment presented three alternate animated displays in a controlled
laboratory environment. The displays were to be used for system monitoring of four
simulated UAVs. Since the first experiment was a success, this experiment’s goal with
respect to this research was intended to answer whether the visual thinking widget was an
effective display alternative as a system monitoring aid. To this end, the visual thinking
widget could then be considered a flexible alternative to other displays.
5.2.1 Training
Training consisted of 30 minutes of instructions via a PowerPoint® presentation,
the presentation was made with a projector and a copy of the PowerPoint® presentation
was on each subject’s computer desktop so they could follow along.

Each subject

received a color copy of the PowerPoint® slides that they could keep for reference during
the experiment.

Each display format was examined in detail, with each prompting

question examined along with verbal descriptions of what the interpretations should be.
Following the PowerPoint® slides, the subjects were given a 5 minute limited
response training simulation. The screen layout was the same as the actual experiment
display, but only 2 of the feedbacks for the sensors were active, i.e., these two sensors
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initially started near 50 (neutral), went out of tolerance, and clicking on those sensors
reset the sensor to a neutral value.

The only sensor display used in the training

simulation was the analog sensor. The training simulator was primarily intended to give
the subjects experience in keeping the target in the crosshair sights. The sensor gauges
that were live were explicitly specified to the subjects, and what “going out of tolerance”
meant was explained.
5.2.2 Design
The experiment was a two repeated-measures factors design with full-model
partitioning. Java® standard software libraries were used to generate the text and gauge
table animations, while software developed in Java® for the MAGE decision support
system generated the sprocket animations. The experiment was divided into two tasks:
the primary task was to maintain target acquisition within the camera’s crosshair while
the UAV drifts (because of simulated turbulence and wind) and the secondary task was
monitoring three UAV systems. (See Section 5.2.4 for a description of the experiment
flow.)
Microsoft Excel® was used to generate the data used in the animated text table,
analog gauges and sprocket displays, guaranteeing consistent repeatable experiments.
Each animation was generated from the same data, i.e., the gauge, text table and sprocket
images were generated from dataset 1, 2, 3, etc. Each FoM had over 1,500 data points to
ensure coverage of at least a 25 minute simulation time. Since this was interspersed with
questions that froze the simulation clock, the data was sufficient for 30 minute trials.
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Table 5.5 Experiment 2 (Dynamic Displays) questions

Situation
Awareness
Level
Level 1 SA

Level 2 SA

Level 3 SA

Question

Answer
Type

For UAVY, what is the value of the GaugeX?

Slider

Did UAVY stay in tolerance?

Boolean

Did UAVY have a Gauge go out of tolerance?

Boolean

Is the GaugeX in UAVY stable? (+/-10 from center)

Boolean

How many UAVs are currently healthy?

Count

Which UAV is MOST healthy? (Closest to center)

Selection

Is the GaugeX in UAVY at the desired level?

Boolean

Which UAV is most likely to fail? (Maintenance Report)

Selection

Which UAV will go out of tolerance next?

Selection

Can the GaugeX for UAVY exceed tolerance in the next 5 seconds?

Boolean

5.2.3 Participants
The second experiment had 24 subjects, recruited from Wright State University
graduate students.

All subjects saw the same animations, however, the order of

presenting the sensor displays varied for each animation and the data behind the
animations was randomly assigned to the display type.
5.2.4 Experiment flow
As mentioned earlier, the two tasks were to maintain target acquisition within the
camera’s simulated crosshair while the UAV drifts (because of simulated turbulence and
wind) and monitoring four UAV systems (See Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 System monitoring experiment flow

The right hand column in Figure 5.2 is an overview of each trial – initialize the
data, run the trial, present a questionnaire, save any additional data, repeat. During the
“run the trial” portion, the subject was expected to perform these two tasks, while
intermittently answering questions. The primary task was to control the UAV’s camera
to be trained on a targeted building. The targeted building is represented by a red box
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surrounding a building on one of three aerial photographs of Bagdad, Fallujah and Hadid.
Each subject was also shown animations of simulated monitored systems and was
instructed to respond by clicking on the gauge if it goes out of tolerance. The initial
conditions of the monitored systems place all the gauges in-tolerance and they “drift”
according to the scripted datasets.
During the test, the subject had to answer probe questions (e.g., How many times
were you aware of out of tolerance conditions? Is UAV1 completely in tolerance at this
moment?

etc.)

The systems monitoring experiment examines an animated Visual

Thinking Sprocket with two criteria (thresholds) per dimension for monitoring the health
of multiple UAVs. Each of these Visual Thinking widgets were designed to be flexible
in number of dimensions (5-15) and different weighting values for each dimension.
However, for this experiment, six dimensions were chosen.
Each subject was shown a series of generated animations for three UAVs, every
60-120 seconds a question was presented to the user. The variation in presenting the
times was to avoid the situation where the subject anticipates/times the question interval
and changes their intensity of the concentration.

When the subject responded to a

question, while the animation was halted, the presented image did not change and
remained visible during the questioning (SPAM – Situation Present Assessment Method).
The three levels of situation awareness, ten associated questions, and their corresponding
input mechanism are listed in Table 5.5. During each pause, a set of three questions were
asked, one from each SA level. Which question was asked was randomly chosen and
dynamically populated with appropriate FoM and UAV data. For example, Level 1 SA
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question “For UAVY, what is the value of the GaugeX?” could be asked as “For UAV1, what is
the value of the Air Temperature Gauge?” or “For UAV2, what is the value of the Engine RPM?”

5.3 Full system experiment
The experiment was a usability study using subject matter experts (SMEs) from
Victorville, CA and Wright Patterson AFB, OH with concurrent protocols and examined
a Visual Thinking decision support aid in the existing full MAGE simulation testbed and
in particular it’s Decision Support System (DSS).
5.3.1 Training
Compared to the existing Predator control mechanisms, operator responses are
different in the MAGE system. Currently, the Predator is manually flown and largely
manually controlled. MAGE on the other had is semi-autonomous in which operators
exercise supervisory control. These SMEs are familiar with many of the operational
issues of UAV operations and are best qualified to appreciate how those issues interact
with UAV operations.

Their instructions were to apply their knowledge to the

supervisory control scheme, although they were free to comment and criticize the
elements and assumptions of the MAGE system.
5.3.2 Design
Usability testing lasted approximately 2.5 hours.

During the first hour, the

participant completed an UAV experience questionnaire that captured their qualifications
as a Subject Matter Expert (SME). This hour included approximately 45 minutes of
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familiarity training with the MAGE system. A short demonstration scenario was run
showing each of the typical events the SME would experience in the longer test scenario.
They were familiarized with the workload and other assessment methods employed
during the usability testing.
The test scenario was specifically designed to exercise all aspects of MAGE, with
particular emphasis on the DSS system. The scenario requires monitoring and control
over two UAVs flying mixed Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
target strike missions over Iraq. The missions were choreographed to contain event
conflicts between the UAV missions to see how well the DSS mitigates the temporal
conflicting mission demands.

The operator received mission updates from higher

authority which added or decreased tasking during the different mission segments.
Furthermore, the displays used during a specific leg of the mission were automatically
changed to visit all three display types.
Besides the automated action data logging, several other measures were used
during the test scenario. First, audio recording were made of each session and the
subjects were instructed during training to “Think Out Loud”, verbalizing their
impressions of the system during the scenario. These audio recordings were screened for
important observations, and carefully scrutinized during key events to extract the most
information about the DSS effectiveness.
Second, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index
(NASA TLX) was used to capture workload assessment between missions. The SME’s
performed a sample NASA TLX during their study preparation. It should be noted that
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the NASA TLX used in this study in known as Raw NASA TLX (Hart 2006). It
eliminates the weighting process all together or weighting the subscales and then
analyzing them individually. The subjects do not have to do a pairwise ranking of the six
scales (Mental, Physical, Temporal, Frustration, Effort and Performance). The subjects
were instructed to use the GCS Variable Information Tables (VIT) as a baseline
definition

of

the

scale.

That

is,

assume

the

mental/physical/temporal/effort/frustration/performance scales for the VIT is 50%. If
that were the case, how would the other displays be rated compared to that baseline.

Figure 5.3 NASA TLX program interface (Sharek 2010)

The last section of the study session was used to complete a close-out
questionnaire about MAGE’s function and to collect open-ended verbal comments from
the SMEs. These data was comprised of the SME subjective evaluation of the DSS and
MAGE.
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5.3.3 Participants
Five current Predator Pilots (P) or Sensor Operators (SO) served as SME
participants for the DSS Usability Study. These P/SO are civilians employed by USI,
Inc. in Victorville, CA. They are former military P/SOs with operational experience,
who now flies the Predator for their employer in support of operational test and training
at Edwards AFB, CA. Furthermore, three additional P/SO SME participants were used
from WPAFB. The P/SOs were active duty or civilian contractors that were at WPAFB
for a three day system review of the Predator system. A background survey captured
each participant’s exact experience with UAV operations.

5.4 Summary
Each experiment presented in this research was carefully designed to specifically
address whether the visual thinking paradigm could be incorporated into a highly
complex, dynamic system. The first showed that the concept was sound, while the
second experiment indicated that the concept was generalizable, and finally, the third
experiment was to try to understand the barriers and hurdles of incorporating the displays
into an existing environment.
The overviews of the three experiments’ variables identified are presented in
Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6 The variables involved in the experiments
Quantitative
Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables

Experiment 1
Yes

Yes

No

Display Type

Display Type

Missions run w/ and w/o baseline
net-centric supplemental display

Questions

Questions

Rank Order

Distracter: RMS Error
centering target
Monitor Task: Accuracy

Observations

Monitor Task: Response Time

NASA TLX scores

Probe questions on current or
future state

Exit Questionnaires

Response Time1

Questions

Minimum criteria
Response Time2
Drop FoM X
Response Time3
Best Dimension Y
Response Time4
Questionnaire

Experiment 2
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Experiment 3

Think Out Loud Protocol

6 Results
6.1 Decision Aid Support Experiment
The data was comprised of answers to questions related to decision support
choices found in the three static displays presented to the operators. The decision support
questions were based on mission critical planning information called Figures of Merit
(FoM) – see Table 4.2. The data collected for this experiment used questions to ascertain
the ease of use as a decision support tool for each display. Recall that the text table
represents the current UAV display technology (circa 2007) used in a Predator Ground
Control Station (GCS) Variable Information Tables (VIT). The bar chart was chosen as a
first naive attempt at a “graphical user interface”. It is understood that these are discrete
interfaces, not integral interfaces, which is because there exist no integral interfaces for
multiple UAVs.
The displays were static images, meant to elicit quickly identified solution
patterns for the operator. The questions were designed to explore specific decisions
considered typical within a multi-UAV mission.
6.1.1 Analysis of Data
The data for the operators’ answers to the static displays were analyzed using
Statistical Analysis Tool® (SAS v 9.2) for windows. There were 24 subjects that had
three display types of twelve images with four questions each (24 subjects x 3 blocks x
12 images x 4 questions = 864 Total Observations). The operators’ responses were
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grouped and analyzed by display type (text table, bar chart and sprocket), for correctness
of answer per question type (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, Drop_Dimension, and
Best_Dimension), response time per question type and response over time (learning
curve).
6.1.1.1 Correctness
Looking at the “correctness of answer” per question data first, the generated
experiment data were examined prior to presentation to the subjects to determine the
“correct answer” to each question.

The operator’s “correctness” response was then

defined as whether the operator responded with the pre-calculated correct answer. A
correct response was assigned a value of 1 and a wrong answer was assigned a value of 0.
The sum of the correct answers was then used as a measure to determine the cognitive
ease of use for each display type – each question had a maximum score of 12 points for
correctness.
For example, the Minimum_Criteria question asks whether all of the mission
alternatives presented to the operator meet the minimum criteria on all dimensions:
(1) the possible answers are Yes or No, and (2) the correct answer is Yes (the three
mission statements are all valid). 13 Then for each operator that answered Yes, a counter
would be incremented by 1. The maximum value the counter could reach is 12, so if the

13

The Text Table and the Sprocket color coded a failure of each dimension, i.e., if the “Probability of
Success” dimension failed to reach the minimum value, then the text (pie piece) would be colored red.
For the Bar Chart, no color coding was attempted.
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final counter value was 12 (out of 12), then 100% of the subjects responded with the
correct answer. If ½ of the subjects responded correctly, then the final value would be 6
(out of 12).
The results of the one-way repeated measures ANOVA are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Tests for Correctness of Within-Subjects Question Type with Subject*Display as an Error
Term
Rank_Order
(Boolean)
Error Term
Minimum_Criteria
Error Term
Drop_Dimension
Error Term
Best_Dimension
Error Term
Rank_Order
(Levels of Correctness)
Error Term

Source
Display

DF ANOVA SS
2
66.08

Mean Square
33.042

Subject*Display
Display
Subject*Display
Display
Subject*Display
Display
Subject*Display
Display

46
2
46
2
46
2
46
2

129.92
24.69
72.64
50.78
83.22
10.75
121.92
182.25

33.042
12.347
1.579
25.389
1.809
5.375
2.650
91.125

Subject*Display

46

403.08

8.763

F Value
11.70

Pr > F
<.0001

Sig
*

7.82

0.0012

*

14.03

<.0001

*

2.03

0.1432

10.40

0.0002

*

Interpreting Table 6.1 is straight forward: For line 1, there exists a significant main effect
of Displays [F(2, 46)=11.70, p<0.0001] when judging the Rank_Order of the three
missions using simple Boolean correct/incorrect scoring. Post hoc analysis (Table 6.2)
using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than
either the Bar Chart or Text Table.
Table 6.2 Rank_Order BOOLEAN Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not
significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
B

Mean
7.17
5.38
4.96

N
24
24
24

Block
Sprocket
Bar Chart
Text Table

For line 2, Table 6.1 shows there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2,
46)= 7.82, p=0.0012] when judging the Minimum_Criteria. Post hoc analysis (Table
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6.3) using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket and Text Table were significantly
more accurate than the Bar Chart. This is most likely attributable to the color coding in
the Sprocket and Text Table displays: operators were able to immediately determine a
bad dimension without having to search the display.
Table 6.3 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not
significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
A
B

Mean
11.29
10.96
9.92

N
24
24
24

Display
Sprocket
Text Table
Bar Chart

For line 3, Table 6.1 there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 46)=
14.03, p<0.0001] when judging the Drop_Dimension question. Post hoc analysis (Table
6.4) using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than
either the Bar Chart or Text Table.
Table 6.4 Dimension_Drop Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not
significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
B

Mean
9.17
7.75
7.17

N
24
24
24

Display
Sprocket
Bar Chart
Text Table

For line 4, Table 6.1 shows NO significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 46)= 10.75,
p=0.1432] when judging the Best_Dimension.
For line 5, Table 6.1 shows there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2,
46)= 10.40, p=0.0002] when judging Rank_Order of the three missions using Levels for
correct/incorrect scoring. Post hoc analysis (Table 6.5) using the Tukey method for
multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 revealed that operator responses
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with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than either the Bar Chart or Text
Table.
Table 6.5 Rank_Order LEVELS Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not
significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
B

Mean
29.88
26.50
26.50

N
24
24
24

Block
Sprocket
Bar Chart
Text Table

Unfortunately, comparing the results of Line 1 (Rank_Order – BOOLEAN) with Line 5
(Rank_Order – LEVELS) shows no gain in the strength of the statistical analysis using
the more sophisticated measure for Rank_Order. This does not mean that the “Levels of
Correctness” is not a valid tool; just that in this circumstance it gives us nothing more.
In summary, the first three question types (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, and
Drop_Dimension) showed significant differences in the Correctness for the displays, with
the Sprocket display being either the best or tied for best display. In the last question
(Best_Dimension), there was no statistical significance in accuracy among any of the
displays.
6.1.1.2 Response Time
A two repeated measure ANOVA was used to test the main effects of display
(Text Table, Bar Chart, and Visual Sprocket) and Trial (12 images) on the operators’
response time for each question type (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, Drop_Dimension,
Best_Dimension). The next four subsections analyze these SAS ANOVA results.
Each analysis has two tables. The first of the pair has the calculated ANOVA
Sum of Squares (SS) and Mean Square of the sources of error generated by SAS: The
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sources of variance are the same for each question type. The second table has the main
effects of Display and Trial and the interaction of Display*Trial analyzed with the
appropriate corrected error.

6.1.1.2.1 Response Time for Rank_Order
The first question examines the operator’s ability to mentally rank the three
mission alternatives from best to worst based on the FoM information presented in each
display.

The operators’ response time needed to Rank_Order the alternate mission

images is analyzed.
Table 6.6 Rank_Order Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Effect
Error
Effect
Error
Effect
Error

Source
Display
Subject*Display
Trial
Subject*Trial
Display*Trial
Subject*Display*Trial

DF
2
46
11
253
22
506

ANOVA SS
98420818853
73242779526
104379784322
137651423089
52837127566
152093131835

Mean Square
49210409427
1592234338
9489071302
544076771
2401687617
300579312

F Value
30.91

Pr > F
<.0001

Sig
*

17.44

<.0001

*

7.99

<.0001

*

The main effect of Display was found to be significant:

[F(2, 46)= 30.91,

p<0.0001]. This means that the Display type used can significantly affect the speed with
which the operator interprets the ranking of the mission alternatives. The main effect of
Trial

(image

presentation

[F(11,253)=17.44, p<0.0001].

order)

was

found

to

be

significant:

Images presented at the beginning of the trial took

significantly longer to interpret than those presented at the end of the trial, irrespective of
display type. This is also known as a “learning curve”.
Examining the post-hoc Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Display
Type (Table 6.7) results for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05
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revealed that operator responses were significantly faster for the Sprocket Display
(smaller is better).
Table 6.7 Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the same letter
are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
C

Mean (Sec)
44.049
23.616
19.708

N
288
288
288

Display
Bar Chart
Text Table
Sprocket

Furthermore, examining the post-hoc Rank_Order Tukey Response Time
grouping by Image Presentation Order (Table 6.8) results for multiple comparisons with
an alpha level set to α=0.05 revealed that there was a learning effect, i.e., the numbers
started large and quickly leveled out (smaller is better). Since the order of the image
presentation was random, the learning effect was similar for each display type (generally
declining response time). However, response times for the early images showed different
levels of cognitive workload for each display type. [For one subject, the first image was
presented and then questions were asked about interpretation. These questions had been
answered in the training, but the subject’s lack of familiarity with the display resulted in
an unusually high response time for the response for the very first image presented – over
330 seconds (5.5 minutes). Replacing that data point with the mean of the subject pool
does not significantly change the results of the statistical findings: Tukey Grouping for
the Display Response Time changed from three to two groups with Text Tables and
Sprocket not being significantly different, and the Response Time Ordering for the
images goes from 1, 2, 3 to 1, 3, 2 – the groupings remain the same!]
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Table 6.8 Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means with
the same letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
BC
BCD
CDE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
E
E

Mean
60084
38708
35656
31358
26211
25612
24559
23459
22908
22380
19290
19269

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

Trial
1
2
3
5
7
4
9
6
8
11
12
10

6.1.1.2.2 Response Time for Minimum_Criteria
Next, the main effects on response time for the Minimum_Criteria were examined
(Table 6.9). As expected, the type of display had a strong statistical effect on the
response time [F(2,46)=29.86, p<0.0001]. Also as expected, the presentation of images
over time improved statistically (had a learning curve) [F(11,253)=13.27, p<0.0001].
Finally, when considering the Display_Type in conjunction with the presentation of the
images showed a statistical difference [F(22,506)=2.80, p<0.0001], implying that the
“learning curve” of the different displays was different.
Table 6.9 Minimum_Criteria Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Effect
Error
Effect
Error
Effect
Error

Source
Display
Subject*Display
Trial
Subject*Trial
Display*Trial
Subject*Display*Trial

DF
2
46
11
253
22
506

ANOVA SS
6767534790
5212332183
8748503790
15160538178
3180072529
26129051706

Mean Square
3383767395
113311569
795318526
59923076
144548751
51638442

F Value
29.86

Pr > F
<.0001

Sig
*

13.27

<.0001

*

2.80

<.0001

*

Examining the post-hoc Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by
Display Type (Table 6.10) shows the Sprocket display is considerably faster than the
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other two displays. This suggests that the Sprocket display is cognitively easier to extract
the data.
Table 6.10 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the
same letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
C

Mean
11784.6
7102.4
5107.0

N
288
288
288

Display
Bar Chart
Text Table
Sprocket

Examining the post-hoc Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by
Image Presentation Order (Table 6.11), there appears to be a learning curve irrespective
of display.

The first image takes considerably longer to process than any of the

succeeding images. This is probably due to the subject trying to interpret all of the data
on the screen without narrowing their attention to the important features. By the time the
fourth image is displayed, the relevance of specific areas within the display rose in
importance and the operator’s attention was drawn to those particular areas.
Table 6.11 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means
with the same letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
BC
BCD
BCD
BCD
CD
CD
D
D
D
D

Mean
16774
11157
9971
8099
7660
7274
6619
6259
6037
5907
5383
4838

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
11
9
8
7
10
12

6.1.1.2.3 Response Time for Drop_Dimension
The third question was an exploration into the operator’s ability to predict the
future by mentally dropping a dimension of the FoMs and then predicting which mission
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alternative was best. This was to mimic a specific operation scenario: The case in which
current mission computer information has not kept up with the real world. For example,
before the mission started, the operator might receive information giving specific
information that is not included in the mission displays. The ability of the operator to
mentally visualize the changes to the mission alternatives might be important during a
mission. This was the most cognitively difficult question, meant to explore situation
awareness Level 3 SA.
Unfortunately, display type was not found to have a significant effect on
predicting the best mission alternative. Although this is a disappointing result, the fact
that Level 3 SA errors only make up 3.3% of the total situation awareness errors (see
Section 2.1.5.3) alleviates some of the agony. Results from the other three questions
(Level 1- and 2-SA) are where the effort and results need to be concentrated.
That being said, there was a significant learning effect from the image
presentation order [F(11,253)=9.37, p<0.0001] along with a significant interaction
between the Display Type and image presentation order [F(22,506)=1.98, p<0.0001].
Table 6.12 Drop_Dimension Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Effect
Error
Effect
Error
Effect
Error

Source
Display
Subject*Display
Trial
Subject*Trial
Display*Trial
Subject*Display*Trial

DF
2
46
11
253
22
506

ANOVA SS
5446634141
42535840506
20747438607
50952518401
8351896340
97059881037

Mean Square
2723317070
924692185
1886130782
201393353
379631652
191817947

F Value
2.95

Pr > F
0.0626

Sig

9.37

<.0001

*

1.98

<.0001

*

Inspecting the post-hoc Drop_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image
Presentation Order (Table 6.13)
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Table 6.13 Drop_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means
with the same letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
AB
ABC
BC
CD
CD
CDE
CDE
CDE
CDE
DE
E

Mean
29617
28129
22428
21129
20356
20082
18437
18370
18170
17186
13517
12006

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

Trial
2
1
4
3
9
5
8
7
11
6
10
12

6.1.1.2.4 Response Time for Best_Dimension
The final question examines the operator’s ability to quickly identify the mission
alternative with the best rating for a given FoM. As expected, Table 6.14 shows there
was a statistically significant effect of display type on predicting the Best_Dimension
[F(2,46)=8.85, p=0.0006]. The image presentation order also showed a learning curve,
i.e.,

response

times

tended

to

improve

over

time

on

the

same

display

[F(11,253)=12.41, p<0.0001]. And finally, there appeared to be an interaction between
the display types and the image presentation order [F(22,506)=8.04, p<0.0001].
Table 6.14 Best_Dimension Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Effect
Error
Effect
Error
Effect
Error

Source
Display
Subject*Display
Trial
Subject*Trial
Display*Trial
Subject*Display*Trial

DF
2
46
11
253
22
506

ANOVA SS
1724807764
4483541158
5327085375
9876518757
6509883486
18626469746

Mean Square
862403882
97468286
484280489
39037624
295903795
36811205

F Value
8.85

Pr > F
0.0006

Sig
*

12.41

<0.0001

*

8.04

<0.0001

*

Looking at the individual post-hoc Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time
grouping by Display Type (Table 6.15) shows the unexpected result that the Text Table
was the fastest response time. This could be because of the presentation of pertinent
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information was proximal: once the operator found the correct column label, they did not
have to “search” beyond the column of numbers.
Table 6.15 Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the same
letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
B
C

Mean
12443.4
10539.8
8988.5

N
288
288
288

Display
Bar Chart
Sprocket
Text Table

Finally, the post-hoc Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image
Presentation Order (Table 6.16) showed a learning curve, but one that was more wildly
ordered. One expects the first image presented to have the slowest reaction time, but the
5th image was slowest (14.7 seconds) and the 10th image was in the middle of the pack
(not one of the fastest).
Table 6.16 Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means
with the same letter are not significantly different)
Tukey Grouping
A
A
AB
ABC
ABCD
ABCD
BCDE
CDE
DE
E
E
E

Mean
14669
14469
12582
12139
11612
11610
10403
8922
8808
7816
7763
7095

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

Trial
5
1
2
3
10
4
7
9
6
12
11
8

6.1.1.3 Comparison of Response Times
With regards to the first experiment, the learning curve of each question is
examined. The important features to examine are the initial values on the left (this is an
indication of how easily this display type is interpreted by an “inexperienced” operator
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for the given question) and the level to which the curve declines (an indication of how
easily the display type is interpreted for an “experienced” operator).
For the first question, Figure 6.1 illustrates the learning curves for the respective
Display Types. The Bar Chart is the most difficult to interpret for an inexperienced
operator, while the sprocket is the easiest. The Bar Chart and the Sprocket appear to
level out near the fourth round of questions, but the Sprocket is still slightly lower.

Rank_Order Learning Curve
Response Time [ms]

120000
100000
80000
60000

Text Table

40000

Bar Chart
Sprocket

20000
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Image Presentation Order

Figure 6.1 Response times for Rank_Order by Display Type

For the second question, the results were similar to the first questions learning
curves. However, the Text Table is initially more difficult for the subject to interpret
than the first question. The subjects quickly understand what the question is asking, so
they are able to anticipate the question and skim more quickly. It should be noted that the
Sprocket Display is easily understood by the subjects and has the quickest (or nearly the
quickest) response for all questions.
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Minimum_Criteria Learning Curve
Response Time [ms]

25000
20000
15000

Text Table

10000

Bar Chart

5000

Sprocket

0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Image Presentation Order
Figure 6.2 Response times for Minimum_Criteria

Dropping a Dimension is significantly more difficult than the previous two
questions, requiring the subject to mentally recalculate the “best route” based on the
information presented to them.

Drop_Dimension Learning Curve
40000
Response Time [ms]

35000
30000
25000
20000

Text Table

15000

Bar Chart

10000

Sprocket

5000
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Image Presentation Order
Figure 6.3 Response times for Drop_Dimension
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The Text Table was the quickest aid when determining the best dimension. The
learning curve is flattest and seems to be the easiest to mentally compute. That said, the
Sprocket display is not that far behind.

Best_Dimension Learning Curve
Response Time [ms]

30000
25000
20000
15000

Text Table

10000

Bar Chart
Sprocket

5000
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Image Presentation Order
Figure 6.4 Response times for Best_Dimension

Taking all four of the learning curves, the Sprocket display seems to be the easiest
to learn for three situations and is near the bottom for the fourth. This implies that the
Sprocket display is easiest to learn among these three displays.

6.2 System Monitoring Experiment
The data was comprised of answers to questions related to system monitoring of
three dynamic displays presented to the subjects. The system monitoring questions were
based on system health information – see Table 5.5.

The data collected for this

experiment used questions to ascertain the ease of use as a system monitoring tool for
each display. The text table represents an advancement of the current UAV display
technology (circa 2007) used in a Predator Ground Control Station (GCS) Variable
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Information Tables (VIT). The analog gauge was chosen as an exemplar of a current
attempt at a “graphical user interface”.
The displays were dynamic animations meant to elicit quickly identified solution
patterns for the operator. The questions were designed to explore specific decisions
considered typical within a multi-UAV mission.
The overall results expanded in the next section show that the Sprocket and
Analog Displays were significantly faster than the Text Display. On the other hand, the
Sprocket and Text Displays were significantly more accurate than the Analog Display.
This infers that if one wants both speed and accuracy, the Sprocket Display would be
preferred over the Analog and Text Displays.
6.2.1 Analysis of Data
In essence, this experiment had interesting results, not all of them expected. The
experiment examined a primary task (simulating a surveillance mission by maintaining a
target box in the crosshairs), a secondary task (simulating a system monitoring task by
responding to gauges that go out of tolerance), and probe questions that examine the
operators’ situation awareness. The data for the operators’ answers to the static displays
were analyzed using JMP® 9.0 for windows.
This experiment examined three objectively measureable facets:

(1) the root

mean square error (RMSE) of the distance from optimal surveillance for the Primary
Task; (2) the response to when a gauge went out of tolerance for the Secondary Task; and
(3) the response to SA questions presented to the operator approximately every minute.
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6.2.1.1 Primary Task Distance from Optimal – Root Mean Square Error
The primary task simulated a UAV mounted camera that constantly moved
because of swirling wind, UAV movement and a bad tracking gear.

These three

character flaws required the operator to constantly monitor and correct the camera
direction to maintain the target under the camera crosshairs.
To examine the data for the primary task, the distance from optimal position had
to be calculated and corrected. With respect to the primary task, the research examined
the root mean square error (RMSE) distance in pixels from the actual position of the
target and the optimal position, i.e., being completely within the crosshair scope. Since
the crosshair was larger than the target, the optimal position, i.e., target being fully within
the crosshairs, was a ±10 pixel range. That is, if the target is located at x=20 and y=-5, to
calculate the Euclidean distance, one had to first map the <x,y>  <ẋ,ẏ> to incorporate
the ±10 pixel range:

ẋ=floor(abs(x-x0))=floor(abs(20-10),0)=10 and ẏ=floor(abs(y-

y0))=floor(abs((-5)-10),0)=0. The final Euclidean distance uses these corrected values
< x , y >; RMSE< x , y > =

x 2 + y 2 =

102 + 02 = 10 .

With respect to the correcting the data sampling frequency, each 25 minute
experiment run could generate more than 2500 data points.

The first attempt in

processing these all of these data points created an analysis that was overwhelmed by the
denominator (used in the statistics), since the variation between each pair of points was
relatively smooth. That is, the total variability was too small over such a large number of
readings. The second attempt was to perform a running average of the data to create a

148

lower statistical denominator. This lowered the statistical denominator; but as a side
effect, the data was smoothed and again the variability was not evident. There were two
versions of this smoothing: (1) averaging every 100 points irrespective of length of run
100

time, p ′ = ∑ pn
n =1

100

; and (2) averaging every minute irrespective of number of data

points=
to be averaged, p ′

N

=
p
, where N
∑
N
n =1

n

count (ti - ti -1 ) .

The third attempt used the data point at the 60 second mark, essentially allowing
the denominator to be lowered while at the same time allowing the data to remain
unsmoothed.

The obvious side effect of ignoring most of the raw data is deemed

acceptable for the following reason. Consider the raw data to be equivalent to looking at
an object at very high resolution, such as a painting of a horse by Remington, a famous
American Painter of southwest life in the 1800s. However, a dot-to-dot drawing of a
horse by a three year old toddler is a simpler representation. Both images reveal a pattern
that can be interpreted as “horse”, but the simpler dot-to-dot image emphasizes bold
features, while Remington’s picture is appreciated for its fine detail. This simplification
is equivalent to choosing a data point at each minute. The underlying “tracking” pattern
might emerge. In other words, the coarse pattern ignores the jittery intermediate noise to
focus on the gross pattern.
Table 6.17 shows the statistical results of these snapshots. There were some
significant differences among the users, displays and their interactions. This necessitates
an investigation of the underlying causes. The fact that the subjects are significantly
different is problematic.
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Table 6.17 Primary Task Effect Tests

Post hoc analysis of the RMSE distance among the three displays shows that the
Sprocket is significantly faster than the Text Table, but it is indistinguishable from the
Analog Display. Also, that the Text table is indistinguishable from the Analog Display.
One way of interpreting this is that the subject has less mental workload on the secondary
task, thus making the primary task easier to perform.

Figure 6.5 Post hoc analysis of the RMSE distance for the three displays
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6.2.1.1.1 Primary Task Distance from Optimal (RMSE) with respect to Subject
Examining the post-hoc subjects Response Time grouping results for multiple
comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 shows that Subject 17 was unusually slow
compared to the rest of the subjects (Figure 6.6). That subject was “asleep with his eyes
open”, not reacting to the gauges.
Removing the 17th subject from the data because of its outlier status leaves a
different, more interesting picture.

Without the anomalous subject, we still have

statistically significant differences for the model [F(2,34)=2.1503, p=0.0002].

Figure 6.6 Users Least Squares Plot showing subject 17 being extremely slow.
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Furthermore, Subject 17’s anomalous behavior was so abhorrent that all other
differences among the subjects were drowned out into a wash of similarity (Figure 6.6).
Now examining the Effect Tests shows that the Display are statistically different
[F(2,32)=3.1193, p=0.0445]. Without Subject 17, there is appears to be much more
variability within the remaining subjects (Figure 6.7). However, one should note that the
y-axes are two drastically different scales in both figures. The variability would not be as
obvious if the scales were the same. The subjects with the highest values (Level A)
probably quickly decided to assign Task 2 (system monitoring) a higher priority than
Task 1 (Surveillance). The subjects with the lowest values (Level F) prioritized the
Surveillance as a higher priority than the system monitoring. Those subjects in between
either had a more balanced approach or changed priorities over time.
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Figure 6.7 Least Squares Means Plot and LSMeans Differences Tukey HSD with Subject 17 removed
as an outlier

Examining the distance over time with respect to subjects shows there are no
significant changes over time (Table 6.18). This implies that there was no changing of
priorities over time and any strategy with which a subject started was the same strategy
with which they ended the experiment.
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Table 6.18 Effects Tests of Distance over Time with respect to Subject

Just to complete this reflection on changing strategies, we examine the distance
over time with respect to the displays (Table 6.19). For a second time, there are no
apparent differences among the displays as time progressed. So once again we are left
with the conclusion that whatever strategy a subject began the experiment with was the
same one that they ended with.
Table 6.19 Effects Test of Distance over Time with respect to Display

6.2.1.1.2 Primary Task Distance from Optimal (RMSE) with respect to Display
From Table 6.17, we know that the displays are significantly different.
Examining the least squares means plot (Figure 6.8) confirms that there is a difference
between the Sprocket and Text Table, but no statistic difference between Sprocket and
Gauge and Analog Gauge and Text Table. The Sprocket is much better than the current
Text Table UI technology.
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Figure 6.8 Least Square Means of Primary Task RMSE with respect to Display

6.2.1.2 Secondary Task: Response to when a Gauge goes Out-of-Tolerance
With respect to secondary task of system monitoring, the research examined the
speed and accuracy of response. The response time was the difference in time between
the gauge going out of tolerance and the subject correcting the condition by clicking on
the gauge. Clicking on the display reset the gauge to initial conditions, and the scripted
animation would restart. Accuracy of response considered whether the user correctly
responded to an out of tolerance condition or incorrectly clicked on a gauge (error). The
two types of errors a subject could have: (1) click on gauges that were not out of
tolerance (false click); or (2) click on the same gauge twice (double click).
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6.2.1.2.1 Secondary Task Response Time
There was a statistical difference for the speed the operator responded found
among the users [F(50,5774)=569.5, p=0.0001]. And indeed, examining the effects tests
confirms that there is a significant difference among users, blocks and the interaction
between users and blocks (Figure 6.9).

Figure 6.9 Effects tests of Secondary Task Response Time

This finding appears to be very good, so we delve further into the effects (Figure
6.10). After examining the Least Means Square plot for the users, one finds that there are
a couple of peaks in an otherwise flat response time. And the Least Means Square
Differences Tukey HSD for the users confirms there are four levels of performance.
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Figure 6.10 Least Square Means of Secondary Task effects

Going back to the raw data finds some obvious strategies employed by four
subjects; namely giving very high priority to the primary task to the exclusion of the
secondary task. To verify this conclusion, a simple count of errors committed per subject
was tabulated and the results were astonishing (Figure 6.11). The top row, Missing,
shows how many responses the subject had without committing an error – typically
ranging between 300 and 400. On the other hand, the row labeled “1” represents the
number of errors committed if there were more than 100 committed. For subjects 6, 8, 13
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and 14, there appears to be a problem. Their error count was a significant proportion to
their total responses. The raw data shows that these four users reset all gauges when one
went out of tolerance so that they could concentrate on the primary task. Subject 14 hit
upon this strategy early, hence his low count for non-errors and his very high count for
errors. Subject 8 & 13 found this strategy after completing at least one run using the
“correct” strategies suggested in the preliminary instructions given to all subjects.
Finally, Subject 6 performed most of the tasks within parameters, but made an excessive
number of double clicks, i.e., he did not always wait for the first click to register with the
Windows® operating system, notoriously known for not being real-time computing.

Figure 6.11 Count of Errors for each subject in secondary task

Looking at the same count by display shows that there does not appear to be any
evidence that displays were immune to errors, but the Sprocket had the fewest.
Furthermore, the one error that occurred more frequently with the Sprocket was the
“nearest neighbor” error. In this error, the neighboring FoM pie pieces were clicked.
However, there were only 12 of these errors, which is an insignificant number when
compared to the total events (25,000+). This was probably because of the button’s
design, and can probably be programmatically corrected by disallowing clicks near the
center of the pie piece.
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Figure 6.12 Count of Errors for each display in secondary task

This discussion is to address the possibility of dropping the subjects or displays
that appear to be anomalous. Obviously that displays are not going to be the deciding
factor here, all three displays seem reasonably similar. Examining the raw data suggests
that Subject 6 was not “redefining” the parameters, but was just eager. So, running the
same tests with Subjects 8, 13, and 14 excluded finds that all of the remaining users are
indeed similar, but there is a significant difference among the displays (Figure 6.13).

Figure 6.13 Fixed Effects Tests without Subject 17 (previous sections) and Subjects 8, 13, and 14

Knowing that there is a difference in the Blocks (Displays), we examine those
effects the displays had on the model using the Least Squares Means plot and the Least
Squares Means Tukey HSD.

From these we conclude that there is a significant

difference in the response speed of the displays – the Text Table is much slower.
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Figure 6.14 Least Square Means of Secondary Task Display effects

6.2.1.2.2 Secondary Task Accuracy
When it comes to the accuracy of responding to the out of tolerance there were
two error conditions examined: double clicking and false clicking. Double clicking
typically arises from the subject observing an out of tolerance event and clicking on the
target gauge twice. This can normally be explained be two conditions: (1) the subject
double clicked because of the lag time inherent in the Java®/Windows® platforms.
There were no significant differences among the displays for all Errors [F(2, 39)=2.7503,
p<0.0750], just the Double Clicking [F(2, 39)=0.4849, p<0.6194], nor False Clicking
[F(2, 39)=2.8819, p<0.0680].
That does not mean that the errors did not affect the experiment. The number of
user generated events is the sum of the correct responses and the incorrect responses
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(Errors). In general, if there were no errors, then all to the events for the displays should
have balanced out, because of Latin Squares balancing the displays and scripts.
However, this was not the case. In fact, because of the additional clicking done for the
errors, the Analysis of Variance for the entire model revealed that there was a difference
among the displays [F(2, 39)=39.3629, p<0.0001].
The Analog Gauge had significantly higher subject initiated events than the Text
Table (Table 6.14). This means that the subjects were “busier” because they were
making errors for themselves. The significance of this is that the more errors created, the
busier the user – in interesting paradox to say the least.

Figure 6.15 LS Means Plot and LS Means Diferrences Tukey HSD for the count of Subject Initiated
Events: correct response + error response

In addition to the count, the amount of time wasted to respond for these errors has
a significant difference among the displays, [F(2, 39)=19.0048, p<0.0001]. This is the
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total amount of time that is wasted for all of the errors for a given display (Table 6.15).
In other words, if the time between the two clicks of a double click takes one second and
there were fourteen Double Click errors for the Analog Gauge display, then fourteen
seconds were wasted during this experimental run.

The amount of time wasted

performing errors is significantly less for the Text Table, while the Analog Gauge has
significantly more time wasted. This implies that when an error was made in the Text
Table, they were of short duration, while the Analog Gauge errors were of relatively long
duration.

Figure 6.16 LS Means Plot and LS Means Differences Tukey HSD for the time to respond of Subject
Initiated Events: correct response + error response

6.3 Full System Experiment: Displays within a full simulator
This experiment was performed at Wright Patterson AFB with active duty and
retired military UAV operators. The retired UAV operators were currently working as

162

subcontractors, training new UAV operators in Victor Valley, CA. The pilot experience
was 14.7±8.2 years, while the pure UAV operator experience was 8.3±4.5 years.
The software used for this experiment, MAGE, is not the official USAF simulator
software. The MAGE software is a testbed to examine next generation user interfaces in
support of command and control of multiple UAV missions. As such, the subjects were
not familiar with the operation of the software and received a 45 minute tutorial and
sample mission to familiarize them with MAGE.
Within the MAGE software were multiple new user interfaces, the Visual
Thinking Sprocket being just one. Others user interfaces included a temporal planner,
map overlays, mission timeline monitor and a planning “sandbox”. As mentioned earlier,
the subjects were instructed during training to “Think Out Loud”, verbalizing their
impressions of the system during the scenario, so that we could have some insight into
their thinking. One of the subjects, upon seeing the Visual Thinking Sprocket for the first
time, said “Wow!” Asked to elaborate, he stated that it was a “confusing looking”
display. However, the third time that the Visual Thinking Sprocket was presented to him
in the simulation he said “Oh, I get it”.
The subjects were specifically asked to subjectively rate the workload of the
different decision aids used within MAGE using NASA TLX. For task performance,
significant differences were observed over task periods (F(2,39) = 15.1133, p < .0001).
Examining the LS Means Plot and Differences Tukey HSD indicates that there is a
significant difference among the displays, with the Sprocket being significantly better
than the other displays.
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Figure 6.17 Mean Values of NASA-TLX scores for the Text, Analog and Sprocket displays

Post mission comments from the subjects indicated that the sprocket was “strange
at first, but simple to use”, “analog display was difficult to read – I had to squint”, and
“analog and text displays take up too much screen space”. These comments probably
were a major effect on the eventual ranking of the displays.

6.4 Conclusions from experiments
From the Decision Support Experiment, the Sprocket design was found to be a
faster and more accurate display as a decision aid in general.

Furthermore, the

experimental results show that the Sprocket display is generally easier to learn than either
of the other two displays. Looking back at the specific research questions originally asked
in Section 4.1., the Decision Support Experiment findings are summarized in Table 6.20.
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Table 6.20 Research questions for Decision Support Experiment: Legend – Visual Thinking
Sprocket (VTS), Bar Chart (BC) and Text Table (TT)

Research Question

Findings

Accuracy 1

Is there a significant difference in accuracy
to obtain good rank order solutions using
cognitively sensitve supervisory control of
multiple UAVs?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
VTS was significantly more accurate than
BC or TT. BC and TT were similar.
[VTS>BC=TT]

Accuracy 2

Is there a significant difference in accuracy
to determine global status information
using cognitively sensitive supervisory
control?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
VTS and TT were significantly more
accurate than BC. VTS and TT were similar.
[VTS=TT>BC]

Accuracy 3

Is there a significant difference in accuracy
to envision new solutions using mental
visualization?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
VTS was significantly more accurate than
BC or TT. BC and TT were similar.
[VTS>BC=TT]

Accuracy 4

Is there a significant difference in accuracy
to determine local status along a specific
dimension using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control?

NO

Response
Time 1

Is there a significant difference in time to
obtain good rank order solutions using
cognitively sensitve supervisory control of
multiple UAVs?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
VTS was significantly faster than TT and TT
was significantly faster than BC.
[VTS<TT<BC]

Response
Time 2

Is there a significant difference in time to
determine global status information using
cognitively sensitive supervisory control?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
VTS was significantly faster than TT and TT
was significantly faster than BC.
[VTS<TT<BC]

Response
Time 3

Is there a significant difference in time to
envision new solutions using mental
visualization?

NO: There was no significant difference
among the displays

Response
Time 4

Is there a significant difference in time to
determine local status along a specific
dimension using cognitively sensitive
supervisory control?

YES: There is a significant difference – the
TT was significantly faster than VTS and
VTS was significantly faster than BC.
[TT<VTS<BC]

The last line of each finding represents the ordering and relative statistical
findings, where the first display has the “best” mean value, and the operators < and >
refer to statistically significant differences, while the operator = means statistically
equivalent. For example, Accuracy ones findings, [VTS>BC=TT], can be interpreted as
“the VTS was significantly more accurate than BC or TT. BC and TT were similar”.
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The System Monitoring Experiment found the VTS is either the best or
statistically indistinguishable from the best display for speed and correct responses.
However, the experiment found TT had significantly fewer errors than the VTS, which
had significantly fewer errors than the AG. The color coding to the TT was probably a
large factor in this accuracy.

The System Monitoring Experiment findings are

summarized in Table 6.21.
Table 6.21 Research questions for Experiment 2: Legend – Visual Thinking Sprocket (VTS), Analog
Gauge (AG) and Text Table (TT)

Experiment

Research Question

Findings

Distracter:
Root Mean
Square Error
[RMSE]

Can the operator perform the
primary task (keeping the target
centered) better using cognitively
sensitve human supervisory
control of multiple UAVs? [RMSE]?

Yes: The VTS and AG were significantly more
accurate than the TT. There was no
significant difference in accuracy between the
VTS and AG. [VTS=AG>TT]

Monitor Task:
Accuracy

Is there a significant difference in
accuracy when monitoring out of
tolerance values?

Yes: The VTS and AG were significantly more
accurate than the TT. There was no
significant difference between the VTS and
AG. [VTS=AG>TT]

Monitor Task:
False Positive

Is there a significant difference in
false positives when monitoring
out-of-tolerance values?

Yes: The TT were fewer errors than the VTS
which in turn had fewer errors than the AG.
[TT>VTS>AG]

Response
Time

Is there a significant difference in
time to respond to out-oftolerance monitored values using
cognitively sensitive supervisory
control?

Yes: The VTS and AG were significantly faster
than the TT. There was no significant
difference between the VTS and AG.
[(VTS=AG)>(AG=TT)]

The final experiment used subject matter experts that were quite positive about
the Sprocket display. Despite the small pool of subjects, the fact that they were experts
and not enlisted college students reflects positively on the conclusions.

Here, the

question asked and answered was that the SME preferred all three modified displays over

166

the current VIT data collection system. However, they considered the Visual Thinking
Sprocket to be significantly easier to use than the Text Table or the Analog Gauge.

167

7 Research Contributions and Significance
Technological advances in propulsion, sensors, wireless communication, and
other areas allow us to have quite sophisticated UAVs.

These advances have

overwhelmed the UAV operators/supervisors with data and information. This research
presented a new model of human cognition that attempts to implement a cognitively
sensitive human-computer interface.

The interface presented information to the

operator/supervisor in a graphical format that more closely follows a visual thinking
paradigm.
Perhaps the most important contribution is a simple three step practical design
loop for the implementation of UIs, which was in turn used to design and assess the
displays used in this experiment (Table 7.1).

WHAT
information
needs to be
presented?

ASSESS
the display
design success

HOW
is the
information to
be presented?
Figure 7.1 Iterative process to designing a display (copied from Figure 1.1)
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This simple, yet elegant framework can be used by a researcher or programmer to
guide the steps of developing a UI that is cognitively sensitive. Just like McNeese’s
research framework guides the researcher through the necessary steps but does not dictate
the tools to be used, this framework guides the designer through the necessary steps
(what, how and assess), and the underlying tools are those available to the designer (user
modeling, NDM, semiotic analysis, VT, SA, etc.)

This framework encourages an

iterative spiral design methodology that is easy to milestone.
Secondly, the use of visual thinking features when designing a display was shown
to be a viable option. The Sprocket design was found to be either best or tied for best in
almost all statistical measurements. Because the Visual Thinking Sprocket is cognitively
sensitive, the operator was able to identify patterns quickly and efficiently, especially
obvious in the decision support experiment. The interpretation of difficult data was not
mentally taxing, but was grasped quickly.
This research showed that the Sprocket was effective in the UAV domain, and by
extension it can be reasonably assumed that the sprocket may be effective in the decision
aid and system monitoring family of problems.
The Operator Function Model was found useful helping to develop the Semiotic
Analysis in a systematic manner that was computationally implemented and evaluated.
This means that development of operator models can help in semiotic analysis, because
Semiotic Analysis suggests that signs should be put into cultural reference. In this case,
the culture is UAV operators. Understanding the culture through the OFM assisted in
applying that semiotic analysis to the UAV operator culture.
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Furthermore, one of the side effects of the Naturalistic Decision Making
interviews was designed extensibility in the Visual Thinking Sprocket. Because of the
UAV culture, different levels of bureaucracy had different requirements. For example,
the Secretary of the Air Force may mandate certain Figures of Merit (FoM), such as a
calculated Probability of Success. At the same time, the UAV constructor might require
a FoM that indicates the wind speed because of possible stall conditions. Similarly, the
wing commander might require a specific FoM and the operator might desire yet another
FoM. The higher levels of bureaucracy FoMs could not be altered by the lower levels.
The Visual Thinking Sprocket is designed to be flexible, allowing between five and
twenty FoMs. Besides adding mandatory FoMs, each level of bureaucracy can also
affect the assigned weights.
Besides this reason for the flexibility, the domain is complex and evolving. FoMs
that were considered important previously might not be important now. For example, a
No Fly Zone (NFZ) might have been imposed for political reasons that may eventually be
removed by diplomacy. The Sprocket’s old NFZ FoM can now be removed at the
command center. The two sprockets used in this research had six and eight FoMs,
respectively.
This research provided useful insights into human decision making in complex
systems. It examined multiple user interfaces: tabular text-based, graphical bar charts,
analog dials and visual thinking sprockets. The text tables were similar to the standard
user interface used in the Predator’s UAV ground control station VIT. These tables are
long, tedious and required a hardcopy, with the potential of easily misinterpreting the
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data. The bar charts and analog dials are a readily available graphics format that could
very easily be implemented in an attempt to create a “visual” interface. Finally, the
visual thinking widget was developed to present the data to the operator in a format easily
interpreted by the operator.
This research also introduced a method to extract multiple levels of “correctness”
for a rank order selection. Traditional research presents the results of the rank ordering as
either correct or incorrect. This research presented a simple method to expand the
incorrect ranking into multiple levels of wrongness. Since a three-way rank order has six
permutations and only one absolutely correct, we examined a method to expand the five
remaining permutations into three levels of “wrongness” or “less correct”.
Besides the “Correctness” of answers, the Response Time needed to be examined.
This led to a discussion of when to choose the better display. If two displays are being
considered (A and B) and both of them are new displays, then the implementation of one
over the other is straight forward. There are nine possibilities shown in Table 7.1. Tie
breakers can be personal preference, program requirements, coin flip, etc.
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Table 7.1 Simplified Decision Matrix when choosing between two displays, - means same
Display A
Correctness
Response Time
Better
Better
Better
Better
-

Display B
Correctness
Response Time
Better

Better
Better

Better
Better
-

-

Better
Better
Better
-

Result
Strong A
Strong B
Tie
Tie
Prefer A
Prefer A
Prefer B
Prefer B
Tie

Decision
Display A
Display B
Weighted Decision
Weighted Decision
Display A
Display A
Display B
Display B
Weighted Decision

However, if one of the displays is the current existing display, then tradeoffs have
to be considered; hence the weighted decision in Table 7.1. The expense of replacing an
existing display with a new display must balance cost in acquisition, deployment and
training. Furthermore, the cost of overcoming the human nature to avoid change when a
current solution “works” needs to be addressed in an objective manner.
In the case of this research, no standard display exists.

If one display is

significantly faster but not statistically different in “Correctness”, it still might be prudent
to change to the faster display. Faster display is the mean response time for each display
type. The designer of the decision support system may weigh a bracketing of the speed
more important than the mean response time.
Mathematically, the expanded decision rules needed to objectively determine
which Display Type to choose are given by
n

(

= max ∑ w1Correcti + w2 µ ResponseTimei + w3σ ResponseTime i
Decision
i =0

)

Where µ and σ are the statistical mean and standard deviation, and w is their associated
weights. The final decision is a linearly weighted sum of the response times.
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This discussion was prompted by the results of the second experiment, in which
the Sprocket design was the best or tied for best display.

Since this research was

supported by a for profit company, recommendations needed to be presented to the
customer. Hence the decision table in Table 7.1. Using this decision table, the clear
preference is the Sprocket Display.
Although the Visual Thinking Sprocket shows promise, further research is
necessary to examine its limitations. The Visual Thinking Sprocket was implemented as
a web applet, and it was animated by the WeatherBug.com data feed, thus showing a
moderate amount of generic appeal. However, this was by no means a complex, time
sensitive domain. The design of the bar chart display was limited by the standard Java®
graphics library. Designing the bar chart display from scratch may have affected the
results with respect to accuracy and speed. However, the Java® library is optimized,
while our display was not and the Visual Thinking Sprocket was still faster.
Furthermore, screen metrics comparing the absolute screen space needed by the
various displays should be performed. While the Visual Thinking Sprocket can be
resized dynamically, the “readability” of the displays may limit the minimum size. The
Analog Gauges were made as large as possible to allow eight FoMs, but still had
readability issues. This interaction of readability and size must be researched further.
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Appendix A – Experiment 1: Data Displayed in Three
Templates
The following pages illustrate the three template versions displayed. The first
page was used in the Training Slide to give the subjects a sample of the same data
displayed in the three templates – Bar Chart, Tabular and Visual Thinking Sprocket.
The top figure illustrates the bar chart template of the data. If we look at the first
bar chart, the dimension/axis name is called “Survivability” and represents the probability
of survival. The label on the right reports directionality of the dimension – either the
largest bar is best (illustrated by the ↑ arrow) or the smallest bar is best (illustrated by the
↓ arrow). In this experiment, the first dimension is the only one in which largest is best.
The label beneath each chart reports the weighting of each dimension. The Survivability
dimension has a weighting factor of 40%, while the Defense Network Tracks only has a
weighting of 9%. On each vertical axis is the range of interest for each dimension. For
each of the probability dimensions the range is held constant between [0.0 .. 1.0].
Otherwise, the upper limit was automatically generated by the charting program
(Microsoft Excel® 2007). The final chart, EW Track Radar Probability of Detection, has
the Legend for all of the charts – Blue is Route 1, Green is Route 2, Yellow is Route 3,
and Red is the Criterion. Examining the Survivability bar chart tells the operator that
bigger bars are better, all three routes surpass the criteria and Route 1 has the best
probability of survival.
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The second template illustrating the layout of the data is the Tabular form. The
top row states the columnar headings: Weighting (of each dimension), the Figure of Merit
(dimension), Route 1, Route 2, Route 3, Criterion (for each dimension), and directionality
(whether higher numbers are better [+] or lower numbers are better [-]). Any values
within the route columns that are black have exceeded the criterion, while those in red did
not exceed the criterion.
Finally, the third template makes the same information available in the Visual
Thinking Sprocket. Each pie slice is labeled with its dimension name for each route.
Each dimension is normalized to be the same diameter. The directionality is fixed so that
the best possible value always is on the edge of the sprocket, i.e., large is always best.
The weighting of each dimension is illustrated by the arc of the pie slice. The criterions
for all of the dimensions are normalized to the same radius and are represented by the red
circle. Any dimension that exceeds its criterion is colored blue, while those that fail are
pink/red.
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Appendix B – comments for experiment 1
The following comments are correctly transcribed from the subjects
questionnaires on experiment one. [ ] indicate difficult terms to interpret or read in the
handwriting.
Any comments about the Text Table block of the experiment?
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

Very easy to distinguish between close choices. The red was also very helpful.
Since certain criteria were weighted it differently, four missions with similar
numbers or number of failures it became difficult sometimes to distinguish which
option was best. I almost wanted to multiply the row data by their weights and
some the results to get a better feeling of what was REALLY best.
This was a little better than the bar graphs and those deficiencies were coded in
red, but it was still hard to compare the routes while taking into account the
different weights. No, the tables are not comfortable. They gave me [a]
headache.
A lot of comparing each and looking but all on tables… Better than the bar one.
Need to look at them, but not too bad.
It would help to invert probability of survival to match the others (lower is better).
The table lacked a sense of scale. His hard to tell how bad things are except in
reference to the criterion.
When all of the three routes are possible it takes time looking at the table and
deciding which is the best route.
Any comments about the Bar Chart block of the experiment?

•

•

•
•
•

Making the Headings match the question would make it easier to read /
understand. Charts were very confusing. Color coding was helpful, but
somewhat overwhelming.
If survivability were replaced by “probability of loss” so that it went the same
way you would have been helpful. Also, I think of the routes in reference to their
color rather than number. Waiting is difficult in this format.
This was very confusing and time consuming.
It’s hard to come up with a decision. It’s slightly confusing.
Tedious compare to the other two.
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•

•

•

•
•

•
•

It was easy to understand, but all those best choices per chart seemed to blend
together, so that some right choices are very hard to choose between. The color
was very helpful in choosing between the routes.
Deftly the most difficult to decipher as far as total merit. It might be the easiest to
decipher for a single value, however. To determine the “best” mission route I was
left and basically deciphering of each category was a pass / fail and counting the
number of failures. Probably not the best approach, but I couldn’t think of any
easier / better way.
A lot more difficult than the sprocket. It was hard to remember that on
survivability hire is better but lower as better on the other two. He was also
difficult to factor in weights since the bars did not change and thickness or area to
reflect a change in wait.
When lower values were better, the difference of the values with the largest
values should be displayed instead of the values themselves!
There’s a lot to think about when reading it. I have to look at each one again and
again to answer the question. Need to recognize if higher is better or which one is
which. There are also 7-8 bar graphs to look at.
Weighting factor was not represented properly.
It was difficult to read the data off the bar chart. You had to keep looking / staring
at the charts and thinking of different alternatives. It was quite tedious, also when
compared to the other two (Sprocket & Text Table).
Any comments about the Sprocket block of the experiment?

•
•

•
•
•

•

And bigger size of sprocket and probably use separate color instead of think has a
son something carry as difficult a notice (as in values which were very small).
This was the best thing to make quick decisions. It was easy to see the most
important and easy to understand the criteria. I think I did the best on this. I think
it is a good idea to use the same (highest / lowest is better) because it takes extra
time to think cool weather that one should be higher or lower. It's not hard, but
it's an extra hoop to jump through.
Difficult to notice small differences quickly but easy for large.
Easy to quickly determine the relative values of each of the parameters and the all
overall weighted area.
There are only three circles instead of so many bars. It was easier to read, see,
and understand. Taking something out of which one is better – this allows me to
just take a look and not have to rethink the graphs.
It would be good if read was used in place of thinking. Red is always associated
with danger and it's kind of always known for danger everywhere.
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•

•

•
•

The ascending or descending order of criteria is important like probability of
survival, etc. [min/max] but for a [non pilot] plane doesn't matter, but is confusing
at first to make decision as an engineer (mechanical) safety came into mind first.
It is easier to make a quick decision when all mission options are coated the same
(more is better). Text for samTracking overlaps the pink area so was hard to
distinguish. Although this was the easiest, it helps to have numbers available
when they are close in value.
It's very clear and helpful.
I believe it is easy to identify the route and is not confusing. Gives the user quick
decision-making ability.
Any comments about the overall experiment?

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Very interesting experiment. The sprocket reduces the decision-making time by a
large extent compared to the [Text] Table and Bar Chart.
The table decision data was the best according to me and was pretty fast and easy
to understand. The color coding of the bar chart was a little bit confusing though.
Good experiment. I would've thought the bar chart would be best.
I really like the sprocket idea as it gives a clear and easy visual cue by using
volume to quantify "strength".
Very good test.
I like this experiment. This pretty good. I would like to participate, if such set of
experiments are held in [the] future.
It's hard for me to read the bar chart. Because the number [were crossed out???].
The sprocket is the way to go! Bar graph is not useful at all. I believe the bar
graph is actually a step backward from the data table.
I had bargained tables first and then finally [the] sprocket. It is sometimes
difficult to come out of state of mind that bigger is always better.
The bar chart was the difficult one and it took a lot of time. [I] felt a little strain
doing that. The sprocket was more handy with everything pictured. In bar chart,
you had to come back again to the different charts when comparing routes.
Visual learning has always been my preferred method of learning and this kind of
proves that.
Went smoothly, but you need to get a new projector without the lack of color
option.
Nice work.
It [is] a good one and the sprocket comes out as a clear winner.
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